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CICERONIS

LAELIUS SIVE DE AMICITIA

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

ST. GEORGE W. Joseph STOCK, M.A.

PEMBROKE COLLEGE, OXFORD

PART I.—INTRODUCTION AND TEXT

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PREFACE

In preparing this edition of the Laelius I have had in view the wants of a University student, who may be supposed to take an intelligent interest, not only in the grammatical, but in the literary, historical, and philosophical aspects of the books he reads. Baiter's text has been followed, with a few variations which have been mentioned in the notes.

The idea of uniting in one table the pedigrees of the Aemilii Pauli and Scipiones is derived from Mr. Sidgwick's edition of this dialogue; so also are a few apt renderings, which are acknowledged in their place. Beyond this I have no obligations to record to my predecessors, having thought that the attempt at a fresh treatment was the best justification for editing an already well edited book.

My thanks are due to Mr. Evelyn Abbott for his indefatigable labour in revision; to Mr. A. C. Clark, Fellow of Queen's College, for having sent me the proof-sheets of his valuable recension of the Harleian MS.; and to Mr. Christopher Phillips, Scholar of Brasenose, who was kind enough to arrange the Index to the Notes.

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. *Greatness of Cicero.*

ALL Rome is summed up for us in Cicero. He united in his one person the diverse characters of statesman, orator, lawyer, general and priest. These, however, were but the ordinary attributes of the Roman princeps, who had to be equipped at all points, having the world to govern as well as to conquer. But beyond all this Cicero was the greatest literary man that Rome, or perhaps the world, has ever seen. He freed his countrymen from the reproach of being conquered in genius by those whom their arms had conquered[1]. To say nothing now of eloquence, in which he was supreme, he was Rome's philosopher, moralist and logician; he was its greatest literary critic; he was its theologian and metaphysician; he was its writer on rhetoric and the art of oratory; he was its exponent of political and legal philosophy; he was its model of epistolary elegance; and, to crown all, he was its wit, upon whom all stray jokes were fathered[2].

§ 2. *Value of his writings.*

Would we realise the amount of our debt to Cicero, let us consider for a moment how great our loss would be if his works

[1] 'Qui effecit ne, quorum arma viceramus, eorum ingenio vinceremur.' —Vel Pat. II, 34, § 3.

[2] Ep. Fam. VII, 32, § 1, IX, 16, § 4, XV, 21, § 2. Cicero's witticisms were published in three books by his freedman Tiro, or somebody else, of whom Quintilian (VI, 3, § 5) complains that he did not exercise

were suddenly to be blotted out. We should have lost, to begin with, a very large part of the prose literature of Rome. But our loss would not be merely one of quantity. We should be without what all after ages have agreed to recognise as the highest achievements of human language. And then to think how great would be our incidental and collateral loss! We should be deprived of our chief source of information on the early poetry of Rome: for Cicero quotes Naevius and Ennius and their successors for their power or pathos, whereas subsequent writers quote them chiefly for the sake of some archaic expression or curiosity of construction. We should have lost our most original authority on questions of early Roman law; we should have lost a vast fund of historical anecdote and a most important contribution to our knowledge of the Roman constitution; we should have lost also the secret history of one of the most critical periods in the annals of the world[1]; and lastly we should have lost the main source of our knowledge of Greek thought during the three centuries after Aristotle.

§ 3. *Cicero as a philosopher.*

It is under this last aspect alone that we have now to speak of the works of Cicero. We must remember that he figured to after ages as the Roman Plato[2]. It was he alone who endeavoured, as his great predecessor had done, to wed strength of reason to beauty of style, and once more to make the dialogue the vehicle of philosophical instruction. When he found that his practical energies were being denied their scope by one of those changes in the political order of things which his reading of Plato had led him to expect[3], he threw himself heart and soul into the

sufficient discrimination. It was perhaps from this work that Macrobius extracted his chapter on the jokes of Cicero, Sat. II, 3.

[1] See what Cornelius Nepos says on the historical importance of the letters to Atticus (Life of Atticus, ch. 17).

[2] Lact. Div. Inst. I, 15—'M. Tullius, qui non tantum perfectus orator, sed etiam philosophus fuit; siquidem solus exstitit Platonis imitator.'

[3] 'Id enim ipsum a Platone philosophiaque didiceram, naturales esse quasdam conversiones rerum publicarum, ut eae tum a principibus tenerentur, tum a populis, aliquando a singulis.'—De Div. II, § 6.

study of philosophy, which had always had charms for him, and which he had kept up through life in intervals of leisure. In this way he thought he would continue best to serve his country, if through his efforts he could spread a taste for philosophy and reclaim the manners of the age. Fired with this ambition, he embarked with fresh energy on his magnificent and long-cherished design of imitating the encyclopaedic method of an Aristotle or a Theophrastus, and rendering Greek philosophy superfluous to his countrymen [1].

§ 4. *His works on rhetoric and oratory.*

The study of rhetoric had been treated by the Peripatetic school as a branch of philosophy. To that Cicero had contributed when he was quite young [2] the De Inventione, which he afterwards despised as a mere schoolboy exercise. This had subsequently (B. C. 55) been glorified into the De Oratore, as the wood of the pear-tree is transformed into the pear [3]. The De Oratore had been followed up some nine or ten years later (B. C. 46 or 45) by the Orator. To the same range of subject belongs the De Optimo Genere Oratorum, which is the preface to a lost translation by Cicero of the speech of Aeschines against Ctesiphon and of Demosthenes De Corona; also the De Partitione Oratoria, which is a sort of catechism of rhetoric, and as purely technical as the De Inventione; and thirdly the Topica, a free adaptation from the work of Aristotle, written for the benefit of the lawyer Trebatius, when Cicero was on a sea voyage in B. C. 44. The Brutus, which was written in B. C. 46, before the Orator, completes the series by a comprehensive history of Roman oratory. Here then we have one department of philosophical disquisition, in which Cicero need fear comparison with no other writer in the world. For here he is on his own ground, and is dilating on a subject, of which long practice joined to natural gifts had made him the most consummate master.

[1] De Div. II, § 5.
[2] Perhaps in B. C. 86 at the age of 20.
[3] De Orat. I, § 5; Ep. ad Fam. I, 9, § 23.

§ 5. *His philosophical works.*

Another well-defined department of speculative inquiry, in which Cicero combined theory with practice[1], was political philosophy. This subject had been amply dealt with by Plato and Aristotle and Theophrastus. Accordingly Cicero must have his treatment of it too. He had accomplished this design as early as the year B.C. 54, when, as he afterwards flattered himself, he was still holding the helm of the state[2]. In that year we find him engaged on the arduous task—'spissum sane opus et operosum' is his own description of it[3]—of composing his six books De Republica. But Plato, who was in all things Cicero's model, had followed up his Republic at some later date by a treatise on Laws. Cicero, therefore, at some later period did the same, and composed his three books De Legibus. This work, however, appears not to have been published during the author's lifetime. The Cato, which was published in B.C. 46, and answered by Caesar in his Anticato[4], is reckoned by Cicero among his philosophical works, as being philosophy teaching by example[5]. Along with it, as belonging to the hortatory species of composition, we may class the Consolatio and the Hortensius, both published in B.C. 45, and both unfortunately lost. In the former he sought to soothe his sorrow for the death of his daughter Tullia[6], by applying the consolations of philosophy; the latter was an exhortation to the study of the subject. To the power of this last work we have the enthusiastic testimony of St. Augustine, to whose spiritual nature it gave the first impulse[7]. These three may be said to

[1] De Rep. I, § 13.

[2] 'Quos tunc scripsimus, quum gubernacula reipublicae tenebamus.' —De Div. II, § 3.

[3] Ad Q. Frat. II, 12, § 1; ad Att. IV, 16, § 2.

[4] Tac. Ann. IV, 34; Quint. I, 5, § 68; Juv. VI, 388; Aul. Gell. IV, 16, § 8.

[5] De Div. II, 1, § 3.

[6] T. D. III, § 70, IV, § 63; Aug. De Civ. Dei XIX, 4; Lact. Div. Inst. I, 15.

[7] Conf. III, 4—'Viluit mihi repente omnis vana spes, et immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam aestu cordis incredibili; et surgere

constitute a trilogy of ἐπιτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι. The same year saw the publication of the Academica in its twofold shape, and of the De Finibus. In the first of these, which has come down to us in a mutilated form, Cicero undertook the defence of that school of philosophy to which he had devoted himself from his boyhood[1], regarding it as a return from dogmatism to the modest unassumingness of Socrates[2]; in the second he lets all the schools have their say and countersay on the capital question of the end of life. As a fitting pendant to these more strictly philosophical works we have the charming Tusculanae Disputationes, published in the next year (B. C. 44), in which Cicero in his own person lectures on the eternal themes of the contempt of death, the endurance of pain, the alleviation of sorrow, the control of the passions, and the all-sufficiency of virtue to a happy life. These three treatises were followed by another well-defined trilogy on theological subjects—the De Naturâ Deorum, the De Divinatione, and the De Fato, all published in the same year, B. C. 44. It might seem by this time that there was nothing left to write upon: but the fecundity of Cicero was not thus to be checked. The public of Rome were immediately presented with another trilogy on outlying subjects of philosophy. This consisted of the Cato Maior or De Senectute, the Laelius or De Amicitia, and the lost De Gloria, which were also published in B. C. 44. Before the close of the same year of stupendous literary activity there appeared the De Officiis, the last, and in some respects the greatest, of Cicero's larger philosophical works, which was composed amid all the distractions of his contest with Antony. It was not, however, absolutely his last effort in philosophy. That was the Topica, which has been already spoken of: so that Cicero's career as a philosophical

coeperam ut ad te redirem.' He goes on to say that the merit of the book lay in the fact that it did not exhort one to embrace the tenets of this or that sect, but to follow truth for its own sake. Yet he is ungrateful enough to say of Cicero—'cuius linguam fere omnes mirantur, pectus non ita.'

[1] See De Inv. II. § 10.

[2] De Inv. II, § 1; T. D. II, § 4; Acad. Post. I, § 17; De Div. II, § 150.

writer ended, as it began, with the technicalities of rhetoric. Two minor works, however, have still to be mentioned in this context, the fragmentary translation of the Timaeus of Plato, of which we know from the preface that it was composed after the Academica, and the Paradoxa Stoicorum, a mere *jeu d'esprit*[1], written in B.C. 46, some time after the Brutus and before the Cato.

§ 6. *Fecundity of Cicero's genius.*

This brief review of Cicero's philosophical writings has been made with a view to assigning its proper position in the series to the treatise with which we are specially concerned, namely, the Laelius or De Amicitia: but we cannot make it without marvelling at the prodigious, one might almost say, feverish activity of our author. Cicero's genius was never dimmed by age. During the greater part of his life he was immersed in the pursuits of ambition and the requirements of the forum. It was not till after the age of fifty that he seriously began his career as an author. With the exception of the De Inventione, which his mature judgment discarded, all the works of which we have been speaking were produced within the space of eleven years. From the year B.C. 55 in which the De Oratore first saw the light, his production went on in a crescendo scale, until it culminated in the amazing fertility of the year B.C. 44, which witnessed the publication in rapid succession of the Tusculan Disputations, the De Naturâ Deorum, the Cato Maior, the De Divinatione, the De Fato, the Laelius, the De Gloria, the De Officiis, and the Topica. Truly in this year Cicero wrote as if he had an instinct that his time was short!

§ 7. *Date of the Laelius.*

With regard to the precise date of the Laelius relatively to the other publications of the same year, we know that it came after the Cato Maior[2], the De Divinatione, and perhaps the

[1] 'Ego vero illa ipsa, quae vix in gymnasiis et in otio Stoici probant, ludens conieci in communes locos.'—Prooemium, § 3.

[2] This had been sent to Atticus before the 11th of May, B.C. 44, for Cicero, writing on that date, says—'legendus mihi saepius est "Cato

De Fato, but before the De Officiis. The book itself contains a reference (§ 4) to the companion treatise on Old Age, which, like it, was addressed to Atticus. On the other hand the De Officiis contains a reference to the Laelius [1]. That it was written after the De Divinatione appears from the fact that in the preface to the second book of that treatise Cicero gives us a list of his philosophical works, so far as they had yet appeared, and while anticipating the appearance of the De Fato says nothing about the Laelius. Whether the Laelius was written before or after the two books De Gloria cannot, so far as I know, be determined [2].

§ 8. *Title of the treatise.*

The proper title of the treatise is Laelius, not De Amicitia, as it is so generally called. In proof of this we may cite the words of Cicero himself in the De Officiis—'Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius,' or, if the genuineness of the last clause be attacked, as it has been, we may fall back on Aulus Gellius (XVII, 5, § 1), who says—'M. Cicero in dialogo, cui titulus est Laelius vel de amicitia.' Cicero, after the manner of Plato, sometimes named his dialogues after one of the principal interlocutors. Thus his account of Roman oratory is named Brutus [3], his treatise on old age is named Cato Maior [4]; his exhortation to philosophy is named Hortensius [5], being an answer to that orator's disparagement of the subject; and the second book of the earlier edition of the Academica is named Lucullus, under which name it is sometimes cited. 'De Amicitia' is the sub-title of our dialogue, indicating the nature of the subject-matter, just as the Brutus is called De Claris Oratoribus, the Cato Maior De Senectute, the Consolatio De Luctu Minuendo [6],

maior" ad te missus; amariorem enim me senectus facit.' Ad Att. XIV, 21, § 3.

[1] 'Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est [qui inscribitur Laelius].'—De Off. II, § 31.

[2] The passage of the De Officiis just quoted goes on—'nunc dicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri.'

[3] De Div. II, § 4.

[4] Lael. § 4; Ad Att. XIV, 21, § 3.

[5] De Div. II, § 1.

[6] Ad Att. XII, 20.

and the Hortensius De Philosophia. The sub-title might be used in place of the title of a book, and was naturally often so employed when any stress was meant to be laid upon the nature of the contents. When Cicero in the De Divinatione is enumerating his philosophical works he does not use the name Cato Maior, but talks of 'liber is quem ad nostrum Atticum de senectute misimus [1].' There is, however, in this passage a definite reason for refraining from employing the proper title of the work, namely the desire to avoid confusion, since in the very next sentence Cicero speaks of his panegyric on Cato Uticensis under the title of 'Cato.' It was to distinguish it from this work that the 'maior' was added to the name of the treatise on old age.

We have spoken already of the actual date of composition of our dialogue. But in a work of imagination like this two other dates have to be taken into account, namely, the supposed date of the occurrence of the dialogue and the supposed date of its narration.

§ 9. *Cicero's respect for history.*

In respect of the historical setting of his dialogues Cicero presents a strong contrast to Plato. The Greek had dwelt in the world of ideas until facts had become to him mere counters to play with, not coins to use; his dialogues are the despair of commentators who seek to run a nail through these gossamer webs and pin them down to the world of reality; he does not mind making Socrates discourse on facts which took place long after he was dead: there was Socrates, and there were facts—why not see how the one would deal with the other? The Roman on the other hand, with his national respect for reality, has a strongly developed historical conscience; he binds himself down under stringent laws of time, place and circumstance; his characters must refer to no events or persons, with which they could not be supposed as a matter of fact to be acquainted [2].

[1] De Div. II, § 3.

[2] Ad Att. IV, 16, § 2—'sed nosti genus dialogorum meorum: ut in oratoriis, quos tu in caelum fers, non mentio potuit fieri cuiusquam ab iis, qui disputant, nisi eius qui illis notus aut auditus esset.'

§ 10. *Dramatic date of the dialogue.*

In the choice of both these imaginary dates Cicero has displayed exquisite literary art. What more striking or pathetic occasion could he have chosen on which to make Laelius discourse on friendship than a few days after the death of Africanus (§ 3), when Rome was still convulsed with the news and with the dark suspicions which attached to it? This event took place in B.C. 129, just after the celebration of the 'feriae Latinae.' There had been a day of great excitement in the senate, during the time that Carbo was carrying on the traditions of Tiberius Gracchus. Scipio had been escorted home by a crowd of senators and Italian allies, whose interests he had espoused as against that of the popular party in the city. He had gone to bed with his tablets beside him, on which he meant to compose a speech to be delivered the next day. In the morning he was dead. No inquiry was ever made, but Cicero was satisfied that he was murdered[1]. And so Laelius was deprived of his lifelong companion, and left only with the memory of his friendship to console him. Allowing Laelius a short interval to overcome the effects of natural emotion—he had not attended the usual meeting of the College of Augurs on the next nones, for which ill-health was pleaded as an excuse (§ 8)—Cicero introduces the Roman sage, in all the dignity of his chastened sorrow, discoursing to his sons-in-law on the theme of friendship, of which he had himself been the brightest example.

§ 11. *Supposed date of narration.*

Thirty-eight years later, when one of these sons-in-law, Q. Mucius Scaevola, the augur, was an old man, Cicero, at the age of sixteen, was introduced to him by his father, in order that he might imbibe a knowledge of law by listening to the answers that he gave to his clients[2]. The connexion thus begun continued until the old man's death, which did not take place until some years later. Scaevola was of a gay[3] and chatty disposition,

[1] See Notes, § 12, *c*, *d*.

[2] Brut. § 306.

[3] 'ioculatorem senem,'—Ad Att. IV, 16, § 3.

and was fond of speaking of his famous father-in-law[1]. What more likely than that his thoughts would revert to him in B.C. 88, when all the town was talking of the rupture of friendship which had just taken place between one of the consuls of the year, Q. Pompeius, and the great orator, P. Sulpicius Rufus, who had recently obtained the tribuneship? Rome had good reason to remember the severance of this friendship, for it was the precursor of the fatal feud between Marius and Sulla. The circumstances of the times therefore might be supposed to lend a special interest to the words of the old man and impress them upon the mind of the youthful Cicero, who was one of the half-circle of intimate friends, whom he addressed from his arm-chair.

§ 12. *The Laelius a work of imagination.*

Thus dexterously does Cicero sustain the illusion that the words which follow are those of Laelius, and not of himself, so dexterously indeed that his simple-hearted biographer Middleton, whose mind was as wholly dominated by Cicero's as Boswell's was by Johnson's, takes it all in good faith, and thinks that the piece must needs 'affect us more warmly' when we find that it exhibits 'the real characters and sentiments of the best and greatest men of Rome.' But we have no reason to suppose that the sentiments are derived from any other source than those Greek models, whom Cicero imitated. Cicero could make Cato talk 'more learnedly than he himself was wont,' and could put into the mouth of a Catulus, a Lucullus and a Hortensius metaphysical disputations which he himself admits they would never have dreamed of uttering[2]. No man's conversation, however eminent he may be, is preserved for a period of eighty-five years before it is committed to writing: but that is the interval between the dramatic and the actual date of the dialogue.

§ 13. *The elder Scipio and Laelius.*

In the introductory letter to Atticus, whichis prefixed to the

[1] De Orat. II, § 23.

[2] 'Haec Academica, ut scis, cum Catulo, Lucullo, Hortensio contu-

Laelius, Cicero speaks of the authority that is imparted to a discourse by attaching to it the name of some ancient and illustrious person. Now there are no names in all the annals of Rome, which are at once so great and so intimately intertwined as those of Scipio and Laelius, and therefore none so well adapted to serve the purpose of Cicero in connexion with this work. It is a strange freak of chance that both in the second and in the third Punic War there should have been a Scipio and a Laelius, each pair united in the strictest bond of friendship. The elder Scipio Africanus was an altogether surprising and phenomenal person, whom the efforts of others as well as of himself have combined to raise above the standard of common humanity. He first bursts upon us in the pages of Livy at the battle of the Ticinus (B. C. 218), where he is said to have saved his father's life, though the historian knows all the time that it was a Ligurian slave who did so [1]. Then we have him waving his sword over the head of Metellus and the other young nobles, when they were on the point of abandoning their country in despair after the battle of Cannae (B. C. 216) [2]. Next we find him elected curule aedile (B. C. 212) when under full age, and cowing the opposition of the tribunes with the remark that 'he was old enough to be aedile, if all the Quirites thought him so [3].' All this before the age of twenty-four, at which he was unanimously appointed to the command in Spain (B. C. 211) [4]! Here he figures as a sort of Moses, before whom the sea retreats to enable him to capture New Carthage (B. C. 210) [5], and as a second Joseph, superior to all the passions and pleasures of youth [6]. His triumphant career in Spain is followed by the romantic episode of his visit to Syphax in Africa, where he is entertained at the same table with his enemy Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, and impresses even foes by his marvellous affability and by the majesty of his presence [7]. Finally

leram. Sane in personas non cadebant. Erant enim λογικώτερα, quam ut illi de iis somniasse unquam viderentur.'—Ad Att. XIII, 19, § 5.

[1] Livy XXI, 46, § 8.
[2] XXII, 53.
[3] XXV, 2, §§ 6, 7.
[4] XXVI, 18, § 7.
[5] XXVI, 45, § 7.
[6] XXVI, 49, 50; Aul. Gell. VII, 8.
[7] Livy XXVIII, 18, § 4.

'stans prima in puppi,' like Aeneas,[1] he invokes the powers of land and sea, and spreads his sails for Carthage, to be crowned with victory over the world's greatest general at Zama. Throughout all this astonishing career the elder Laelius plays the part of his 'fidus Achates,' sharing his counsels and indispensable to his acts[2]; he is his right-hand man, his ambassador, his confidential agent; it is his diplomacy that paves the way for Scipio's visit to Africa, and he alone who accompanies him on that visit[3]; if Scipio commands the land forces, then Laelius commands the fleet[4]; if Scipio wins a victory, Laelius goes to Rome to report it[5]; his co-operation is so essential to his friend that the senate pass a special decree to authorize its continuance[6]; at the crowning moment of Scipio's fortunes it is the timely arrival of Laelius with the cavalry, that puts the final touch to the rout of Hannibal[7].

§ 14. *Superior attraction of the later pair.*

In all this there was enough already to throw a glamour over the names of Scipio and Laelius, and to link them with the idea of friendship. And yet it is not this pair whose relation Cicero has selected as his theme. He might not indeed have been deterred by the somewhat obtrusive virtue of the elder Africanus, by the conscious possession of a great mind, which reveals itself in his wonted utterance 'nunquam se plus agere, quam nihil quum ageret; nunquam minus solum esse, quam quum solus esset[8],' or even by the mystical pretensions to a special guidance by heaven, and the art of evading the question when taxed with a divine origin[9]. Cicero might have got over all this, for a shrinking modesty was no ideal of his. But there was one fatal

[1] Verg. Aen. III, 527–9; Livy XXIX, 27.
[2] 'Sine quo nihil maioris rei motum volebat,'—Livy XXVII, 17, § 7.
[3] XXVIII, 17.
[4] XXVI, 48; cp. 49, § 4.
[5] XXVI, 51, §§ 1, 2; XXVII, 7, § 1: XXX, 16, § 1, 36, § 2.
[6] XXX, 33, § 1.
[7] XXX, 35, §§ 1, 2.
[8] Rep. I, § 27.
[9] On the fable about his birth cp. Livy XXVI, 19, §§ 4–6; Aul. Gell. VII, 1.

defect about the elder Africanus and the elder Laelius. They were not literary. Even Cicero himself, who in his Brutus has a kind word for everyone who had a tincture of learning or ever spoke from a hustings, can only say of this Africanus, 'ipsum Scipionem accepimus non infantem fuisse [1].' By any one accustomed to such testimonials this reticence must be accepted as extremely damaging. Of Laelius in the same connexion he says nothing at all, though Livy tells us that he had much influence in the Senate [2]. That age was too early for the combination of Roman virtue with Greek culture, which alone would satisfy the ideal of Cicero. But in the next generation the influence of Greek literature was already beginning to make itself felt. The son of the elder Scipio left some speeches behind him and a history very pleasantly written in Greek [3]. His health, however, was too weak to allow him to play a part in politics. Having no son of his own, he adopted the second son of L. Aemilius Paulus, whose victory over Perseus at Pydna had won him the title of Macedonicus. The youth who now became by adoption the son of P. Scipio was at the same time his cousin by blood, since the elder Africanus had married Aemilia, the sister of Macedonicus. On his transference from the Aemilian to the Cornelian gens the son of Aemilius Paulus became P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, and he won for himself afterwards the already inherited surname of Africanus [4], to which the word 'minor' is usually added to distinguish him from his grandfather or uncle. The life-long friend of this Scipio was also a C. Laelius, the son of the man of whom we have spoken. The names of these two persons were more attractive to Cicero than any other names in all the annals of his country [5]; and the

[1] Brut. § 77. There was a speech extant in the time of Aulus Gellius, under the name of Africanus the elder, but its genuineness was doubted. Noct. Att. IV, 18, § 6.

[2] Livy XXXVII, 1—'multum in senatu poterat.'

[3] Brut. § 77.

[4] De Rep. VI, § 11.

[5] Apart from his own repeated utterances this might be gathered even from his use of pronouns. Cp. Brut. § 77—'is qui *hunc* minorem Scipionem a Paulo adoptavit'; Phil. XI, § 16—'*huius* Sapientis patrem'; De Rep. I, § 14—'P. Africanus *hic*, Pauli filius.'

secret of this peculiar charm lies in the fact that they were philosophers and men of letters as well as soldiers and statesmen.

§ 15. *The younger Scipio.*

The time of the later Scipio and Laelius was for Cicero the golden age of Rome. It was a time when men were equally conspicuous for the purity of their lives and of their language [1]; it was a time when the learning of Greece had come in and the virtue of Rome had not gone out; it was a time of great achievements in action, but also of a newly-awakened thirst for literature, like the age of the Renaissance, when the dying embers of Greece sufficed again to rekindle Italy. And the central figures of this great age were entwined in a friendship which Cicero has rendered immortal. Born about B.C. 185, it is not long before Scipio figures on the field of history. He and his elder brother, Quintus Fabius Maximus, were both present at the battle of Pydna (B.C. 168), while Scipio was still in his 17th year. At the close of the day the younger and favourite son of the consul was missing, and his disappearance caused anguish to his father and consternation in the camp. The soldiers left their supper and went out with torches to look for him. At last he came in covered with blood along with one or two comrades. The ardour of the chase had carried him away, like a well-bred puppy, as Plutarch puts it, and he had pursued the enemy far into the night [2]. When the Third Punic War broke out in B.C. 149 Scipio first served as tribune of the soldiers, and won so much distinction in that capacity for his prudence and valour, that Cato, to whose policy the war was due, exclaimed of him in the words of Homer—

οἶος πέπνυται, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι [3].

This testimony was the more valuable, as Cato had been an enemy to the former Africanus. The sage did not live to see the verification of his prophecy: but his opinion was confirmed

[1] Brut. § 258—'mitto C. Laelium, P. Scipionem; aetatis illius ista fuit laus tanquam innocentiae sic Latine loquendi.'

[2] Liv. XLIV, 44; Plut. Aemil. Paul. 22.

[3] Plut. Cato, 27.

by the verdict of the people, and, before two years were out, Scipio was commanding in Africa as consul (B.C. 147). In the next year he destroyed Carthage. This was the first great triumph of his life. The second was the destruction of Numantia, which for ten years (B.C. 143–133) had defied the arms of Rome. He was elected consul in his absence in B.C. 134, and the next year witnessed the fall of that city[1]. When he returned to Rome a year later (B.C. 132), it was to find the city plunged in confusion over those popular reforms, which had already cost the life of his cousin and brother-in-law Tiberius Gracchus. Scipio had struck the keynote of his future policy, when he exclaimed at Numantia, on hearing the news,

ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος, ὅ τις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι[2].

When Carbo asked him before the people what he thought of the death of his kinsman, he made the well-known reply, 'iure eum caesum videri,' and met the clamours of the crowd with the scornful exclamation, 'Taceant, quibus Italia noverca est[3]!' These things lost him the favour of the people, and he himself threw all the weight of his influence into the cause of the Senate. Cicero suggests that he might have been appointed dictator to quell the disturbances, if his life had been prolonged[4]. The manner of his death at the age of 56 has been already related.

§ 16. *The younger Laelius.*

The career of Laelius as a man of action was completely outshone by that of his illustrious friend. Born about a year before Africanus, Laelius attained the praetorship in B.C. 145, and the consulship five years later[5], after being rejected the year before in favour of Q. Pompeius[6]. As a general he acquitted himself creditably in his campaign against Viriathus, in which he broke the power of that prince of bandits[7]. Plutarch says that in the

[1] De Rep. VI, § 11. [2] Plut. Tib. Grac. 21.
[3] Livy, Epit. 59; Val. Max. VI, 2, § 3.
[4] De Rep. VI, § 12.
[5] See § 96 *ad fin.* and cp. Brut. § 161.
[6] See 77 *c.* and cp. T. D. V, § 54.
[7] Brut. § 84; De Off. II, § 40.

beginning of his political career he endeavoured to remedy the depopulation of Italy by agrarian reforms, but afterwards allowed himself to be deterred by the opposition of the nobles. According to the same author the surname of 'Sapiens' was conferred upon him for his wisdom in desisting from this dangerous path, which the Gracchi afterwards pursued to their ruin[1]. In this notion, however, Plutarch receives no countenance from earlier writers, whose language always implies that Laelius was called 'Sapiens' on account of his eminence in philosophy; and certainly, whatever the origin of the name, it was not as a man of action, like his father or his friend, but by his renown for learning and letters that Laelius has achieved his niche in the temple of fame.

§ 17. *Scipio and Laelius as orators.*

Among the orators of their time Scipio and Laelius held the first place, not for fiery utterance, like Galba or the Gracchi, but for the elegance and purity of their language. They have been paid the highest compliment that could be paid them in this respect in being suspected of having had a hand in writing the plays of Terence[2]. To an after age indeed, when the language had been wrought to its utmost polish, their style, while revealing the hand of a master, appeared at the same time rather hard and stiff, like the painting of a Polygnotus[3]. Although by mutual consent and among their admirers the palm of eloquence was assigned to Laelius, perhaps to compensate him for the superiority of Africanus in arms, Cicero is inclined to reverse this decision. He finds the style of Laelius much more rugged and antique than that of Scipio, a fact which he ascribes to an affected preference for archaic expressions (Brut. § 83). The speech of Laelius which appears to have been most read and admired afterwards was the 'De Conlegiis,' which was delivered in his praetorship, and is referred to in our dialogue (§ 96). The occasion which called it forth was the proposal made by

[1] *Φοβηθεὶς τὸν θόρυβον καὶ παυσάμενος ἐπεκλήθη σοφὸς ἢ φρόνιμος. ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἐδόκει σημαίνειν ὁ σαπίηνς.*—Plut. Tib. Grac. 8.

[2] See 89 *b*; Quint. X. 1, § 99.

[3] Quint. XII, 10, § 10; cp. Cic. Brut. § 70.

the demagogue C. Licinius Crassus to throw open the priestly colleges to popular election. As the art of augury was one of the chief weapons of popular control in the hands of a dominant aristocracy, all the conservatism of Rome was up in arms at this proposal. Laelius figured as the defender of the faith, and delivered a speech upon religion, which Cicero makes Cotta speak of as 'oratio nobilis' and 'aureola oratiuncula[1].' Yet he says that this speech is no better than any one out of many of Scipio's[2]. This verdict of Cicero's is confirmed by Aulus Gellius, who speaks of Scipio as the purest speaker of his age[3]. Another occasion referred to in the text (§ 96) on which both orators exerted their powers, was in opposing the bill brought forward by C. Papirius Carbo, to legalise the re-election of tribunes. Carbo was supported by C. Gracchus, but the bill was nevertheless thrown out[4]. Scipio's oratory was intense and severe. Two fairly long specimens of his style have been preserved to us. The one is an energetic denunciation of the sin of dancing, which somehow found a place in his speech against the judiciary law of Ti. Gracchus[5]; the other is a stinging piece of invective against a tribune of the commons, Tiberius Claudius Aselius, whom Scipio had degraded during his censorship (B.C. 142), and who afterwards sought to have his revenge upon him by accusing him before the people[6].

§ 18. *Characters of Scipio and Laelius.*

The strong and serious character of Scipio found its fitting relief in the gentle wisdom and genial disposition of Laelius. When wishing to express in one word the prevailing characteristic of each orator of the time, Cicero chooses 'gravitas' for Scipio and

[1] De N. D. III, 5, 43.

[2] 'Oratio Laelii de conlegiis non melior quam de multis quam voles Scipionis.'—Brut. § 83.

[3] Aul. Gell. II, 20, § 5—'Scipionem, omnium aetatis suae purissime locutum.'

[4] § 96. See Livy, Epit. 59.

[5] Macrob. Sat. II, ch. 10.

[6] Aul. Gell. III, 4, § 1, IV, 17, § 1. The passage referred to is given in VI, 11, § 9. Cp. De Orat. II, §§ 258, 268.

'lenitas' for Laelius[1]; and the same features were reflected in their lives, as Horace has so happily put it—

virtus Scipiadae et mitis sapientia Laeli[2].

And, again, we have Cicero saying in the De Officiis[3]—'in C. Laelio multa hilaritas; in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior.' It may be imagined that two such characters would happily blend with one another, like the strong Falernian with honey in the Roman mead or 'mulsum.' Their mutual admiration formed a sound basis for friendship, which is a commerce that requires give and take. Laelius worshipped Scipio as a god because of his unsurpassed renown in war, while Scipio revered his friend because he was a little older than himself, and conceded to him the primacy in all the arts of peace[4]. Laelius is always spoken of as a perfect master of philosophy, and it is to be presumed that he had gone deeper into the subject than his friend. He studied first under Diogenes the Stoic, who was sent to Rome from Athens on an embassy to the senate in B.C. 155, and afterwards under Panaetius[5]. Under this second master at all events his friend shared his studies, and he may have done so under the first. In fact Panaetius lived with Africanus[6], who was one of the first to begin the practice, which afterwards became so common among Roman magnates, of keeping a philosopher, much as a private chaplain is kept in the house of an English nobleman. We may believe that the paths of learning were rendered smooth for so great a pupil, and that Africanus gently imbibed philosophy from the discourses of his guest, instead of spending his days and nights over it, like his nephew Tubero[7]. This suspicion is strengthened when we learn that Xenophon was his favourite author, and

[1] De Orat. III, § 28.
[2] Hor. Sat. II, 1, 72.
[3] I, § 108.
[4] De Rep. I, § 18; Brut. § 84.
[5] De Fin. II, § 24; cp. Cat. Mai. § 23.
[6] See T. D. 1, § 81—'vellem adesse posset Panaetius—vixit cum Africano'; Pro Mur. § 66; Ad Att. IX, 12, § 2; De Rep. I, § 34; De Fin. IV, § 23.
[7] De Orat. III, § 87—'at eius avunculum vix intellegeres id agere cum ageret tamen, Africanum.'

hardly ever out of his hands[1]. Here he would get elevated sentiments coupled with the very weakest of dialectic. Panaetius has left us through Cicero the record of a highly Xenophontean utterance on the part of his distinguished pupil[2]. But after all philosophy is a thing to be lived rather than to be learnt, and we have the consentient testimony of all antiquity to the fact that these two great men exemplified in their lives the efficacy of their beliefs. Laelius, in addition to his studies in philosophy, had the true philosophical temperament, the equability of demeanour and unchanging serenity of face, which had been noticed in Socrates, of whom his wife said that he always looked the same when he came in as when he went out. Laelius was a Stoic whom the teachings of his school had failed to sour. For those to whom Cato seemed too stern Seneca suggests Laelius as an example of life and as a moral guardian to be kept continually before one's thoughts[3]. As for Africanus, the accounts that we have of his magnanimity, of the moderation which led him in his censorship to discard the prayer for the extension of the Roman empire, and substitute one for its preservation[4], of his justice, liberality, and filial affection[5], of his simplicity of life and absence of personal ostentation[6] are enough to show that the lessons of Panaetius were not thrown away upon his pupil. The admiration that was entertained by the ancients for his character may be inferred from an expression of the Christian writer Lactantius[7]—'Hercules, qui ob virtutem clarissimus, et quasi Africanus inter deos habetur.' It was not Africanus that was compared to Hercules, but Hercules that was compared to Africanus!

§ 19. *The Scipionic circle.*

Charming glimpses have been left us of the private life of these illustrious friends. We may picture them on some public

[1] T. D. II, § 62. [2] De Off. I, § 90.

[3] Epist. 11, *ad fin.*—'Elige itaque Catonem: si hic videtur tibi nimis rigidus, elige remissioris animi virum Laelium'; Epist. 104—'Ad meliores transi. Cum Catonibus vive, cum Laelio, cum Tuberone.'

[4] Val. Max. IV, 1, § 10. [5] See § 11 and notes.

[6] Athen. VI, p. 273. [7] Div. Inst. I, 9.

holiday, when there came a pause in their political and forensic toils, flying off together, like delighted schoolboys, and perhaps amusing themselves by picking up shells and cockles on the shore of Caieta or Laurentum [1], or else retiring to some country place—say to Laelius' villa at Formiae [2], and engaging in an altogether undignified romp with the young Lucilius [3], while their simple dinner is being cooked. Lucilius, it may be mentioned, served as an 'eques' under Africanus at Numantia [4], and lived to leave his stamp on literature, as the inventor of the one species of poetry, which the Romans can claim as their own. Or perhaps it is the Lavernian villa of Scipio which they choose for their retreat, where Scipio was once presented with a magnificent 'acipenser,' a fish dear to the epicures of Rome, and was so lavish of his invitations to visitors to dine with him that one Pontius, who was with him, had to whisper in his ear—'Scipio, vide quid agas; acipenser iste paucorum hominum est,' which amounts to saying, 'Do not offend that sturgeon, Scipio; it is exclusive in its choice of company [5].' Or, again, we may look in on Africanus during the leisure of the great Latin festival, when his most intimate friends have arranged to visit him in his gardens. The first of all to arrive is a nephew of his own, who comes before his uncle has had time to dress. A daughter of the great Aemilius Paulus had allied herself with a very poor but honourable man, Q. Aelius Tubero, whose son, of the same name, was an ardent student of philosophy, according to the straitest sect of the Stoics. The uncle wonders how the nephew has dragged himself away from his books on so tempting an occasion for study: but Tubero replies that his books are never engaged, whereas it is rare to find his uncle at leisure. They begin then to talk of the prodigy of a double sun, which had lately been announced to the Senate on the most reliable authority. Scipio wishes that Panaetius, their great authority on astronomy were present, but whispers a doubt as to the absolute infallibility of that philosopher's opinions, who seemed to have seen and handled things that lay beyond the ken of

[1] De Orat. II, § 22.
[2] De Rep. I, § 61.
[3] Hor. Sat. II, 1, 70–4.
[4] Vell. Pat. II, 9, § 4.
[5] Macrob. Sat. II, 12.

ordinary mortals. This leads on to remarks about Socrates' rejection of natural science, though he is so abtruse and Pythagorean in Plato. At this point L. Furius Philus drops in, accompanied by a young man P. Rutilius Rufus, who, like Lucilius, had served under Africanus at Numantia. Furius had studied astronomy, and is appealed to as an authority. But before he can deliver himself on the subject a page enters the room to say that Laelius is coming. Scipio hereupon puts on his boots and coat, and goes out into the portico to meet him. He is accompanied by his two sons-in-law C. Fannius and Q. Scaevola, and by Spurius Mummius, a very dear friend of Scipio's, in spite of his disagreement in his censorship with his brother Lucius, the conqueror of Corinth. They take a few turns in the portico, Laelius occupying the place of honour in the middle, and are just about to adjourn to a pleasant spot in a meadow, where they might catch the winter sun, when yet another friend of all present comes in. This is the great lawyer M. Manilius, whom Laelius, the wag of the party, rallies with some remarks about legal proceedings between the two suns. Laelius holds the Socratic position that they had better attend to things at home, and let things in the heavens look after themselves: but Furius answers from the Stoic standpoint that the world is their home[1], and that what happens therein must necessarily concern them. So Furius is allowed his chance of speaking, and begins with C. Sulpicius Gallus, a most learned man and great student of astronomy in the same generation as their fathers. Gallus has much to say about a sphere made by Archimedes, the mechanism of which could be worked so as to display the motions of the heavenly bodies. The conversation gets more and more sublime until Laelius again insists on bringing it down to human interests, and leaving the two suns to fight it out between themselves. He calls upon Africanus for a discourse upon political philosophy, seeing that he is not only the leading statesman of Rome, but has often discussed the subject along with those learned Greeks Polybius and Panaetius. Africanus is compelled to admit that he has studied the subject,

[1] 'Mundum hunc omnem oppidum esse nostrum.' Cleanthes in Cic. De Fin. IV, § 7.

and is therefore willing to oblige the company. But here we must leave him and his friends after this peep at what is known as 'the Scipionic circle.'

§ 20. *Treatment of friendship by earlier writers.*

Concerning friendship many of the sages of early Greece had their word to say, which was worth saying then when the world was young, and may be worth remembering now that it is old. The school of Pythagoras were especially remarkable for the cultivation of this virtue, and it is to that philosopher that the three most pregnant apophthegms on the subject are attributed—the *μία ψυχή*, which goes at once to the heart of the matter, the *κοινὰ τὰ φίλων* and the *ἰσότης φιλότης*[1]. These are chapters of philosophy in themselves, the contents of which have yet to be exhausted. The utterances of other worthies are of a more commonplace character. Among other sound maxims which Solon left to the world we find this on record,—'Make not friends quickly, but when you have made them be sure to keep them[2].' Bias of Priene gave that advice about loving as though you might hate and hating as though you might love, which Cicero in our treatise has so strongly protested against[3]. Anacharsis said it was better to have one good friend than many bad ones[4]. But it is not till we come down to Plato that we have a piece of writing on the subject of friendship. The Lysis of that author is a dialogue of the 'maeeutic' or elicitory order, and a peculiarly provoking specimen of its class. It is logical, subtle, suggestive, but it plays with ideas as a child plays with a pack of cards, and ends by leaving them strewn in confusion. Cicero has borrowed nothing from it, and, for aught we know, may never have read it. Aristotle's *περὶ φιλίας*, which has come down to us as Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics,

[1] E. N. IX, 8, § 2; De Off. I, § 56,—'efficiturque id, quod Pythagoras volt in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus'; Diog. Laert. VIII, § 10 —*εἶπέ τε πρῶτος (ὥς φησι Τίμαιος) κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι· καὶ φιλίαν ἰσότητα.*

[2] D. L. I, § 60—*φίλους μὴ ταχὺ κτῶ· οὓς δ' ἂν κτήσῃ, μὴ ἀποδοκίμαζε.*

[3] See § 59; D. L. I, § 87.

[4] D. L. I, § 105.

is highly tinged by the Lysis of Plato. There are a great many ideas in this work, which reappear in the Laelius of Cicero, such, for instance, as that true friendship is only possible among the good[1], that the good do not ask for base compliance from their friends or render it to them[2], that one's feeling towards oneself is the perfect type of friendship[3], that the friend is a second self[4], that friendship is the greatest of external goods[5]; then there is the notion of friendliness towards people whom one has never seen[6], the quotation of the proverb about the salt[7], the references to *μία ψυχή*[8], and the remark about the fewness of friends in all ages[9]; lastly the assimilation of friendship to the natural love of offspring shown by the lower animals is quite Aristotelian[10]. Yet in spite of these many points of contact the whole impression left upon the mind is that Cicero has not borrowed directly from Aristotle. Some of these resemblances are accidental; in others the ideas have filtered down to our author through other channels. Cicero's reading was confined almost entirely to the exoteric works of Aristotle, and the Aristotle he knew and loved was a writer of dialogues, in which the author played the principal part, which were preceded by introductions, and in which the meaning was conveyed in a golden flood of eloquence[11]. In the vast philosophical literature of the Greeks, which penetrated into every department of life and thought, friendship was not likely to escape attention. Cicero mentions it among a list of subjects requiring to be illuminated by splendour of diction, that had been mag-

[1] E. N. VIII, 1, § 7; 3, § 6, cp. Lysis 214 D; Lael. § 18.
[2] E. N. VIII, 8, § 5; Lael. § 40.
[3] E. N. IX, 4, § 1; Lael. § 80.
[4] E. N. IX, 4, § 5; 9, § 10; Lael. § 80.
[5] E. N. IX, 9, § 2; Lael. §§ 20, 104.
[6] E. N. VIII, 2, § 4; Lael. § 28.
[7] E. N. VIII, 3, § 8; Lael. § 67.
[8] E. N. IX, 8, § 2; Lael. §§ 81, 92.
[9] E. N. IX, 10, § 6; Lael. § 15.
[10] E. N. VIII, 1, § 3; Lael. §§ 27, 81.
[11] Ad Att. IV, 17, § 2, XIII, 19, § 4—'flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles,' Acad. II § 119.

nificently treated by 'the old Peripatetics and Academics[1].' Among the Academics may perhaps be reckoned Simmias of Thebes, one of whose twenty-three dialogues was entitled περὶ φίλου[2]. Speusippus, sister's son to Plato, and who succeeded him in the Academy, left a treatise on friendship; so also did Xenocrates, who succeeded Speusippus[3]. Nor was the subject let drop among the later school of Stoics, for we find mention of a περὶ φιλίας among the works of Cleanthes[4]. That Cicero was in some measure indebted to the Stoics would seem probable from the coincidence of his own words in the Laelius with language which he elsewhere attributes to them[5]. His obligation to Xenophon is obvious, as he has taken the words of Socrates in the Memorabilia and put them into the mouth of Scipio[6]. But the chief source from which Cicero borrowed seems to have been the lost treatise on friendship, in three books[7], by Theophrastus, who succeeded Aristotle as the head of the Peripatetic school. This may be gathered from the chapter of Aulus Gellius[8], in which he complains that Cicero, while freely imitating Theophrastus has not, like him, gone into the casuistical question εἰ δεῖ βοηθεῖν τῷ φίλῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ μέχρι πόσου καὶ ποῖα, but passed it over with the vague generalisation in § 61, which ends with the words—'est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit.' It was perhaps discreet of Cicero not to enter too minutely into this point. He was so good a friend that principle with him sometimes went to the wall. What his own practice in such cases was may best be given in his own words—'Beneficium sequor, mihi crede, non causam, ut in Milone, ut in—Sed haec hactenus[9].'

[1] De Fin. IV, §§ 5, 6.
[2] Diog. Laert. II, § 124.
[3] Diog. Laert. IV, §§ 4, 12.
[4] Diog. Laert. IV, § 175.
[5] Cp. § 28—'nihil est enim virtute amabilius,' &c. with N. D. I, § 121—'quanto Stoici melius,' &c.
[6] Lael. § 62; Xen. Mem. II, 4, §§ 1, 2, 4.
[7] Diog. Laert. V, § 45 *ad fin.*
[8] Noct. Att. I, 3.
[9] Ad Att. IX, 7, § 3.

M. TULLII CICERONIS

LAELIUS

DE AMICITIA

AD T. POMPONIUM ATTICUM.

M. TULLII CICERONIS

LAELIUS

SIVE

DE AMICITIA.

1 1. Q. Mucius augur multa narrare de C. Laelio socero suo Address
memoriter et iucunde solebat nec dubitare illum in omni ser- to Atticus,
mone appellare sapientem; ego autem a patre ita eram de- §§ 1–5.
ductus ad Scaevolam sumpta virili toga, ut, quoad possem et
liceret, a senis latere numquam discederem. Itaque multa ab
eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commode
dicta memoriae mandabam fierique studebam eius prudentia
doctior; quo mortuo me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli,
quem unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestan-
tissimum audeo dicere; sed de hoc alias, nunc redeo ad
2 augurem. Cum saepe multa, tum memini domi in hemi-
cyclio sedentem, ut solebat, cum et ego essem una et pauci
admodum familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere, qui
tum fere multis erat in ore: meministi enim profecto, Attice,
et eo magis, quod P. Sulpicio utebare multum, cum is
tribunus pl. capitali odio a Q. Pompeio, qui tum erat consul,
dissideret, quocum coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat,
3 quanta esset hominum vel admiratio vel querella. Itaque
tum Scaevola, cum in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset,
exposuit nobis sermonem Laelii de amicitia habitum ab illo
secum et cum altero genero, C. Fannio, Marci filio, paucis
diebus post mortem Africani. Eius disputationis sententias
memoriae mandavi, quas hoc libro exposui arbitratu meo:

quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentis ne 'inquam' et 'inquit' saepius interponeretur atque ut tamquam a praesentibus coram haberi sermo videretur. Cum enim saepe mecum 4
ageres, ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi res cum omnium cognitione tum nostra familiaritate visa est; itaque feci non invitus ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. Sed ut in Catone Maiore, qui est scriptus ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur aptior persona, quae de illa aetate loqueretur, quam eius, qui et diutissime senex fuisset et in ipsa senectute praeter ceteros floruisset, sic, cum accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laelii et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Laelii persona visa est quae de amicitia ea ipsa dissereret, quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaevola. Genus autem hoc sermonum positum in hominum veterum auctoritate et eorum inlustrium plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis; itaque ipse mea legens sic adficior interdum, ut Catonem, non me loqui existimem. Sed ut tum ad senem 5
senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia. Tum est Cato locutus, quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior: nunc Laelius et sapiens—sic enim est habitus—et amicitiae gloria excellens de amicitia loquetur. Tu velim a me animum parumper avertas, Laelium loqui ipsum putes. C. Fannius et Q. Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani; ab his sermo oritur, respondet Laelius, cuius tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens te ipsum cognosces.

Introduction, §§ 6–15.

2. *Fannius*. Sunt ista, Laeli; nec enim melior vir fuit 6
Africano quisquam nec clarior: sed existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse coniectos unum; te sapientem et appellant et existimant. Tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni, scimus L. Acilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse sapientem, sed uterque alio quodam modo: Acilius, quia prudens esse in

iure civili putabatur, Cato, quia multarum rerum usum habebat: multa eius et in senatu et in foro vel provisa prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur; propterea quasi cognomen iam habebat in senectute sapientis.
7 Te autem alio quodam modo non solum natura et moribus, verum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem, nec sicut volgus, sed ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem, qualem in reliqua Graecia neminem—nam qui septem appellantur, eos qui ista subtilius quaerunt in numero sapientium non habent—, Athenis unum accepimus et eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum iudicatum: hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant, ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanosque casus virtute inferiores putes. Itaque ex me quaerunt, credo ex hoc item Scaevola, quonam pacto mortem Africani feras, eoque magis, quod proximis Nonis, cum in hortos D. Bruti auguris commentandi causa, ut adsolet, venissemus, tu non adfuisti, qui diligentissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.

8 *Scaevola.* Quaerunt quidem, C. Laeli, multi, ut est a Fannio dictum, sed ego id respondeo, quod animum adverti, te dolorem, quem acceperis cum summi viri tum amicissimi morte, ferre moderate, nec potuisse non commoveri nec fuisse id humanitatis tuae; quod autem Nonis in collegio nostro non adfuisses, valetudinem respondeo causam, non maestitiam fuisse.

Laelius. Recte tu quidem, Scaevola, et vere: nec enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi, cum valerem, abduci incommodo meo debui, nec ullo casu arbitror hoc constanti
9 homini posse contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat officii. Tu autem, Fanni, quod mihi tantum tribui dicis, quantum ego nec adgnosco nec postulo, facis amice, sed, ut mihi videris, non recte iudicas de Catone: aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut, si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. Quo modo,

ut alia omittam, mortem filii tulit! Memineram Paulum, videram Gallum, sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem 10
ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit: huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque loquar, sic habetote.

3. Ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem, quam id recte faciam viderint sapientes, sed certe mentiar. Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitror, nemo umquam erit, ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit; sed non egeo medicina: me ipse consolor et maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo, quo amicorum decessu plerique angi solent. Nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto: mihi accidit, si quid accidit; suis autem incommodis graviter angi non amicum, sed se ipsum amantis est. Cum illo vero quis neget actum 11
esse praeclare? Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, inmortalitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est, quod homini fas esset optare? qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit; qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus [consul] est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero; qui duabus urbibus eversis inimicissumis huic imperio non modo praesentia, verum etiam futura bella delevit. Quid dicam de moribus facillumis, de pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, iustitia in omnis? Nota sunt vobis. Quam autem civitati carus fuerit, maerore funeris indicatum est. Quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio iuvare potuisset? Senectus enim quamvis non sit gravis, ut memini Catonem anno ante quam est mortuus mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen aufert eam viriditatem, in qua etiam nunc erat Scipio. Quam ob rem 12
vita quidem talis fuit vel fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere, moriundi autem sensum celeritas abstulit: quo de

genere mortis difficile dictu est, quid homines suspicentur videtis. Hoc vere tamen licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex multis diebus, quos in vita celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, cum senatu dimisso domum reductus ad vesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e vita, ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius quam ad inferos pervenisse.

13 4. Neque enim adsentior iis, qui haec nuper disserere
coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire atque
omnia morte deleri: plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas
valet, vel nostrorum maiorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa iura
tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto, si nihil ad eos per-
tinere arbitrarentur, vel eorum, qui in hac terra fuerunt
magnamque Graeciam, quae nunc quidem deleta est, tum
florebat, institutis et praeceptis suis erudierunt, vel eius, qui
Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, cui non tum
hoc, tum illud, uti plerisque, sed idem semper, animos
hominum esse divinos iisque, cum ex corpore excessissent,
reditum in caelum patere optumoque et iustissimo cuique
14 expeditissimum. Quod idem Scipioni videbatur, qui quidem,
quasi praesagiret, perpaucis ante mortem diebus, cum et
Philus et Manilius adessent et alii plures, tuque etiam,
Scaevola, mecum venisses, triduum disseruit de re publica,
cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de inmortalitate
animorum, quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse
dicebat: id si ita est, ut optumi cuiusque animus in morte
facillime evolet tamquam e custodia vinclisque corporis, cui
censemus cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni?
quocirca maerere hoc eius eventu vereor ne invidi magis
quam amici sit. Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit
animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil
boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali; sensu enim amisso fit

idem, quasi natus non esset omnino, quem tamen esse natum
et nos gaudemus et haec civitas, dum erit, laetabitur. Quam 15
ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum optume est,
mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius, ut prius introi-
eram, sic prius exire de vita; sed tamen recordatione nostrae
amicitiae sic fruor, ut beate vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione
vixerim, quocum mihi coniuncta cura de publica re et de
privata fuit, quocum et domus fuit et militia communis et id,
in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum, studiorum, sen-
tentiarum summa consensio. Itaque non tam ista me sapi-
entiae, quam modo Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat,
falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam
spero sempiternam fore, idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod
ex omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria
amicorum, quo in genere sperare videor Scipionis et Laelii
amicitiam notam posteritati fore.

Division of the subject-matter, § 16.

Fannius. Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse est. Sed, quo- 16
niam amicitiae mentionem fecisti et sumus otiosi, pergratum
mihi feceris—spero item Scaevolae—, si, quem ad modum
soles de ceteris rebus, cum ex te quaeritur, sic de amicitia
disputaris quid sentias, qualem existumes, quae praecepta des.

Scaevola. Mihi vero, atque id ipsum cum tecum agere
conarer, Fannius antevortit: quam ob rem utrique nostrum
gratum admodum feceris.

I. Panegyric on friendship, §§ 17–25.

5. *Laelius*. Ego vero non gravarer, si mihi ipse con- 17
fiderem; nam et praeclara res est et sumus, ut dixit Fannius,
otiosi. Sed quis ego sum aut quae est in me facultas?
Doctorum est ista consuetudo eaque Graecorum, ut iis
ponatur de quo disputent quamvis subito: magnum opus
est egetque exercitatione non parva. Quam ob rem quae
disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis, qui ista
profitentur: ego vos hortari tantum possum ut amicitiam
omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam

naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel
18 adversas. Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam
esse non posse: neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi, qui haec
subtilius disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem
parum; negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi
sapientem. Sit ita sane: sed eam sapientiam interpretantur,
quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus, nos autem ea,
quae sunt in usu vitaque communi, non ea, quae finguntur
aut optantur, spectare debemus. Numquam ego dicam C.
Fabricium, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium, quos sapientis
nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapi-
entis; qua re sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et invidiosum et
obscurum, concedant ut viri boni fuerint. Ne id quidem
19 facient: negabunt id nisi sapienti posse concedi. Agamus
igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva: qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt,
ut eorum probetur fides, integritas, aequitas, liberalitas, nec
sit in eis ulla cupiditas, libido, audacia, sintque magna con-
stantia, ut ii fuerunt, modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos,
ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur,
quantum homines possunt, naturam optumam bene vivendi
ducem. Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos,
ut inter omnis esset societas quaedam, maior autem, ut
quisque proxime accederet. Itaque cives potiores quam
peregrini, propinqui quam alieni: cum his enim amicitiam
natura ipsa peperit, sed ea non satis habet firmitatis; namque
hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate
benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata
enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis
20 manet. Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intellegi
maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani,
quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et adducta
in angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos
iungeretur.

6. Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio: qua quidem haud scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis inmortalibus datum. Divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates: beluarum hoc quidem extremum, illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam in fortunae temeritate; qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest. Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae **21**
sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur virosque bonos eos, qui habentur, numeremus, Paulos, Catones, Gallos, Scipiones, Philos: his communis vita contenta est, eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur. Talis igitur inter viros **22**
amicitia tantas opportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. Principio qui potest esse 'vita vitalis,' ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescit? Quid dulcius quam habere quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? Qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui illis aeque ac tu ipse gauderet? Adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret. Denique ceterae res, quae expetuntur, opportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis, divitiae, ut utare, opes, ut colare, honores, ut laudere, voluptates, ut gaudeas, valetudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis: amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta est; itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia. Neque ego nunc de volgari aut de mediocri, quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit; nam et secundas

res splendidiores facit amicitia et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.

23 7. Cumque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bonam spem praelucet in posterum nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur; verum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et inbecilli valent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt: tantus eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum; ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. Quod si exemeris ex rerum natura benevolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri quidem cultus permanebit. Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque ex discordiis perspici potest: quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit everti? ex quo quantum
24 boni sit in amicitia iudicari potest. Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam; atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. Itaque, si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est qui id non maximis efferat laudibus? Qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitis et amici mei M. Pacuvii nova fabula! cum, ignorante rege uter Orestes *esset*, *Pylades* Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret. Stantes plaudebant in re ficta: quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse? Facile indicabat ipsa natura vim suam, cum homines, quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent. Hactenus mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem, potuisse dicere: si

qua praeterea sunt—credo autem esse multa—, ab iis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant, quaeritote.

Fann. Nos vero a te potius: quamquam etiam ab istis **25** saepe quaesivi et audivi non invitus equidem, sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae.

Scaev. Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis, cum est de re publica disputatum, adfuisses: qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!

Fann. Facile id quidem fuit iustitiam iustissimo viro defendere.

Scaev. Quid amicitiam? nonne facile ei, qui ob eam summa fide, constantia iustitiaque servatam maximam gloriam ceperit?

II. Nature of friendship, §§ 26–35.

(1) Origin of friendship. §§ 26–32.

8. *Lael.* Vim hoc quidem est adferre: quid enim refert **26** qua me ratione cogatis? cogitis certe; studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est tum ne aequum quidem obsistere. Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter inbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa: amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam; nam utilitates quidem etiam ab iis percipiuntur saepe, qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa; in amicitia autem nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum, et, quicquid est, id est verum et voluntarium. Qua- **27** propter a natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, adplicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura. Quod quidem quale sit etiam in bestiis quibusdam animad-

verti potest, quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus
et ab eis ita amantur, ut facile earum sensus adpareat: quod
in homine multo est evidentius, primum ex ea caritate, quae
est inter natos et parentes, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere
non potest, deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris, si ali-
quem nacti sumus, cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus,
quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspi-
28 cere videamur. Nihil est enim virtute amabilius, nihil quod
magis adliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtutem
et probitatem etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam
modo diligamus. Quis est qui C. Fabricii, M'. Curii non
cum caritate aliqua benevola memoriam usurpet, quos num-
quam viderit? Quis autem est qui Tarquinium Superbum,
qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit? Cum duobus
ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Han-
nibale: ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos
animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec
civitas oderit.

29 9. Quod si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis, quos
numquam vidimus, vel, quod maius est, in hoste etiam dili-
gamus, quid mirum est, si animi hominum moveantur, cum
eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt, virtutem et
bonitatem perspicere videantur? Quamquam confirmatur
amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine
adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et
amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae
magnitudo; quam si qui putant ab inbecillitate proficisci, ut
sit per quem adsequatur quod quisque desideret, humilem
sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum
amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt:
quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum esse in se arbitraretur,
30 ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus, quod longe secus est. Ut
enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit et ut quisque maxime

virtute et sapientia sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat suaque
omnia in se ipso posita iudicet, ita in amicitiis expetendis
colendisque maxime excellit. Quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? minime hercule! ac ne ego quidem illius: sed
ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione
fortasse non nulla, quam de meis moribus habebat, me
dilexit; auxit benevolentiam consuetudo. Sed quamquam
utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen
ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae; ut enim benefici 31
liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam—neque enim
beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem
sumus—, sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod
omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus. Ab his, qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia re- 32
ferunt, longe dissentiunt, nec mirum; nihil enim altum, nihil
magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt, qui suas omnis
cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. Quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum
diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis: quam qui adpetiverunt, adplicant se et propius admovent, ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et
moribus; suntque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec
inter eos est honesta certatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitia
maximae capientur et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab inbecillitate gravior et verior; nam si utilitas amicitias conglutinaret, eadem commutata dissolveret, sed quia natura mutari
non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt. Ortum
quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte voltis.

Fann. Tu vero perge, Laeli; pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.

Scaev. Recte tu quidem: quam ob rem audiamus. 33

10. *Lael.* Audite vero, optumi viri, ea, quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur: quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere; nam vel ut non idem expediret incidere saepe, vel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur; mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias aetate ingravescente. Atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga

(2) Difficulties of friendship, §§ 33–35.

34 ponerentur; sin autem ad adulescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriae condicionis vel commodi alicuius, quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. Quod si qui longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari, si in honoris contentionem incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiis quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae, ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos

35 exstitisse. Magna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis, quod rectum non esset, postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam, quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab iis, quibus obsequi nollent; illos autem, qui quidvis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos; eorum querella inveterata non modo familiaritates exstingui solere, sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna: haec ita multa quasi fata inpendere amicitiis, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae, sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri.

III. Precepts on friendship, §§ 36–104.

(1) Duty must be preferred to friendship, §§ 36–44.

36 11. Quam ob rem id primum videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. Numne, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? num Viscellinum amici regnum ad-

37 petentem, num Maelium debuerunt iuvare? Tiberium quidem

Gracchum rem publicam vexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaevola, cum ad me, quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc ut sibi ignoscerem causam adferebat, quod tanti Ti. Gracchum fecisset, ut quicquid ille vellet sibi faciendum putaret. Tum ego 'Etiamne,' inquam 'si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet?' 'Numquam' inquit 'voluisset id quidem, sed, si voluisset, paruissem.' Videtis quam nefaria vox! Et hercule ita fecit, vel plus etiam quam dixit; non enim paruit ille Ti. Gracchi temeritati, sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem praebuit. Itaque hac amentia quaestione nova perterritus in Asiam profugit, ad hostis se contulit, poenas rei publicae gravis iustasque persolvit. Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam, cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris.
Quod si rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis quicquid **38**
velint vel impetrare ab iis quicquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res vitii, sed loquimur de iis amicis, qui ante oculos sunt, quos vidimus aut de quibus memoriam accepimus, quos novit vita communis: ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem
maxime, qui ad sapientiam proxume accedunt. Videmus **39**
Aemilium Luscino familiarem fuisse—sic a patribus accepimus—, bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum iis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium memoriae proditum est: igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quippiam contendisse, quod contra fidem, contra ius iurandum, contra rem publicam esset. Nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid attinet dicere, si contendisset, impetraturum non fuisse? cum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, aeque autem nefas sit tale aliquid et

facere rogatum et rogare. At vero Ti. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem Gaius frater, nunc idem acerrimus.

40 12. Haec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpis nec faciamus rogati; turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae: deflexit iam ali-
41 quantulum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum. Ti. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est, vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses: num quid simile populus Romanus audierat aut viderat? Hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P. Scipione effecerint sine lacrimis non queo dicere. Nam Carbonem, quocumque modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Ti. Gracchi sustinuimus; de C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid exspectem non lubet augurari: serpit deinde res, quae proclivius ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. Videtis in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia: videre iam videor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis arbitrio res maximas agi; plures enim discent, quem ad modum haec
42 fiant, quam quem ad modum his resistatur. Quorsum haec? quia sine sociis nemo quicquam tale conatur. Praecipiendum est igitur bonis ut, si in eius modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se adligatos, ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re peccantibus non discedant, inprobis autem poena statuenda est, nec vero minor iis, qui secuti erunt alterum, quam iis, qui ipsi fuerint inpietatis duces. Quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle? quis potentior? qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam liberavisset propterque invidiam in exsilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit, quam ferre debuit: fecit idem quod viginti

annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. His adiutor contra
patriam inventus est nemo; itaque mortem sibi uterque
conscivit. Qua re talis inproborum consensio non modo 43
excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est, sed potius supplicio
omni vindicanda est, ut ne quis concessum putet amicum vel
bellum patriae inferentem sequi: quod quidem, ut res ire
coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit; mihi autem non
minori curae est, qualis res publica post mortem meam
futura, quam qualis hodie sit.

13. Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis 44
honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne ex-
spectemus quidem, dum rogemur, studium semper adsit,
cunctatio absit, consilium vero dare audeamus libere. Pluri-
mum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas,
eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed
etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur. Nam 45
quibusdam, quos audio sapientis habitos in Graecia, placuisse
opinor mirabilia quaedam—sed nihil est, quod illi non per-
sequantur argutiis—: partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias,
ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis super-
que esse sibi suarum cuique rerum, alienis nimis inplicari
molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas
habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas cum velis vel
remittas; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem,
qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro
pluribus. Alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius 46
—quem locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi—praesidii adiu-
mentique causa, non benevolentiae neque caritatis, amicitias
esse expetendas; itaque, ut quisque minimum firmitatis
haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias adpetere maxime:
ex eo fieri ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quae-
rant quam viri et inopes quam opulenti et calamitosi quam
ii, qui putantur beati. O praeclaram sapientiam! solem 47

(2) Refutation of false ideas, §§ 45–55.

enim e mundo tollere videntur qui amicitiam e vita tollunt, qua nihil a dis inmortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. Quae est enim ista securitas? Specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda; neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. Quod si curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit, ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, ignaviam fortitudo. Itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, inbellibus fortis, flagitiosis modestos. Ergo hoc proprium est animi bene
48 constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis. Quam ob rem, si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur, quae causa est cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? Quid enim interest motu animi sublato non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem? Neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt: quae quidem est cum multis in rebus tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur. Quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet, ut tollat e vita amicitiam, non plus quam ut virtutes, quia non nullas curas et molestias adferunt, repudientur.

14. Cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se similis animus adplicet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse
49 est. Quid enim tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanibus rebus, ut honore, ut gloria, ut aedificio, ut vestitu cultuque corporis, animante virtute praedito, eo qui vel amare vel, ut ita dicam, redamare possit, non admodum

delectari? Nihil est enim remuneratione benevolentiae, nihil vicissitudine studiorum officiorumque iucundius. Quid? 50
si illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse quod ad se rem ullam tam inliciat et attrahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo, concedetur profecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant adsciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura; nihil est enim adpetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura. Quam ob rem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scaevola, constet, ut opinor, bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam benevolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus. Sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet; non enim est inhumana virtus neque inmunis neque superba, quae etiam populos universos tueri eisque optume consulere soleat, quod non faceret profecto, si a caritate volgi abhorreret. Atque etiam mihi quidem videntur, 51
qui utilitatis causa fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum amicitiae tollere; non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat, tumque illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum, iucundum, si cum studio est profectum, tantumque abest ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ii, qui opibus et copiis maximeque virtute, in qua plurimum est praesidii, minime alterius indigent, liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi. Atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis: ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est.

15. Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes audiendi, 52
si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt; nam quis est, proh deorum fidem atque hominum, qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? Haec enim est tyran-

norum vita, nimirum in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper
53 suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae; quis enim aut eum diligat, quem metuat, aut eum, a quo se metui putet? Coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus: quod si forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderunt, tum intellegitur quam fuerint inopes amicorum; quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt, tum [exsulantem] se intellexisse, quos fidos amicos habuisset,
54 quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset: quamquam miror illa superbia et inportunitate si quemquam amicum habere potuit. Atque ut huius, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parere non potuerunt, sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fidelis: non enim solum ipsa Fortuna caeca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos, quos conplexa est; itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia, neque quicquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos, qui antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio, potestate, prosperis rebus inmutari [sperni ab iis veteres amicitias, indulgeri novis].
55 Quid autem stultius quam, cum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quae parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa, amicos non parare, optumam et pulcherrimam vitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? Etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent nesciunt nec cuius causa laborent; eius enim est istorum quidque, qui vincit viribus: amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio, ut, etiam si illa maneant, quae sunt quasi dona Fortunae, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. Sed haec hactenus.

(3) The limits of friendship, §§ 56-61.

56 16. Constituendi autem sunt, qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi, de quibus tris video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo: unam, ut eodem modo erga amicum adfecti simus quo erga nosmet ipsos, alteram, ut nostra in

amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae pariter
aequaliterque respondeat, tertiam, ut, quanti quisque se ipse
faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. Harum trium sententiarum nulli 57
prorsus adsentior: nec enim illa prima vera est, ut, quem ad
modum in se quisque, sic in amicum sit animatus; quam
multa enim, quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus
[causa] amicorum! precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum
acerbius in aliquem invehi insectarique vehementius, quae in
nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime;
multaeque res sunt, in quibus de suis commodis viri
boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur, ut iis amici potius
quam ipsi fruantur. Altera sententia est, quae definit ami- 58
citiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. Hoc quidem est
nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par
sit ratio acceptorum et datorum: divitior mihi et adfluentior
videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare restricte ne plus
reddat quam acceperit; neque enim verendum est ne quid
excidat aut ne quid in terram defluat aut ne plus aequo quid
in amicitiam congeratur. Tertius vero ille finis deterrumus, 59
ut, quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis; saepe
enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae
fortunae fractior: non est igitur amici talem esse
in eum, qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere, ut
amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque *in* spem cogitationemque
meliorem. Alius igitur finis verae amicitiae
constituendus est, si prius, quid maxime reprehendere Scipio
solitus sit, dixero: negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae
potuisse reperiri quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere,
ut si aliquando esset osurus; nec vero se adduci posse, ut
hoc, quem ad modum putaretur, a Biante dictum esse
crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem: inpuri
cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis
esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo quisquam

amicus esse poterit ei, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? Quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo pluris det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum; rursus autem recte factis commodisque ami-
60 corum [necesse erit] angi, dolere, invidere. Qua re hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet: illud potius praecipiundum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse possemus. Quin etiam si minus felices in deligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.

61 17. His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut etiam, si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit. Nec vero neglegenda est fama, nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium, quam blanditiis et adsentando conligere turpe est: virtus, quam
62 sequitur caritas, minime repudianda est. Sed—saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia—querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent: capras et ovis quot quisque haberet dicere posse, amicos quot haberet non posse dicere; et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis deligendis neglegentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos, qui ad amicitiam essent idonei, iudicarent. Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi, cuius generis est magna penuria; et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum, experiundum autem est in ipsa amicitia: ita praecurrit amicitia

(4) Choice of friends, §§ 62–66.

iudicium tollitque experiundi potestatem. Est igitur pru- 63
dentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo utamur quasi equis temptatis sic aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. Quidam saepe in parva pecunia perspiciuntur quam sint leves, quidam autem, quos parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna; sin vero erunt aliqui reperti qui pecuniam praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment, ubi eos inveniemus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut, cum ex altera parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint? Inbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam; quam etiam si neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. Itaque verae amicitiae 64
difficillime reperiuntur in iis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur: ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo? Quid? haec ut omittam, quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates! ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendant. Quamquam Ennius recte

'Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur,'

tamen haec duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt. Qui igitur utraque in re gravem, constantem, stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene divino.

18. Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est 65
eius, quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides; nihil est enim stabile, quod infidum est. Simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est, qui rebus isdem moveatur, eligi par est, quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem; neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum, neque vero, qui non isdem rebus movetur naturaque consentit, aut fidus aut

stabilis potest esse. Addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis, quae pertinent omnia ad eam, quam iam dudum tracto, constantiam. Ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse; est enim boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum, ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam; deinde non solum ab aliquo adlatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspitiosum, semper aliquid existimantem ab
66 amico esse violatum. Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haud quaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.]

67 19. Exsistit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis, num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus: indigna homine dubitatio! non enim debent esse amicitiarum, sicut aliarum rerum, satietates: veterrima quaeque, ut ea vina, quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debet suavissima, verumque illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul
68 edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit. Novitates autem, si spem adferunt ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus adpareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda; maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Quin ipso equo, cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res inpediat, nemo est quin eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur quam intractato et novo; nec vero in hoc, quod est animal, sed in iis etiam, quae sunt inanima, consuetudo valet, cum locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus.

(5) New friends versus old, §§ 67, 68.

(6) Inequalities in friendship, §§ 69–74.

Sed maximum est in amicitia parem esse inferiori; saepe **69**
enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in
nostro, ut ita dicam, grege: numquam se ille Philo, numquam
Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris
ordinis amicis; Quintum vero Maximum fratrem, egregium
virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat
aetate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnis per se
esse ampliores volebat. Quod faciendum imitandumque est **70**
omnibus, ut, si quam praestantiam virtutis, ingenii, fortunae
consecuti sint, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum
proximis; ut, si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos
habeant inbecilliores vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant
opes eisque honori sint et dignitati; ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu
propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerunt,
cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent
tamen caritatem in pastores, quos patres multos annos
esse duxerunt: quod est multo profecto magis in veris
patribus certisque faciendum; fructus enim ingenii et virtutis
omnisque praestantiae tum maximus capitur, cum in proximum
quemque confertur.]

20. Ut igitur ii, qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionisque **71**
necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent,
sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut
fortuna aut dignitate superari; quorum plerique aut queruntur
semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant, eoque magis, si habere
se putant quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo
factum queant dicere: odiosum sane genus hominum officia
exprobrantium, quae meminisse debet is, in quem conlata
sunt, non commemorare qui contulit. Quam ob rem, ut ii, **72**
qui superiores sunt, submittere se debent in amicitia, sic
quodam modo inferiores extollere. Sunt enim quidam, qui
molestas amicitias faciunt, cum ipsi se contemni putant;
quod non fere contingit nisi iis, qui etiam contemnendos se

arbitrantur, qui hac opinione non modo verbis, sed etiam
73 opere levandi sunt. Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum, quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam, quantum ille, quem diligas atque adiuves, sustinere; non enim neque tu possis, quamvis excellas, omnis tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere, ut Scipio P. Rupilium potuit consulem efficere, fratrem eius Lucium non potuit. Quod si etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen quid ille
74 possit sustinere. Omnino amicitiae conroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingeniis et aetatibus iudicandae sunt, nec, si qui ineunte aetate venandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios, quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. Isto enim modo nutrices et paedagogi iure vetustatis plurimum benevolentiae postulabunt: qui neglegendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam modo aestimandi. Aliter amicitiae stabiles permanere non possunt; [dispares enim mores disparia studia sequuntur,] quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias, nec ob aliam causam ullam boni inprobis, inprobi bonis amici esse non possunt nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse, morum studiorumque distantia.
75 Recte etiam praecipi potest in amicitiis, ne intemperata (7) Selfish fondness, § 75.
quaedam benevolentia, quod persaepe fit, inpediat magnas utilitates amicorum; nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, si Lycomedem, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum inpedientem audire voluisset. Et saepe incidunt magnae res, ut discedendum sit ab amicis: quas qui inpedire volt, quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura et ob eam
76 ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus. Atque in omni re considerandum est, et quid postules ab amico et quid patiare a te inpetrari.

21. Est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis (8). Dropping friendships, §§ 76–78.
non numquam necessaria; iam enim a sapientium familiari-

tatibus ad volgaris amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. Erum-
punt saepe vitia amicorum tum in ipsos amicos, tum in
alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia: tales
igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae et, ut Catonem
dicere audivi, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi
quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque
rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit ut non statim
alienatio disiunctioque faciunda sit. Sin autem aut morum 77
aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit
aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit—loquor
enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium, sed de
communibus amicitiis—, cavendum erit ne non solum ami-
citiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur;
nihil enim est turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere, quocum
familiariter vixeris. Ab amicitia Q. Pompeii meo nomine
se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio, propter dissensionem autem,
quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Me-
tello: utrumque egit graviter, auctoritate et offensione animi
non acerba. Quam ob rem primum danda opera est ne 78
qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut
exstinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae videantur. Ca-
vendum vero ne etiam in gravis inimicitias convertant se
amicitiae, ex quibus iurgia, maledicta, contumeliae gignuntur;
quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferundae sunt et hic honos
veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit, qui faciat, non
is, qui patiatur iniuriam.

(9) Miscellaneous remarks, §§ 79–88.

Omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum
una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis cito diligere
incipiant neve non dignos. Digni autem sunt amicitia, 79
quibus in ipsis inest causa cur diligantur. Rarum genus!
et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec quicquam difficilius
quam reperire quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere per-
fectum. Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quicquam

bonum norunt nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam
pecudes eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se
80 maximum fructum esse capturos. Ita pulcherrima illa et
maxime naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita,
nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et
quanta sit; ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se
ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se quisque
sibi carus est: quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur,
verus amicus numquam reperietur; est enim is, qui est tam-
81 quam alter idem. Quod si hoc adparet in bestiis, volucri-
bus nantibus agrestibus, cicuribus feris, primum ut se ipsae
diligant—id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur—,
deinde ut requirant atque adpetant, ad quas se adplicent
eiusdem generis animantis, idque faciunt cum desiderio et
cum quadam similitudine amoris humani, quanto id magis in
homine fit natura, qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit,
cuius animum ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat paene unum ex
duobus.

82 22. Sed plerique perverse, ne dicam inpudenter, habere
talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaeque
ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab iis desiderant. Par est
autem primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem
sui quaerere. In talibus ea, quam iam dudum tractamus,
stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest, cum homines bene-
volentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus iis, quibus ceteri
serviunt, imperabunt, deinde aequitate iustitiaque gaudebunt
omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet neque quicquam umquam
nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit, neque
solum colent inter se ac diligent, sed etiam verebuntur: nam
maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea tollit vere-
83 cundiam. Itaque in iis perniciosus est error, qui existimant
libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam:
virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum

comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea, quae summa sunt, pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret; quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum optimus beatissimusque comitatus. Haec est, inquam, so- 84
cietas, in qua omnia insunt, quae putant homines expetenda, honestas, gloria, tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas, ut et cum haec adsint beata vita sit et sine his esse non possit. Quod cum optimum maximumque sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus; ea vero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt, cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit. Quocirca— 85
dicendum est enim saepius—cum iudicaris, diligere oportet, non, cum dilexeris, iudicare. Sed cum multis in rebus neglegentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis; praeposteris enim utimur consiliis et acta agimus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio. Nam inplicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione disrumpimus.

23. Quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime neces- 86
sariae tanta incuria; una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt. A multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur; multi divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat; honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur, quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil esse levius existiment; itemque cetera, quae quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent: de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt, et ii, qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt, et ii, qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ii, qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi, postremo ii, qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus,

sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo velint aliqua ex
87 parte liberaliter vivere.] Serpit enim nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui; quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et inmanitate naturae, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus, tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitatis suae. Atque hoc maxime iudicaretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam conlocaret atque ibi subpeditans omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet: quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam ferre posset cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum
88 omnium solitudo? Verum ergo illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum: si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore, quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem cui narraret habuisset. Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur, quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.

24. Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret quid velit, anquirat, desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ea, quae ab ea monemur, audimus. Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae multaeque causae suspitionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est: una illa subeunda est offensio, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur; nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole
89 fiunt. Sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit,

(10) Flattery the bane of friendship, §§ 89–100.

'Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.'

Molesta veritas, si quidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxima autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio inpellitur. Omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat; in obsequio autem, quoniam Terentiano verbo libenter utimur, comitas adsit, adsentatio, vitiorum adiutrix, procul amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur. Cuius autem aures clausae veritati 90
sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est; scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa, melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri quam eos amicos, qui dulces videantur: illos verum saepe dicere, hos numquam. Atque illud absurdum, quod ii, qui monentur, eam molestiam, quam debent capere, non capiunt, eam capiunt, qua debent vacare; peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt: quod contra oportebat delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

25. Ut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est verae 91
amicitiae et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est nullam in amicitiis pestem esse maiorem quam adulationem, blanditiam, adsentationem; quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium, ad voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem. Cum autem 92
omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est—tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat—, tum amicitiae repugnat maxime: delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius, commutabilis,

93 multiplex? Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium quam animus eius, qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam voltum atque nutum convertitur?

> 'Negat quis, nego; ait, aio; postremo imperavi egomet mihi
> Omnia adsentari,'

ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona, quod
94 amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est. Multi autem Gnathonum similes cum sint, loco, fortuna, fama superiores, horum est adsentatio molesta, cum ad vanitatem accessit
95 auctoritas. Secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. Contio, quae ex imperitissumis constat, tamen iudicare solet, quid intersit inter popularem, id est adsentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem
96 et severum et gravem. Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat in auris contionis, cum ferret legem de tribunis pl. reficiendis! dissuasimus nos; sed nihil de me, de Scipione dicam libentius: quanta illa, di inmortales, fuit gravitas, quanta in oratione maiestas! ut facile ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceres. Sed adfuistis et est in manibus oratio. Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. Atque, ut ad me redeam, meministis, Q. Maximo fratre Scipionis et L. Mancino consulibus, quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C. Licinii Crassi videbatur! Cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur, atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo: tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum inmortalium nobis defendentibus facile vincebat. Atque id actum est praetore me, quinquennio ante quam consul sum factus: ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa est.

97 26. Quod si in scaena, id est in contione, in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si modo id patefactum et inlustratum est, quid in amicitia fieri

oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur? in qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari, cum id quam vere fiat ignores. Quamquam ista adsentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest nisi ei, qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur. Ita fit ut is adsentatoribus patefaciat auris suas maxime, qui ipse sibi adsentetur et se maxime ipse delectet. Omnino est amans sui virtus; 98
optume enim se ipsa novit quamque amabilis sit intellegit: ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor, sed de virtutis opinione. Virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt: hos delectat adsentatio, his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant. Nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter verum audire non volt, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. Nec parasitorum in comoediis adsentatio faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi.

'Magnas vero agere gratias Thais mihi?'

Satis erat respondere 'magnas': 'ingentis' inquit. Semper auget adsentator id, quod is, cuius ad voluntatem dicitur, volt esse magnum. Quam ob rem, quamquam blanda ista 99
vanitas apud eos valet, qui ipsi illam adlectant et invitant, tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animadvertant ne callida adsentatione capiantur. Aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors: callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet studiose cavendum est. Nec enim facillime agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam adversando saepe adsentetur et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is, qui inlusus sit, plus vidisse videatur. Quid autem turpius quam inludi? quod ut ne accidat magis cavendum est, ut in Epiclero:

'Ut me hodie ante omnis comicos stultos senes
Versaris atque inluseris lautissime.'

100 Haec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est inpro-
vidorum et credulorum senum. Sed nescio quo pacto ab
amicitiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium—de hac
dico sapientia, quae videtur in hominem cadere posse—, ad
levis amicitias defluxit oratio. Quam ob rem ad illa prima
redeamus eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.

27. Virtus, virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et Peroration
conciliat amicitias et conservat; in ea est enim convenientia §§ 100–
rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia: quae cum se extulit 104.
et ostendit suum lumen et idem adspexit agnovitque in alio,
ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est,
ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia. Utrumque enim
ductum est ab amando; amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum
ipsum diligere quem ames, nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate
quaesita; quae tamen ipsa ecflorescit ex amicitia, etiam si tu
101 eam minus secutus sis. Hac nos adulescentes benevolentia
senes illos L. Paulum, M. Catonem, C. Gallum, P. Nasicam,
Ti. Gracchum, Scipionis nostri socerum, dileximus; haec
etiam magis elucet inter aequalis, ut inter me et Scipionem,
L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummium: vicissim autem
senes in adulescentium caritate adquiescimus, ut in vestra, ut
in Q. Tuberonis; equidem etiam admodum adulescentis P.
Rutilii, A. Verginii familiaritate delector. Quoniamque ita
ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut alia *ex alia*
aetas oriatur, maxime quidem optandum est ut cum aequali-
bus possis, quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus sis,
102 cum isdem ad calcem, ut dicitur, pervenire; sed quoniam res
humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi
sunt quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur; caritate enim
benevolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata iucunditas.
Mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit
tamen semperque vivet; virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae
exstincta non est. Nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, qui

illam semper in manibus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis: nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam
putet. Equidem ex omnibus rebus, quas mihi aut fortuna 103
aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare: in hac mihi de re publica consensus, in hac rerum privatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectationis fuit. Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem senserim, nihil audivi ex eo ipse quod nollem, una domus erat, idem victus isque communis, neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque
communes. Nam quid ego de studiis dicam cognoscendi 104
semper aliquid atque discendi, in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus? Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem; sed nec illa exstincta sunt alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea, et, si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen adferret mihi aetas ipsa solacium; diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum; omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiam si magna sunt.

Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem: vos autem hortor ut ita virtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.

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CICERONIS

LAELIUS SIVE DE AMICITIA

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A.

PEMBROKE COLLEGE, OXFORD

PART II.—NOTES

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NOTES

a. **Q. Mucius augur.** Q. Mucius Scaevola the augur is to be distinguished from his more illustrious namesake, who was known as 'pontifex.' He was no great orator, but was a man of shrewd intellect and skilled in civil law. This Q. Mucius Scaevola was consul in B.C. 117, twelve years after the date at which this dialogue is supposed to have taken place. He was still alive during the Marsic or Social War (B.C. 90–88), and in spite of old age and feeble health displayed a conspicuous example of energy. No client ever found him in bed in the morning, and he used to be the first to enter the senate (Phil. VIII, § 31). After the close of this war in B.C. 88, when Sulla had accomplished his victorious march on Rome, Mucius refused to join in the decree of proscription against Marius, declaring that he would not, for the sake of the few poor drops of blood that remained to him, declare him a public enemy by whom the City and Italy had been saved. This conduct of his is cited by Valerius Maximus (III, 8, § 5) as a shining instance of the Roman virtue of 'constantia.' § 1.

Mucius the augur is a favourite 'persona' with Cicero, who introduces him not only here, but also in the De Oratore and the De Republica.

b. **C. Laelio.** The abbreviation C. stands for Gaius, not Caius. Similarly Cn. stands for Gnaeus, not Cnaeus. See Quintilian, I, 7, § 28—'Quid? quae scribuntur aliter quam enuntiantur? Nam et Gaius C litterâ significatur.... Nec Gnaeus eam litteram in praenominis notâ accipit, quae sonat.'

c. **memoriter,** 'with good memory'—a term of praise. Cp. Acad. Pr. II, § 63—'Si te, inquit, Luculli oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, accurate, copiose'; so also De Fin. I, § 34, IV, § 1—'Ne tu, inquam, Cato, ista exposuisti ut tam multa memoriter, ut tam obscura dilucide'; De N. D. I, § 91; Ter. Phorm. 394. In De Div. II, § 14 it might merely mean 'by rote.' The adverb is formed from

the adjective 'memor,' as 'graviter' from 'gravis.' The precise sense of the adjective which is reflected by the adverb 'memoriter' is found in De Leg. I, § 22—'animal hoc providum, sagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus *hominem*.'

d. **sapientem.** The 'sapiens' is defined by Lactantius (Div. Inst. III, 13) to be the man who possesses the art of life—'cuius doctrina est, quomodo vivere oporteat.' Thus the term corresponds to the *φρόνιμος*, and not to the *σοφός*, of Aristotle. In the De Officiis, I, § 153, it is true, 'sapientia' is identified by Cicero with *σοφία*, while 'prudentia' is used to translate *φρόνησις*. The latter is defined to be 'rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia,' the former 'rerum divinarum atque humanarum scientia.' But the *σοφία* of Aristotle, which was the exercise of thought simply and solely for its own sake, is an idea which the practical Roman mind never really entertained. The Romans followed the Stoics, who reversed the decision of Aristotle as to the comparative merits of the contemplative and practical life.

e. **ita . . . ut,** 'with the view that.' Cp. § 19—'ita natos esse nos, ut,' &c.

f. **ad Scaevolam,** i.e. 'Q. Mucius augur' mentioned above. Scaevola did not profess to teach law, but allowed young men to listen when he was giving his answers as jurisconsult. See Brut. § 306—'ego autem juris civilis studio multum operae dabam Q. Scaevolae Q. F., qui quamquam nemini se ad docendum dabat, tamen consulentibus respondendo studiosos audiendi docebat.'

g. **sumpta virili toga.** Cicero assumed the garb of manhood at the usual age, namely sixteen. Before this he was a 'praetextatus' (Pro Sest. § 144; Phil. II, § 44), that is, he wore a white toga with a purple border similar to that which was worn by magistrates. Perhaps it was to encourage their ambition that the free-born youth of Rome were thus clad. But at the age of sixteen or thereabouts they appeared before the praetor in the Forum and solemnly laid aside their childhood's garb ('praetexta toga,' § 33), assuming in its stead the plain white robe known as the 'toga pura' or 'virilis.' The ceremony took place early in the morning (Pro Mur. § 69).

h. **quoad possem et liceret,** 'so far as I could and might.' 'Liceret' seems to refer to the permission of Scaevola.

i. **multa ab eo prudenter disputata,** &c., 'many wise discussions of his, many brief and pithy sayings.' In such constructions the past participle is arrested as it were in the act of passing into a substantive. In strict grammar 'multa' is here the substantive and 'disputata' the adjective, but the mind involuntarily reverses this relation, while on the other hand the adverb which clings to 'disputata' still serves to show its participial nature. Cp. § 6—'multa eius . . . provisa . . . acta . . . responsa.'

j. **prudentia doctior.** What is 'prudentia' in the mind in which it originates becomes 'doctrina' when transmitted to another. The specially Roman meaning of 'prudentia,' namely, an aptitude for law, is still testified to by our word 'jurisprudence.' In the De Naturâ Deorum II, § 58 Cicero shows himself acquainted with the fact that 'prudentia' is a contracted form of 'providentia,' offering it as an alternative for that word in translating the Greek πρόνοια; cp. De Rep. VI, § 1. In his juvenile work the De Inventione (II, § 160), he subordinates 'providentia' to 'prudentia' as 'species' to 'genus.' 'Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutrarumque scientia; partes eius memoria, intellegentia, providentia.'

k. **pontificem Scaevolam.** Q. Mucius Scaevola pontifex, Publii filius, was one of the chief founders of Roman law, and as such has had his share in the making of history. He codified the 'ius civile' in eighteen books (Digest I, ii, 2, § 41). His father before him had excelled in the same study (De Off. I, § 116). He was raised to the consulship in B.C. 95 along with the celebrated orator L. Licinius Crassus. Cicero (De Off. III, § 62) recounts a striking instance of his personal probity. On being shown a farm, for the purchase of which he was in treaty, he said that it was valued too low, and added 100,000 sesterces to the price. His administration of the province of Asia was marked by such integrity and firmness that by a decree of the Senate Scaevola was held up as a pattern to all future governors of that province (Val. Max. VIII, 15, § 6). As a speaker he was unrivalled in the lucid interpretation of law, though otherwise more formidable as a critic than admirable as an orator (Brut. § 146). In the civil dissensions he was a moderate adherent of the aristocratic side, and in favour of effecting a compromise between the two parties (Pro Rosc. Am. § 33). Nevertheless an attempt was made on his life by C. Fimbria, a Marian leader, and the most reckless man of his day. Four years later he was actually murdered in the consulship of the younger Marius (B.C. 82), when Sulla's army was already at the gates of Rome. The image of Vesta was sprinkled with his blood (De Orat. III, § 10), and his body was thrown into the river (Appian, Bell. Civ. I, 88). Lucan (II, 126) refers to his death in these words—

> 'Te quoque neglectum violatae, Scaevola, dextrae
> Ante ipsum penetrale Deae, semperque calentes
> Mactavere focos.'

l. **unum . . . praestantissimum.** The exclusive force of the superlative is increased by the addition of 'unus.' Cp. Verg. Aen. II, 426—

> 'justissimus unus
> Qui fuit in Teucris et servantissimus aequi.'

Sometimes 'omnium' is added to 'unus' to impart still greater emphasis, e. g. Brut. § 25—'rem unam esse omnium difficillimam.'

m. **et ingenio et iustitia,** 'both for ability and uprightness.'

n. **alias,** 'on other occasions,' e. g. De Orat. I, § 180, III, § 10; Brut. §§ 145–8; Pro Rosc. Am. § 33; De Off. I, § 116, III, § 62; De Leg. II, § 47; De N. D. III, § 80, where he is called 'temperantiae prudentiaeque specimen.'

§ 2. *a.* **Cum . . . tum.** 'Among many other things I remember.' There is a zeugma involved by the use of 'illum incidere' following, for this only suits the 'tum memini' and not the 'cum saepe multa.' With the former we may supply 'illum dicere.'

b. **hemicyclio.** 'Hemicyclium' (ἡμικύκλιον) = semicircular. Here it is probably used for a row of seats arranged in a semicircle. Perhaps Cicero had the opening of the Republic in his mind at this point (328 c)—*ἐκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν· ἔκειντο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλῳ.*

c. **in eum sermonem,** &c., 'his entering on that topic.'

d. **incidere.** The present infinitive is usual after 'memini' when a personal reminiscence is being spoken of. Cp. § 11—'memini Catonem disserere;' Cat. Mai. § 30—'Ego L. Metellum memini puer . . . ita bonis esse viribus;' De Orat. I, § 24—'dici mihi memini.' When the fact has not come within the immediate experience of the subject, the perfect is always employed, and may also be employed when it has. Thus in Pro Rosc. Am. § 122 we have (in the 2nd person)—'Meministis me ita distribuisse initio causam,' and in § 4 below (in the 3rd)—'disputata ab eo meminisset Scaevola.'

e. **fere multis.** A slight redundancy, as 'fere' adds nothing to the idea of 'multis.'

f. **P. Sulpicio.** P. Sulpicius Rufus was one of the greatest orators of his day. His style was tragic in its intensity, his voice full and mellow, and his gesture and movements graceful and dignified: but he lacked the wit of Crassus, whom he took for his model (Brut. § 203; cp. De Orat. I, § 27). At first he was regarded as one of the rising hopes of the aristocratical party, who smiled upon his candidature for the tribuneship (De Orat. I, § 25). He is described by Velleius Paterculus as 'disertus, acer, opibus, gratia, amicitiis, vigore ingenii atque animi celeberrimus.' But his talents and influence were lost to his party, when he obtained the tribuneship in B.C. 88. For he flung himself into the cause of the commons, and among other popular resolutions proposed to transfer the command against Mithridates from Sulla to Marius. It was these measures that led to Sulla's march upon Rome, and to the first pitched battle within the walls of the city. Marius and Sulpicius fled before their victorious antagonist, by whom a price was set upon their heads. Sulpicius hid himself in a villa, but was betrayed

by a slave. The slave was rewarded by Sulla with his liberty, and then flung down from the Tarpeian rock (Liv. Epist. 87; Plut. Sulla, 10). We catch an utterance of the defeated party in the words of Cornificius (Ad H. IV, § 31)—'Sulpicio qui paulo ante omnia concedebant, eum brevi spatio non modo vivere, sed etiam sepeliri prohibuerunt.'

g. **utebare.** For 'uti' used of intimate acquaintance, cp. Pro Rosc. Am. § 27—'quâ pater usus erat plurimum.' The abstract term 'usus' has sometimes the same force, e.g. § 32; Pro Plancio, § 5—'in tanto usu nostro tantaque amicitia.' Cp. the use of 'consuetudo,' as in Livy XXV, 18, § 4. Atticus' cousin Anicia was married to M. Servius, the brother of the orator Sulpicius.

h. **capitali odio.** The adjective 'capitalis' is properly a legal term signifying what affects a man's life or status as a citizen. We have the substantive 'capital' in Livy XXIV, 37, § 9, 'Praesidio decedere apud Romanos capital esse.' From 'capital' to 'deadly' the transition is easy. How deadly the hatred was between Sulpicius and Pompeius may be gathered from the statement of Velleius Paterculus (II, 18) that Sulpicius caused the murder of his former friend's son—'Quin etiam Q Pompeii filium, eundemque Sullae generum, per emissarios factionis suae interfecit.' A less dark complexion however is put upon the act by the account in Appian (Bell. Civ. I, 56)—*κἀν τῷδε Πομπηΐου τὸν υἱόν, κηδεύοντα τῷ Σύλλᾳ, παρρησιαζόμενόν τι καὶ λέγοντα, κτείνουσιν οἱ τοῦ Σουλπικίου στασιῶται.*

i. **Q. Pompeio.** Q. Pompeius Rufus was consul along with Sulla in the year B.C. 88. When Sulla was about to set out for the East, he was appointed to the command of the army in Italy. But he was murdered by the soldiers, with the connivance, it was supposed, of Cn. Pompeius Strabo, the father of Pompeius Magnus. At all events Strabo quietly resumed the command, which he had held before the arrival of Rufus (Appian, B. C. I, 63; Vell. Pat. II, 20, § 1).

j. **coniunctissime et amantissime.** Cp. § 104—'coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri.'

k. **quanta esset,** &c. 'How much people wondered or lamented.' Perhaps we catch an echo of this quarrel in the rhetorical example given by Cornificius (IV, § 49)—'mihi cum isto, iudices, fuit amicitia, sed ista tamen amicitia—tametsi vereor, quomodo accepturi sitis, tamen dicam—vos me privastis. quid ita? quia, ut vobis essem probatus, eum, qui vos oppugnabat, inimicum quam amicum habere malui.'

a. **eam ipsam mentionem** = 'eius ipsius rei mentionem.' Cp. Pro § 3.
Mur. § 68—'si tibi istam rationem non possim reddere,' where 'istam rationem' = 'istius rei rationem.'

b. **C. Fannio.** C. Fannius was older than Scaevola the augur, but he married the younger daughter of Laelius. Following the example

of his father-in-law he had studied under the Stoic philosopher Panaetius. He is described by Cicero in the Brutus (§ 100 *ad fin.*) as 'et moribus et ipso genere dicendi durior.' He was the author of a history of which Cicero speaks in terms of moderate praise. In it he recorded how he and the celebrated Tiberius Gracchus had been the first to scale the walls of the enemy when serving under the younger Scipio in Africa (Plut. Tib. Grac. 4). Fannius also figures in the De Republica.

c. **sententias memoriae mandavi.** The ascription of the ideas or sentiments of the following discourse to Laelius may safely be regarded as nothing more than a literary artifice.

d. **quasi enim ipsos,** &c. Dialogues may be divided into two kinds, the dramatic and narrated. In the dramatic dialogue only the speeches of the interlocutors are given; in the narrated they are connected by a thread of story. The first kind is the less troublesome; the second involves a strain upon the credulity of the reader, owing to the prodigious memory that must be possessed by the reciter, but has the advantage of allowing the author to notify from time to time the circumstances of time and place and the play of character and feeling. The dramatic dialogue has often an introduction prefixed in order to compensate in some measure for its absence of setting. Of Plato's dialogues those which are couched in the narrated form are the Phaedo, Parmenides, Symposium, Anterastae, Charmides, Lysis, Euthydemus, Protagoras, and Republic; the rest are dramatic. The bulk of Cicero's dialogues on the other hand are in the narrated form. This is the case with the De Oratore, which is supposed to be narrated by Cotta, with the Brutus, the Posterior and Prior Academics, the De Finibus, the De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione, De Fato, and Timaeus, all of which are supposed to be narrated by Cicero himself, and lastly with the De Republica, which is supposed to be narrated by P. Rutilius Rufus. It was easier for Cicero to adopt this form, as the sharp sword-play of dialectic is absent from his writings. Only in five of his dialogues has Cicero preferred the dramatic form. These are the De Partitione Oratoria, which is a dialogue, without introduction, held between Cicero and his son, the Tusculan Disputations, a series of scholae, in which Cicero, after the manner of the Greek sophists, is supposed to discuss the subject propounded by the hearer, the Cato Maior, the Laelius and the De Legibus, the form of which is doubtless modelled on the Laws of Plato. The Paradoxa Stoicorum are in part what may be called 'altercations' or 'rhetorical dialogues,' that is an opponent is sometimes assumed in them for the purposes of argument. The rest of Cicero's prose works are either treatises or speeches.

e. **ne 'inquam' et 'inquit,'** &c. Cp. Tusc. Disp. I, § 8—'sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi

agatur res, non quasi narretur.' It is possible that Cicero had before his mind the passage in the Theaetetus (143 c), in which Plato declares in favour of the dramatic form of dialogue: but the marks of imitation are not conclusive.

f. **interponeretur.** It is habitual with Cicero to use the historic sequence after a true perfect like 'induxi.'

a. **mecum ageres, ut,** 'you pleaded with me that.' Cp. Pro Mur. § 4.
§ 32—'neque vero cum P. Africano senatus egisset, ut legatus fratri proficisceretur.'

b. **digna . . . omnium cognitione,** 'one of general interest.'

c. **feci non invitus ut,** 'I was not unwilling to.' An idiomatic periphrasis of common occurrence. Cp. Cat. Mai. § 42—'Invitus feci ut . . . L. Flamininum e senatu eicerem.'

d. **Catone Maiore . . . de senectute.** Here Cicero himself indicates the correct title and sub-title of the earlier dialogue composed in this the most active year of his literary life, B.C. 44.

e. **Catonem.** Cp. §§ 5, 6, 9, 11, 21, 90, 101.

f. **aptior . . . quae.** Like 'dignus, indignus, idoneus qui.'

g. **persona.** A theatrical metaphor. The word means literally a mask ('personae pallentis hiatum,' Juv. III, 175), and then the character or part played by a person on the stage or off. Hence our word 'person,' by which the Latin term has sometimes to be rendered. De Orat. III, § 53—'ut rerum, ut personarum dignitates ferunt.'

h. **eius, qui . . . fuisset,** 'one who had been.' The generic sense of 'one' is imparted by the use of the subjunctive.

i. **maxime memorabilem.** The comparative 'memorabilior' occurs in Livy XXXVIII, 53, but the single form of the superlative is avoided, doubtless as being too long. Cp. De Div. I, § 94—'quod agros uberrimos maximeque fertiles incolunt.'

j. **disputata.** There is no 'dissertus' in Classical Latin. 'Dĭsertus,' which is said to stand for it, is used only as an adjective.

k. **et eorum inlustrium.** Cp. § 7—'et eum quidem;' § 17—'eaque Graecorum.'

a. **ad senem senex de senectute,** &c. A good instance of a figure § 5.
of speech, which may be designated Paronymous Terms. Cp. § 25—'iustitiam iustissimo.' One of the most sustained instances of it to be found anywhere is in Plato, Prot. 326 D—ὥσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι οὕτω τὸ γραμματεῖον διδόασι.

b. **sapiens.** The distinction that is here implied between 'sapiens' and 'prudens' is brought out below. 'Prudentia' involves only 'multarum rerum usus'; 'sapientia' demands also 'studium et doctrina'; the one is based on practice, the other superadds theory.

c. **velim.** 'Velim, malim, nolim' are a modest way of expressing a wish. 'Ut' is commonly omitted after them, as also after the imperatives 'dic, fac, sine,' and verbs of commanding, begging, and persuading.

d. **animum . . . avertas.** The opposite of 'animum advertere.'

e. **ab his,** 'on their part.' 'Oritur' is not a passive verb, and 'ab' here does not quite denote the agent.

f. **respondet Laelius.** That is, Laelius here plays the same part as Cicero (under the symbol M) plays in the Tusculan Disputations, of discussing 'more Graeco' the subject propounded to him by his auditors.

§ 6. *a.* **Sunt ista.** 'What you say is true.'

b. **appellant.** Cf. T. D. IV, § 5—'sapientiae studium vetus id quidem in nostris, sed tamen ante Laelii aetatem et Scipionis non reperio quos appellare possim nominatim.'

c. **Tribuebatur hoc.** 'This compliment used to be paid.'

d. **L. Acilium.** This is evidently the same person who in the Digest (I, ii, 2, § 38) is called Publius Atilius, and who is there stated to have been the first who was called Sapiens by the people. He is mentioned along with the brothers Sextus and Publius Aelius as a successor of Tiberius Coruncanius, who was the first professional teacher of law at Rome ('ante Tiberium Coruncanium publice professum neminem traditur,' Ibid. § 35). Before Atilius or Acilius however Sempronius, who was consul in B.C. 304, had received the cognomen of Σοφός from the people. The surname Σοφός was given in this instance alone: but it would appear from Aulus Gellius that Sapiens was often conferred as a title of honour upon those who were learned in the law (IV, 1, § 16—'veteres iuris magistri, qui "sapientes" appellati sunt').

e. **multarum rerum usum,** 'great experience of affairs.'

f. **multa eius,** &c., 'many instances on his part of wise prevision, of firm action, or acute reply.' See § 1 *i*.

g. **cognomen . . . sapientis.** Genitive of definition, in place of a noun in apposition. Cp. De Fin. II, § 6—'haec vox voluptatis'; § 75 ad in.—'verbum ipsum voluptatis.' On Cato's surname of Sapiens cp. Cat. Mai. § 5—'quocirca si sapientiam meam admirari soletis—quae utinam digna esset opinione vestra nostroque cognomine!'

§ 7. *a.* **Te autem alio,** &c. This sentence is constructed with colloquial looseness. It involves what grammarians call an 'anacoluthon,' i.e. it is not finished in exactly the way which the opening leads us to expect. 'Te autem . . . sapientem' requires 'existimant,' for which we have substituted, after the self-interruption of the speaker, the phrase 'hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant,' which is further elucidated by an epexegetical clause 'ut . . . putes.'

b. **neminem.** Governed by 'accepimus' after the parenthesis. Supply 'fuisse.'

c. **qui septem appellantur,** 'the so-called seven sages,' Sidgwick. The earliest form of Greek philosophy embodied itself in short and pithy sayings, which by this time appear pretty trite, such as 'Know thyself,' 'All things in moderation,' 'It is hard to be good.' The authors of these maxims lived in the sixth century B.C. and were known as The Seven Wise Men. Their names, according to the list given by Plato in the Protagoras, were—

1. Thales of Miletus.
2. Pittacus of Mitylene.
3. Bias of Priene.
4. Solon of Athens.
5. Cleobulus of Lindus.
6. Myson of Chenae.
7. Chilon of Lacedaemon.

Periander of Corinth generally figures in the list instead of Myson of Chenae (or Chen, *ὁ Χηνεύς*).

d. **ista.** Philosophical questions, which Fannius regards as the special province of Laelius.

e. **subtilius.** Thus Dicaearchus, who belonged to the Peripatetic School, declared that the Seven were neither sages nor philosophers, but shrewd men of the world with a turn for legislation (*οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε φιλοσόφους . . . συνετοὺς δέ τινας καὶ νομοθετικούς*, D. L. I, § 40. Cp. Cic. De Rep. I, § 12). Thales however must be excepted from this criticism, an exception which Cicero himself makes, De Orat. III, § 137.

f. **Apollinis oraculo.** Cp. Cat. Mai. § 78. The reference is to the story told in the Apology of how Chaerephon consulted the oracle at Delphi to know whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates, and was told that there was not. The Scholiast on Plato professes to preserve the words of the oracle—

σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος (δ') Εὐριπίδης·
ἀνδρῶν δ' ἁπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος.

The second line is also quoted by Diogenes Laertius.

g. **omnia tua in te,** &c. Cp. § 30; Cat. Mai. § 4. This was the standing formula of the self-centred philosophy of the ancient world, the keynote of which was *αὐτάρκεια*. When Bias of Priene, on the capture of his native city, was recommended to take as much of his property with him as he could, he is said to have replied, 'I have with me all that belongs to me' ('omnia mea porto mecum,' Paradox. I, § 8. A similar story is told of Stilpo by Seneca De Const. Sap. ch. 5). Cp. T. D. V, § 30—'omniaque sibi in sese esse posita'; ib. § 42; Menex. 247 E—*ὅτῳ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνήρτηται πάντα τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν φέροντα κ.τ.λ.*; Ceb. Tab. XXIII, *ad fin.*—*καὶ ἔχει οὐκ ἐν ἑτέροις τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἀλλ' ἐν αὑτῷ*. In the Phormio of Terence, which is from the Greek of Apollodorus, the same sentiment is bombastically put into the mouth of a slave, line 139—'in me omnis spes mihist.'

h. **humanosque casus,** &c. We should rather turn the phrase the other way 'and that virtue rises superior to the chances of human life.'

i. **hoc,** 'here,' *δεικτικῶς*.

j. **proximis Nonis,** 'last Nones.' The words might mean 'next Nones,' since 'proximus' is used of what is nearest in time, whether in the past or in the future.

k. **hortos.** 'Hortus' is 'a garden,' or, as a singular term, 'the garden,' whereas 'horti' means 'pleasure grounds.'

l. **D. Bruti.** Decimus Junius Brutus, surnamed Gallaecus, was a celebrated general. He carried the Roman arms into the furthest corner of Lusitania (Vell. Pat. II, 5, § 1; Liv. Epit. 55). He was consul in B.C. 138 along with P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, the murderer of Tiberius Gracchus. They were both thrown into prison during their term of office by a tribune C. Curiatius (Liv. Epit. 55; Cic. De Leg. III, § 20). Decimus Brutus was a friend of the poet Accius, a not unpolished speaker, and fairly versed in Greek literature for the time at which he lived (Brut. § 107).

m. **commentandi causa,** 'for a rehearsal,' either of ceremonies or formulae, such as those of which we have a specimen in De Div. II, §§ 71, 72. It was a standing custom among the members of the College of Augurs to meet on the Nones, but had been discontinued before B.C. 44. See De Div. I, § 90 (where Quintus Cicero is addressing his brother Marcus)—'et in Persis augurantur et divinant Magi, qui congregantur in fano commentandi causa atque inter se colloquendi: quod etiam idem vos quondam facere Nonis solebatis.'

n. **venissemus.** This implies that Fannius was a member of the College of Augurs, whereas it is expressly stated in Brut. § 101 (written B.C. 46) that he was not, and disliked his father-in-law on account of the preference he had shown in this respect for Scaevola.

o. **qui . . . solitus esses,** 'though you had been accustomed.'

p. **illum diem . . . obire,** 'to meet your engagements on that day.'

§ 8. *a.* **Quaerunt quidem.** The 'quidem' indicates assent to the last speaker. 'Yes: many do ask.'

b. **quod animum adverti.** 'Quod' here is not a conjunction, but the relative pronoun with 'id' for its antecedent. The clause 'quod animum adverti' might be taken out without injury to the construction, which runs thus—'respondeo te dolorem ferre moderate, nec potuisse,' &c. Notice that 'animum adverti,' though written separately, practically make up one verb, which governs 'quod.'

c. **humanitatis tuae,** 'your feelings as a man.' Even the stoic Seneca sanctions some exhibition of human weakness. Cons. ad Polyb. 36—'Nam et non sentire mala sua non est hominis, et non ferre non est viri.'

d. **adfuisses.** The subjunctive is due to the oblique oration.

valetudinem. Like our own word 'health,' 'valetudo' often stands for 'ill-health,' as when we say, 'My health did not permit me to do so and so.' When it is meant definitely to stand for 'good health,' 'integra' or 'bona' (cp. § 20) is generally added. Pliny the younger (Epist. V, 16) talks of a fatal illness as 'novissimam valetudinem.' By the time of Aulus Gellius the bad meaning had completely established itself in common usage. See Noct. Att. XII, 9, § 1.

e. **isto officio,** 'the duty you speak of.' Referring to the words of Scaevola, 'quod autem Nonis,' &c.

a. **quod . . . dicis,** 'in saying,' explanatory of the clause 'facis amice.' § **9.**

b. **tribui.** Cp. § 6—'Tribuebatur.'

c. **ut mihi videris.** 'Videri' in Latin, like *φαίνεσθαι* in Greek, prefers the personal to the impersonal construction.

d. **si quisquam.** Note the emphatic force of 'quisquam,' 'any one at all.' Cp. the line of Publius Syrus quoted by Seneca (Cons. ad Marc. 9; De Tranq. An. 11)—

'Cuivis potest accidere, quod cuiquam potest.'

'That can happen to anyone you choose to take, which can happen to anyone at all.'

e. **Memineram Paulum,** &c. With this passage we may compare T. D. III, § 70—'quid, qui non putant lugendum viris? qualis fuit Q. Maxumus efferens filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus duobus paucis diebus amissis filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione conlegimus.'

f. **Paulum.** L. Aemilius Paulus, surnamed Macedonicus from his victory over Perseus, died in B.C. 160, that is, thirty-one years before the time at which Laelius is supposed to be speaking. He was consul for the first time in B.C. 182, and for the second in B.C. 168. He was the son of the consul who died at Cannae and the father of the younger Africanus. He lost his two younger sons, one four days before his triumph over Perseus, the other three days after. Their death was the more lamentable, as his two elder sons, Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus and P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, had been lost to his house by adoption, and there was no one to carry on the line. The praise of his magnanimity, which is so frequent in Cicero's mouth (cp. Ad Fam. IV, 6, § 1), seems to be based on a speech which he delivered to the people, of which a notable passage has been preserved by Valerius Maximus (V, 10, § 2).

g. **Gallum.** C. Sulpicius Gallus was one of the most accomplished men of his age. He was not only deeply versed in Greek literature (Brut. § 78), but also well acquainted with astronomy (Cat. Mai. § 49; De Rep. I, § 21). On the eve of the battle of Pydna, when serving as tribune in the army of his friend Paulus Aemilius Macedonicus, he

made his knowledge useful by predicting to the soldiers that an eclipse of the moon would take place the following night, telling them the exact time it would last and ascribing its cause to the intervention of the earth's shadow (Livy XLIV, 37; Plin. N. H. II, 12 or § 53). In this way the Romans were saved from the scare which pervaded the Macedonian camp. It should be added that according to Cicero (De Rep. I, § 23) the prophecy was after the event. Two years later he became consul himself (B.C. 166) along with M. Claudius Marcellus, grandson of the capturer of Syracuse, and carried on a successful campaign against the Ligurians (Liv. XLV, 44; Epit. XLVI). It was in his consulship that the Andria of Terence was acted, as appears from the Didascalia prefixed to that play. I have not thought it necessary to follow Baiter in the spelling Galus in this passage. The name is spelt Gallus by Kayser in vol. II, Brut. § 78, and by Baiter himself in vol. VIII, De Rep. § 21.

h. **in perfecto et spectato viro.** M. Porcius Cato Licinianus, the eldest son of Cato the Censor, was eminent as a jurist. Aulus Gellius (XIII, 20) says—'egregios de juris disciplina libros reliquit' and he is referred to as an authority in the Digest (I, ii, 2, § 38). He fought at Pydna under Aemilius Paulus, whose daughter he afterwards married. There is an anecdote related of the coolness with which he recovered his sword in battle, when he had dropped it (Val. Max. III, 2, § 16). He was 'praetor designatus' when he died. The modesty of his funeral, suitable to his father's narrow means, is remarked upon in Liv. Epit. 48. Cp. the reference to him in the Cato Maior, § 68—'Sensi ego in optimo filio . . . mortem omni aetati esse commune.'

§ 10. *a.* **cave . . . anteponas.** 'Cave,' it may be noticed, is the only word in Latin after which 'ne' can be omitted.

b. **huius enim facta,** &c. This is said from an *ex parte* standpoint. For the life of Socrates influenced his followers no less than his discourses. 'Huius' is used of Cato, as being nearer from a Roman point of view.

c. **habetote.** The so-called future imperative is used in laws and in solemn and definite exhortations. Cp. Cat. Mai. § 79—'eundem igitur esse creditote, etiam si nullum videbitis': 'you must believe therefore that I exist all the same, even though you shall see me not at all.'

d. **desiderio.** 'Desiderium' is here used in its strict sense of regret for what is dear and lost. Cp. § 104 and Hor. Carm. I, 24, § 1—

'Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus
tam cari capitis?'

e. **moveri.** 'Motus,' 'affectus,' 'perturbationes,' 'commotiones animi' are all used as equivalents for the Greek πάθη, to describe those gusts of passion which are liable to disturb the calm reasonableness of the sage. Of these terms 'motus' is the mildest. Cp. T. D. III, § 7—'Nam

misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos (=πάθη) Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantes.'

f. **negem . . . mentiar.** The event is still possible, hence we have not the imperf. subj., but it is intimated that it will not actually occur.

g. **viderint sapientes.** 'Let the philosophers see to it.' The jussive use of the perfect subjunctive. We are more familiar with it in prohibitions, e.g. Livy XXI, 44, § 6—'Ne transieris Hiberum.'

h. **sed certe.** The intrusion of these words involves a slight anacoluthon. They are due to the thought which occurred on the way, 'quam id recte,' &c. The cast of the passage is like Livy XXIII, 47, § 8 'Huic pugnae equestri rem, quam vera sit, communis existimatio est ('every one may judge for himself'), mirabilem certe adiiciunt quidam annales.'

i. **confirmare.** Stronger than 'affirmare': 'positively assert.'

j. **egeo.** The distinction between 'egere,' and 'carere' is brought out in this passage. 'Egere,' 'to stand in need of'; 'carere' simply 'to be without.'

k. **si quid accidit.** Not a dependent clause, but subject to 'mihi accidit.' 'Any that has happened has happened to me.'

l. **suis autem incommodis,** &c. See the turn given to the same sentiment in the Brutus, § 4—'illius vero (Hortensii) mortis opportunitatem benevolentia potius quam misericordia prosequamur, ut . . . illum potius quam nosmet ipsos diligere videamur.'

a. **Cum illo . . . actum esse praeclare,** 'that he has been dealt well by.' Cp. Acad. Prior. II, § 128—'praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile quod sit invenerit.' **§ 11.**

b. **quod . . . putabat,** 'an idea that never entered his head.'

c. **inmortalitatem,** 'exemption from death,' immortality of earthly existence: not as in § 14—'de inmortalitate animorum.'

d. **optare,** 'to pray for.' Livy IV, 15, § 6—'cui tribunatus plebis magis optandus quam sperandus fuit.' Lact. Div. Inst. II, 1—'Nam et cum iurant et cum optant et cum gratias agunt, non Iovem aut Deos multos, sed Deum nominant.' See 18 *d.*

e. **primum,** B.C. 147, when Scipio was about thirty-eight, whereas the legal age for the consulship was forty-three. Velleius Paterculus (II, 4, § 7) says that Scipio was elected to his first consulship at the age of thirty-six and died at the age of fifty-four. The way in which he says it shows that it was not the prevalent opinion.

f. **iterum,** B.C. 134, when he was appointed to the command at Numantia.

g. **sibi suo tempore,** 'at the proper time as regards himself.' For 'suo tempore' cp. Phil. XIV, § 15—'sed suo tempore totius huius

sceleris fons aperietur.' The expression 'annus suus' is used of the exact year in which a man first became eligible for public office. Pro Mil. § 24—'subito reliquit annum suum seseque in annum proximum transtulit.'

h. **rei publicae paene sero.** Because of the inefficiency of the generals who had previously commanded in Spain.

i. **duabus urbibus**, Carthage and Numantia. Cp. De Rep. I, § 71 *ad fin.*

j. **inimicissumis.** Cp. 'facillumis,' below; 'optumo,' § 13; 'optumi,' § 14; 'optume,' § 15; 'existumes,' § 16; 'optumam,' § 19; 'optumi,' § 33; 'lubet,' § 41; 'optume,' § 50 *ad fin.*; 'optumam,' § 55; 'deterrumus,' § 59; 'imperitissumis,' § 95. The archaic u in Latin gave way slowly to i. Quintilian (I, 7, § 21) records that the title 'optimus maximus' was first written without the u in an inscription of Caligula's. We need not infer that the change took place equally late in other words, as religion is one of the most conservative forces in language.

k. **facillumis.** As used of character 'facilis' is 'kind' and 'difficilis' the contrary. Cp. Martial's epigram:—

> 'Difficilis, facilis, iucundus, acerbus es idem:
> nec possum cum te vivere, nec sine te;'

which someone has well rendered:—

> 'So cross, so kind, such bitter-sweet about thee;
> I cannot live or with thee or without thee.'

l. **pietate**, 'filial feeling,' the prevailing meaning of the word.

m. **matrem.** His mother Papiria was divorced by her husband Aemilius Paulus for no assignable reason. When his friends remonstrated, he merely remarked that they could not tell where the shoe pinched. Plut. Aemil. Paul. V.

n. **sorores.** He had two. One of them was married to the eldest son of Cato the Censor (see § 9 *h*), the other to Aelius Tubero, an honourable but very poor man. Plut. Aemil. Paul. V.

o. **bonitate in suos.** E.g. he gave up his share of the inheritance from his father L. Paulus, to his elder brother Q. Maximus (see § 69 *f*), who, like himself, had been adopted into another family. Cic. Paradox, § 48; Plut. Aemil. Paul. V.

p. **maerore.** Used properly, as here, of the outward signs of grief. T. D. IV, § 18—'maeror aegritudo flebilis.'

q. **ut memini.** A piece of literary artifice, to give verisimilitude to the former dialogue.

r. **anno ante quam est mortuus.** The conversation is supposed to have been held in B.C. 150, when Cato was in his eighty-fourth year. See Cat. Mai. § 32.

s. **disserere.** See § 2 *d*.

t. **etiam nunc.** Scipio was about fifty-six years of age at the time of his death in B. C. 129.

a. **moriundi.** Cp. § 60—'praecipiundum'; § 62—'experiundum'; § 76—'faciunda'; § 78—'ferundae.' § 12.

b. **quo de genere.** Cp. De Inv. I, §§ 29, 30; II, § 102, where 'quo de genere' is used without a genitive depending on it. The collocation is similar to 'quam ob rem,' which we have just had; 'quem ad modum,' §§ 16, 41 ad fin.; 'qua de re,' De Inv. I, § 29.

c. **difficile dictu.** Scipio was supposed to have been murdered. In the evening he laid a tablet beside his bed on which he meant to compose a speech to be delivered the next day; in the morning he was found dead without a wound (Appian, Bell. Civ. I, 20). There were said, however, to be marks of strangling ('mane in lectulo repertus est mortuus, ita ut quaedam elisarum faucium in cervice reperirentur notae,' Vell. Pat. II, 4).

d. **quid homines suspicentur.** Suspicion attached to C. Gracchus, to his mother Cornelia, and his sister Sempronia, who was wife to Africanus (Liv. Epit. 59; Plut. Caius, 10; Appian, Bell. Civ. 20). The more probable opinion, however, pointed to Fulvius Flaccus and C. Papirius Carbo, who had been appointed triumvirs along with C. Gracchus (in place of Tiberius and his father-in-law Appius Claudius), as the authors of the murder. It was said that some slaves had confessed under torture that strangers had come in by a back-way during the night and strangled Scipio. Carbo was charged with the crime by the young orator Crassus. See De Or. II, § 170, and cp. ad Fam. IX, 21, § 3; ad Q. Frat. II, 3, § 3. Cicero himself entertained no doubt but that there had been foul play in the matter. Cp. De Fat. § 18—'sic si diceretur "morietur noctu in cubiculo suo vi oppressus Scipio," vere diceretur; id enim fore diceretur, quod esset futurum, futurum autem fuisse, ex eo, quia factum est intellegi debet.'

e. **quos . . . celeberrimos.** When a relative clause, such as 'quos in vita viderit,' defines the limitation under which a superlative is to be taken, the superlative naturally finds its place in the relative clause in Latin. Not so in English: we should say something like this—'out of the many days of crowds and rejoicing.'

f. **sociis et Latinis.** The agrarian enactments of the Gracchi affected injuriously the Italian allies of Rome; and it was Scipio's championship of the latter, as against the Roman commons, that led to his unpopularity and indirectly to his death.

g. **ut ex tam alto,** &c., 'that from so lofty a pinnacle of dignity he seems rather to have been translated to the gods above than to have descended to the shades below.'

§ 13. *a.* **adsentior.** A middle voice both in form and meaning = join myself in assent to.

b. **nuper disserere.** In the debate in the Senate during Cicero's consulship (B.C. 63) as to the fate of Catiline's adherents Caesar had declared 'in luctu atque miseriis mortem aerumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse; eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere, ultra neque curae neque gaudio locum esse' (Sall. Cat. 51, § 20). The doctrines of Epicurus had been gaining ground lately among the Romans. In Cicero's eyes they were 'the enemy,' and it was chiefly as a counterblast to them that he undertook his championship of the Academy. The most powerful exposition of the Epicurean philosophy that has ever been given is that by Lucretius, but it made singularly little impression on the minds of his countrymen. Cicero just mentions him in reply to his brother Quintus (II, 9, § 3—'Lucretii poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt, multis luminibus ingenii, multae etiam artis'). It was chiefly through the medium of a writer named Amafinius (or Amafanius) that the doctrines of Epicurus became known to the Romans. See T. D. IV, § 6—'C. Amafinius exstitit dicens, cuius libris editis commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam'; and cp. Acad. Post. I, §§ 5, 6. Amafinius seems to have had a host of followers. T. D. IV, § 7—'post Amafinium autem multi eiusdem aemuli rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt.'

c. **antiquorum.** The Academic and Peripatetic schools back to Plato and Aristotle.

d. **nostrorum maiorum.** This form of the argument from authority had always much weight with the conservative Roman mind. See the words of Cotta on the subject in N. D. III, §§ 5, 6, and especially his enouncement of the duty of blind belief—'maioribus autem nostris (debeo) etiam nulla ratione reddita credere.' When Christianity was still struggling for acceptance, its defenders asserted the right of private judgment and anticipated the apophthegm of Bacon—'Antiquitas saeculi iuventus mundi.' Thus we find Lactantius saying (Div. Inst. II, 7)—'Nec quia nos illi temporibus antecesserunt, sapientia quoque antecesserunt.'

e. **si nihil . . . arbitrarentur,** 'if they thought that they (i.e. the "religiosa iura") in no way concerned them.' The argument is that the care bestowed upon the dead indicates a belief in their survival. For why should we concern ourselves on their behalf in that which does not concern them? The argument here is not the same as in Cat. Mai. § 80—'nec vero clarorum virorum post mortem honores permanerent, si nihil eorum ipsorum animi efficerent, quo diutius memoriam sui teneremus': but very possibly it is suggested by the same words of Xenophon

(Cyrop. VIII, 7, § 18)—τοῖς δὲ φθιμένοις τὰς τιμὰς διαμένειν ἔτι ἂν δοκεῖτε, εἰ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κύριαι ἦσαν;

f. **eorum.** The Pythagoreans, who dwelt in the cities of Magna Graecia, and especially in Croton.

g. **magnamque Graeciam.** A name given to the Greek settlements in Southern Italy, just as we talk of 'Greater Britain.'

h. **institutis et praeceptis.** The distinction between these corresponds to that between ἔθος and λόγος or διδαχή, Arist. E. N. X, 9, § 6.

i. **eius.** Socrates. Cp. § 7 *f*, § 10.

j. **sed idem semper.** Supply 'videbatur' from below. Socrates, which of course means Plato, never argues in favour of any other view than that of immortality, but he more than once admits that the survival of death by the soul is after all an open question. Take for instance Apol. 29 A, B.

k. **reditum in caelum.** The four elements were supposed to occupy their places in the universe in order of comparative grossness or purity—earth, the heaviest, lowest, then water, then air, then fire. Any particle of one element, if separated from the main body, always tended to return to it. Hence a stone falls down to earth, whereas fire burns up to heaven. Now the soul was evidently connected with fire—as witness the heat of the body, which becomes cold at death, when deserted by the soul. Hence, when released from the body, it tended to rejoin the celestial fires. This idea is unconsciously perpetuated whenever we talk of 'going up to heaven' at death. See De Rep. VI, § 15—'iisque (i. e. hominibus) animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis.'

a. **quasi praesagiret.** A reference to the idea that men become in- **§ 14.**
stinct with the spirit of prophecy at the approach of death. See Apol. 39 C, Riddell's note, and the treatment of the subject put into the mouth of Quintus Cicero in De Div. I, §§ 63–5, from which it will be sufficient to extract the following passage bearing on the meaning of the word 'praesagire. Neque enim illud verbum temere consuetudo adprobavisset, si ea res nulla esset omnino,

praesagibat animus frustra me ire, cum exirem domo.

[sagire enim sentire acute est, ex quo sagae anus, quia multa scire volunt, et sagaces dicti canes: is igitur, qui ante sagit quam oblata res est, dicitur praesagire, id est futura ante sentire].'

b. **Philus.** See De Rep. I, § 17. L. Furius Philus was an intimate friend of Scipio and Laelius, and celebrated like them for his uprightness and moderation. Cicero often mentions him in the same breath with his two more famous compeers, e. g. De Orat. II, § 154; Pro Archia § 16; De Leg. Agr. II, § 64. He was an ardent student of

Greek literature and a good speaker in his own language. See Brut. § 108—'L. Furius Philus perbene Latine loqui putabatur litteratiusque quam ceteri.' He became consul in B.C. 136.

c. **Manilius.** See De Rep. I, § 18 *ad fin.* The praenomen of Manilius is sometimes given as Marcus, sometimes as Manius. He was one of the most eminent jurists of his time (De Orat. I, § 212, III, § 133; Brut. § 108; De Rep. III, § 17). He is mentioned in the Digest (I, ii. 2, § 39) along with Brutus and Publius Mucius Scaevola, who, like his son Quintus, was 'pontifex maximus,' as one of the three founders of civil law. He was consul in B.C. 149 at the beginning of the Third Punic War.

d. **alii plures.** To wit Q. Tubero (sister's son to Africanus), P. Rutilius, the supposed narrator of the dialogue (De Rep. I, § 17), Laelius with his two sons-in-law, C. Fannius and Q. Scaevola, and Spurius Mummius.

e. **Scaevola.** De Rep. I, § 18. He and Fannius are described as being at that time 'iam aetate quaestorii.'

f. **de re publica.** The De Republica, which is one of the most important of Cicero's works, has survived only in fragments, partly preserved in other writers, and partly published by Angelo Mai in 1822 from a palimpsest of Augustine in the Vatican. It consists of a discourse on political philosophy supposed to have been held between Africanus the younger and his friends during the leisure of the feriae Latinae in the year B.C. 129. Cicero purports to have heard it from the lips of one of the persons present, namely, the exile P. Rutilius Rufus (§ 101), when he visited Smyrna in 78 B.C., i. e. 51 years later. He was accompanied on that occasion by the person, possibly Atticus, to whom the treatise is addressed (De Rep. I, § 13).

g. **quae se in quiete,** &c. This refers to the famous 'Somnium Scipionis,' which is Cicero's equivalent for the vision of Er, with which Plato's Republic closes. When the younger Africanus was on a visit to Masinissa in Africa, the elder is supposed to have appeared to him in a vision, foretelling his destiny and expounding to him the mysteries of the universe. Macrobius has a long treatise on the 'Somnium Scipionis,' which is a mine of curious learning.

h. **ut.** The clause with 'ut' is explanatory of 'ita.' So in such phrases as 'mos est ut,' 'consuetudo ut,' § 17.

i. **e custodia vinclisque corporis.** The idea of the 'shades of the prison-house' goes back to the Mysteries. See Phaedo 62 B—ὁ . . . *ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν.* The word *φρουρά* in this passage evidently means a prison, a sense which it bears also in Gorg. 525 A, but it might mean 'a watch-post,' as might

also 'custodia,' if its meaning were not settled by 'vinclis.' In Cat. Mai. § 73, we seem to have the same word φρουρά translated the other way—'vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, id est, dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere.' With this cp. T. D. I, § 74—'Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis deus, iniussu hinc nos suo demigrare . . . . nec tamen illa vincla carceris ruperit,' and De Rep. VI, § 15.

j. **illa.** Referring to what is coming, namely the explanatory clause introduced by 'ut.'

k. **fit.** The suppressed subject is Scipio, as shown by the 'quem' following.

l. **erit, laetabitur.** The two things are regarded as taking place contemporaneously in the future.

a. **ut supra dixi.** § 11 *ad in.* **§ 15.**

b. **incommodius.** Supply 'actum est.'

c. **fuerat aequius.** Notice here a difference of idiom between English and Latin. We state conditionally what the Latin language states categorically. The fairer or better course was fairer or better, whether it were realised in fact or not. The idiom of Greek coincides with that of Latin in this respect. Take for instance Aristoph. Av.—

κρεῖττον εὐθὺς ἦν τότε
ἀπερυθριᾶσαι μᾶλλον ἢ σχεῖν πράγματα.

d. **recordatione.** 'Recordari' = 'reminiscor,' 'to recollect'; 'meminisse,' 'to remember.'

e. **vixerim.** Subjunctive because depending on 'videar,' and so stated as a thought, not as a fact.

f. **et domus . . et militia.** The nominative of the phrase of which 'domi militiaeque' is the locative.

g. **id, in quo, &c.** Cp. Sall. Cat. 20—'nam idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum est firma amicitia.'

h. **quod . . . spero.** The clause with 'quod' is equivalent to an abstract noun, 'my hope that,' and so coordinate with 'fama.'

i. **idque . . . cordi.** 'A hope which is the more dearly cherished, because, &c.'

j. **vix tria aut quattuor.** Cp. Arist. E. N. IX, 10, § 6—*οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται*: De Fin. I, § 65—'quod quam magnum sit, fictae veterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tam multis tamque variis ab ultima antiquitate repetitis tria vix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem pervenias profectus a Theseo.' To Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Peirithous, we may add Achilles and Patroclus.

a. **Istuc quidem, &c.** 'Yes, what you say must needs be so.' **§ 16.**

b. **feceris . . . disputaris.** The use of the future perfect in both

clauses indicates that one action will be completed at the same time as the other.

c. **quem ad modum soles.** See § 5 *f.*

d. **disputaris,** 'discuss and tell.'

e. **quid sentias,** &c. We have here a brief instance of what is known in rhetoric as 'divisio' or 'partitio.' 'Quid sentias' carries us as far as the end of § 24, where the words 'Hactenus mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem, potuisse dicere,' mark the close of the first head. **qualem existumes** extends from the beginning of § 26 to the end of § 35. The third head **quae praecepta des** occupies the rest of the dialogue its beginning being marked by the words 'Quamobrem id primum videamus' in § 36. Three heads are declared by Cornificius (Ad Herennium I, § 17) to be the proper number for a speech. But of course the number must vary with the requirements of the subject matter even in forensic oratory, and this is still more the case in a philosophical disquisition. In the De Natura Deorum the Stoic views on theology are distributed by Balbus under four heads. See II, § 3 and III, § 6—'quadripertita' inquit 'fuit divisio tua, primum ut velles docere deos esse, deinde quales essent, tum ab iis mundum regi, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis. haec, si recte memini, partitio fuit.'

f. **tecum agere,** 'make that request of you.' Cp. § 4 *a.*

g. **antevortit.** Archaic form for 'antevertit.'

§ 17. *a.* **gravarer.** 'Gravari' is to make objections, to represent a thing as difficult. Cp. Caesar, B. G. I, 35—'hanc sibi populoque Romano gratiam referret, ut in colloquium venire invitatus gravaretur.'

b. **consuetudo . . . ut.** § 14 *h.*

c. **censeo petatis.** § 5 *c.*

d. **qui ista profitentur.** There is a trace here of the aristocratic scorn of the professions. Laelius is a Roman gentleman, not a sophist. The feeling was not confined to the Romans. The young Hippocrates, in the Protagoras, though so eager about philosophy, is seen to blush in the morning light at the idea of his wishing to take to the profession (Prot. 312 A).

e. **vel secundas vel adversas,** 'to prosperity or adversity, take which you will.' The alternatives though exclusive, are not exhaustive —adversity or prosperity or both.

§ 18. *a.* **nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse.** Cp. Plato, Lysis 214 D—*ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὔτ' ἀγαθῷ οὔτε κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρχεται.* This conclusion is deduced from the physical principle that like seeks like. Socrates is made to argue that the wicked are never continuously like themselves, but crazy and unstable (*ἀλλ' ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους.* Cp. Isaiah, lvii. 20—'But the wicked are like the troubled sea; for it cannot rest,

and its waters cast up mire and dirt'): how then can they be like another, or afford a steady basis for friendship? Aristotle laid down the same principle in his treatise *περὶ φιλίας*. See E. N. VIII, 3, § 6—Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. *οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ᾗ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὑτούς.*

b. **ad vivum reseco.** 'I am not for pressing too closely,' lit. 'cutting to the quick.' The metaphor is of homely origin. Cp. Val. Max. III. 2, § 15—'cultellum tonsorium, quasi unguium resecandorum causa, poposcit.'

c. **qui haec subtilius disserunt.** The allusion is to the paradoxes of the Stoics.

d. **quae finguntur aut optantur,** 'things imaginary or utopian.' From the idea of praying (see § 11 *d*) it is an easy transition to that of something merely visionary or ideal. For the latter sense of 'optare' cp. Acad. Pr. II, § 121—'Somnia censet haec esse Democriti, non docentis sed optantis'; T. D. II, § 30—'optare hoc quidem est, non docere'; De Fato § 46; De N. D. I, § 19—'quae talia sunt, ut optata magis quam inventa videantur.' The words *εὔχεσθαι* and *εὐχή* in Greek have undergone the same transition. Plat. Rep. 450 D, 456 C—*Οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὅμοια ἐνομοθετοῦμεν*, 499 C; Ar. Pol. VII, 4, §§ 1, 2; VII, 11, § 1.

e. **C. Fabricium.** C. Fabricius Luscinus was one of the typical Roman heroes. After the victory of Pyrrhus over the Romans in B. C. 280 Fabricius was sent to him as ambassador to treat of the ransom of the captives (Brut. § 55). He impressed that monarch so much by his incorruptibility that the prisoners were released without ransom (Liv. Epit. § 13). Pyrrhus' admiration for Fabricius was raised still higher when, in his second consulship in B. C. 278, he sent back to the king the physician who had offered to poison him (Liv. Epit. 13; Eutrop. II, 14). In his two consulships and in his censorship (B. C. 275) Fabricius had the same colleague, Q. Aemilius Papus. They ejected from the senate P. Cornelius Rufinus, whom Fabricius himself had helped to attain his second consulship in B. C. 277, out of respect for his military talents. No charge is stated to have been urged against Rufinus except that he possessed ten pounds of plate for his dinner-service (Liv. Epit. XIV; Aul. Gel. XVII, 21, § 39). The way however in which the plate was obtained may have had something to do with the expulsion of Rufinus; for when he thanked Fabricius for his exertions in raising him to the consulship the latter replied that 'he had nothing to thank him for, as it was no wonder if he preferred being robbed to being sold' (De Orat. § 268). Fabricius himself remained poor through life, refusing not only the bribes of Pyrrhus, but even presents of honour from the Samnites (Val. Max. IV, 3, § 6; Aul. Gel. I, 14). Fabricius was

contemporary with Epicurus, and according to Cicero was much scandalized at his doctrine, of which he heard from Cineas the Thessalian (Cat. Mai. § 43). His merit was considered so great that he was buried within the walls of Rome, though that was forbidden by a law of the Twelve Tables (De Leg. II, § 58).

f. **M'. Curium.** Cp. §§ 28, 29 and Cat. Mai. §§ 15, 43, De N. D. II, § 165, in all which passages these three worthies are mentioned together. They were contemporaries and friends, and their friendship was founded on similarity of character. M'. Curius Dentatus first distinguished himself as tribune of the commons, when he compelled the senate to ratify beforehand the election of a plebeian consul, whom Appius Claudius Caecus, in his capacity of interrex, wished to reject (Brut. § 55). Afterwards he was made consul three times—in 290, 275, and 274 B.C. In his first consulship he triumphed over the Samnites and Sabines; in his second he had the glory of expelling Pyrrhus from Italy, and led four elephants in his triumph (Eutrop. II, 14). Such was his integrity that he was able to swear that he had touched nothing out of all the spoil he had taken except a beechen flask with which to sacrifice (Plin. N. H. XVI, 38, § 185). The story of his rejecting the gift of the Samnites is similar to that told of Fabricius (see Cat. Mai. §§ 55, 56; De Rep. III, § 40 *ad fin.*; Val. Max. IV, 3, § 5).

g. **Ti. Coruncanium.** Tiberius Coruncanius was a 'novus homo' (Vell. Pat. II, § 128), coming like Manius Curius from a municipium (Pro Sulla, § 23). Nevertheless he also achieved the highest honours of the State. He was elected consul in B. C. 280, and was the first plebeian who was made 'pontifex maximus' (Liv. Epit. 18). He was more famous as a lawyer than as a soldier. It is mentioned in the Digest (I, ii. 2, § 38) that he was the first professional jurisconsult. He left no writings, but many of his 'responsa' were remembered (Cp. De Leg. II, § 52). In Brut. § 55 Cicero says that the 'pontificum commentarii' give proof of his surpassing ability. One of his pronouncements on ritual is preserved by Pliny (N. H. VIII, 51, § 206).

h. **ad istorum normam,** 'after their pattern.' 'Norma' is literally a T square used by carpenters. Hence 'abnormal' of what does not square with a rule.

i. **concedant ut viri boni fuerint.** The acc. with infin. is more usual after 'concedo' to express the proposition granted.

§ 19. *a*. **pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva,** 'with coarse mother-wit, as they say.' Cp. Hor. Sat. II, 2, 3—

'rusticus, abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva.'

b. **cupiditas, libido, audacia.** Cp. Lact. Div. Inst. VI, 19—'Tres sunt igitur affectus, qui homines in omnia facinora praecipites agunt, ira, cupiditas, libido. Propterea poetae tres furias esse dixerunt, quae

mentes hominum exagitant; ira ultionem desiderat, cupiditas opes, libido voluptates.' We have no exact equivalent in English for the Latin word 'audacia.' It denotes that perversion of courage which characterizes the bold bad man. In De Inv. II, § 165 Cicero contrasts it with the virtue of 'fidentia—audacia non contrarium, sed appositum est ac propinquum et tamen vitium est.'

c. **modo quos nominavi.** Hyperbaton. The adverb 'vix' is liable to be brought to the front in the same way. Brut. § 82 *ad fin.*—'itaque exaruerunt, vix iam ut appareant'; Caes. B. G. I, 6—'vix qua singuli carri ducerentur'; ib. II, 28, III, 4.

d. **naturam optumam bene vivendi ducem.** This is said from the Stoic point of view. Zeno's definition of the end of life was—'cum natura congruenter vivere' (Lact. Div. Inst. III, 7). With the Stoics 'nature,' 'right reason,' 'wisdom,' and 'virtue,' were all at bottom identical. See De Leg. I, § 25—'Est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura.' In his dogmatic moments Cicero was a Stoic. It is from this standpoint that he asks in Cat. Mai. § 5 *ad fin.*—'quid est enim aliud Gigantum modo bellare cum dis nisi naturae repugnare?'

e. **ita natos esse nos, ut . . . esset,** 'that we were born with the idea that there should be.' The sequence is unaffected by the fact that the remark holds true of all time. Cp. De Rep. VI, § 15—'homines enim sunt hac lege generati, qui tuerentur illum globum'; De Div. II, § 33—'qui omne, quod esset, unum esse dixerunt.'

f. **inter omnis.** All animals, says Aristotle (E. N. VIII, 1, § 3) have a natural feeling of fellowship with their own kind, but this is especially the case with man, as may be observed more particularly in travelling. Those who are distinguished above the rest for this feeling are called *φιλάνθρωποι*, and the feeling itself is *φιλανθρωπία*. The closer feeling which unites, or should unite, members of the same community is termed *ὁμόνοια*. Both come under the generic term *φιλία*, though this is used also in a narrower sense for the 'caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos' mentioned below.

g. **his.** Referring to 'cives' and 'propinqui.'

a. **conciliavit,** 'has instituted.' 'Conciliare societatem' is on the analogy of 'conciliare amicitiam.' **§ 20.**

b. **aut inter duos aut inter paucos.** Cp. Arist. E. N. IX, 10, § 5 —*ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα.*

c. **iungeretur.** See § 19 *e*.

d. **Est enim amicitia,** &c. This definition takes no account of the disinterested feeling of goodwill, which is essential to friendship. Cicero's juvenile work, the De Inventione (II, § 166) contains a much

better definition—'voluntas erga aliquem rerum bonarum illius ipsius causa, quem diligit, cum eius pari voluntate.' The only flaw that can be found in this statement is that the disinterested good will might exist on both sides, and yet be concealed by a reciprocal ignorance. Cp. Arist. E. N. VIII, 2, § 4—*φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας.*

e. **omnium . . . rerum . . . consensio,** 'agreement on all things sacred and secular.' An objective genitive like this is more common when the verb from which the abstract noun is formed governs the accusative, as in the passage just quoted, where 'voluntas rerum bonarum' suggests 'velle res bonas.'

f. **haud scio an . . . nihil,** 'I doubt whether anything.' 'Haud scio an,' 'nescio an' indicate a suspicion that a thing is: hence a doubt is expressed by the addition of a negative.

g. **excepta sapientia.** 'Sapientia' may be taken to include 'virtus.' Cp. the last words of the dialogue.

h. **nihil melius.** Cp. E. N. IX, 9, § 2, where friendship is declared to be the greatest of external goods (*ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι*). In IV, 3, § 10 this primacy was assigned to honour (*μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν*). They cannot both be the greatest. But in VIII, 8, § 2 we have the question definitely settled in favour of friendship. Honour is there shown not to be an end in itself. It is sought from the powerful as a pledge of prosperity, from the wise and good as a proof of merit, whereas men delight in being loved in and for itself (*τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ χαίρουσι. διὸ δόξειεν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι*).

i. **a dis inmortalibus.** Both here and in § 104 the attitude of Laelius is more reverent than that of ancient philosophy generally. Wisdom and virtue were just the things which the sage was supposed to provide for himself. In the De Natura Deorum (III, § 86) Cotta is made to say—'atque hoc quidem omnes mortales sic habent, externas commoditates . . . a dis se habere; virtutem autem nemo unquam acceptam deo retulit.' See the whole passage ending—'iudicium hoc omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam.' Cp. Hor. Epist. I, 18, 111—

> 'sed satis est orare Iovem, qui ponit et aufert,
> det vitam, det opes; aequum mi animum ipse parabo.'

So Juvenal (X, 356–63), after enumerating the things that are really worth praying for, adds—

> 'monstro quod ipse tibi possis dare.'

The claims to genuineness of the 'Consolatio' might almost be disposed of on the strength of this one passage (§ 184), so contrary to the self-

reliance of Paganism—'Quod contra probis virtutemque amantibus accidit. Nam divinae voluntati obtemperantes nihil in se ipsis, sed in ea se ipsos ac sua ponunt et locant omnia.'

j. **voluptates: beluarum.** Cp. § 32—'qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt.' The term 'voluptas' in Latin is the exact equivalent of the Greek *ἡδονή*. See De Fin. II, § 13, where it is defined as follows—'huic verbo omnes, qui ubique sunt, qui Latine sciunt, duas res subiciunt, laetitiam in animo, commotionem suavem iucunditatis in corpore.' Cicero never faces the philosophical position that even the highest things, like friendship and virtue, may derive their value from the mental delight which they are capable of imparting.

k. **caduca et incerta,** &c. This passage is imitated in the 'Consolatio'—'Caduca enim et incerta sunt omnia, non in humanis consiliis aut viribus posita, sed in fortunae temeritate ac temporum vicissitudine constituta.' On 'caducus' see § 102 *a.*

l. **temeritate,** 'caprice.'

m. **qui autem in virtute,** &c. The Stoics preeminently. Cp. the title of Paradox. II—*Ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν.*

a. **Iam.** 'Furthermore.' § **21.**

b. **virtutem ex consuetudine vitae.** For the reduction of the Stoic extravagances to common-sense cp. §§ 18, 19.

c. **verborum magnificentia,** 'pomp of language.'

d. **Paulos, Catones,** &c. For this generic use of the plural of proper names cp. Cat. Mai. § 13—'nec tamen omnes possunt esse Scipiones aut Maximi.' It is common in all authors, e.g. Verg. Georg. II, 169—'Decios, Marios, magnosque Camillos'; Hor. Sat. I, 7, 8—'Sisennas, Barros'; Juv. I, 109—'Pallante et Licinis' (see Mayor's note).

a. **vita vitalis.** Evidently meant as a translation of the Greek *βίος* § **22.**
βιωτός. 'How can life be worth living?' Cp. Soph. O. C. 1691—*ὡς ἔμοιγ' ὁ μέλλων βίος οὐ βιωτός*: Plat. Apol. 38 A—*ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ.*

b. **Ennius.** See Cat. Mai. §§ 10, 14, 73. Ennius was regarded with reverence by the Romans as the father of Latin poetry. He was born at Rudiae in Calabria in the year 239 B.C., and lived to the age of seventy. He was first brought to Rome by Cato. The most popular of his many works was his Annals in eighteen Books, a history of Rome in verse from the loves of Mars and Rhea down to his own time. He passed lightly over the first Punic War, because it had been treated by Naevius (Brut. §§ 75, 76). Ennius received the honour of Roman citizenship, which was at that time a rare privilege. He was buried in the tomb of the Scipios. His place in Roman poetry could not be better described than in the noble words of Quintilian (X, 1, § 83)—'Ennium sicut

sacros vetustate lucos adoremus, in quibus grandia et antiqua robora iam non tantam habent speciem quantam religionem.'

c. **quicum** = 'quocum,' §§ 2, 15.

d. **opportunae . . . singulis**, 'are for the most part adapted each to one end.'

e. **opes**, 'resources,' 'power.' It occupies the same place in the enumeration of goods as 'potentia' above in § 20. Cp. § 51 *d.*

f. **non aqua, non igni.** Two of the prime necessities of life, and so in constant use. Hence 'aqua et igni interdicere' was equivalent to a capital sentence.

g. **qui pauci nominantur.** The construction with 'paucus' is the same as with a superlative. See § 12 *e.*

§ 23. *a.* **Cumque . . . contineat.** With 'cum . . . tum,' when the subjunctive is used in the first clause, a comparison is meant to be instituted between the general and the particular case. 'Cum . . . tum' with the indicative in both clauses means simply 'both . . . and.'

b. **illa.** Nominative. Supply 'commoditas.'

c. **bonam spem praelucet**, 'sheds a beacon of fair hope.' This transitive use of 'praelucere' is very rare. Cp. Ausonius, Idyll. IV, 95—'lumenque tuae praeluceo vitae.'

d. **tamquam exemplar aliquod . . . sui.** See § 80.

e. **absentes adsunt.** Because their friends act for them.

f. **quod difficilius dictu est**, 'what is more of a paradox.'

g. **prosequitur.** 'Prosequi' is here used of the feeling itself: in Brut. § 4 it is transferred to the persons who experience the feeling—'illius vero mortis opportunitatem benevolentia potius quam misericordia prosequamur.' The underlying physical sense seems to be that of setting a person on his way out of respect.

h. **benevolentiae coniunctionem**, 'the bond of goodwill.' Sidgwick.

i. **nec domus ulla nec urbs.** Cp. E. N. VIII, 9, where it is shown that the fields of justice and of friendship are co-extensive; and that since each form of fellowship (*κοινωνία*) has its special justice, each will have likewise its special friendship. All minor fellowships are embraced in the great fellowship of the state.

j. **ne agri quidem cultus.** Because this demands co-operation and security.

k. **minus.** 'Minus' = 'non' is especially common after 'si' and 'sin.' Cp. §§ 60, 100 *ad fin.*; Caesar, B. G. I, 47—'uti aut iterum colloquio diem constitueret, aut, si id minus vellet, e suis aliquem ad se mitteret.' It is used also as a weakened negative before adjectives, as 'minus iustae,' in § 61, which is meant not to be as strong as 'iniustae'; cp. 'parum iustus,' in § 76.

§ 24. *a.* **Agrigentinum**, &c. Empedocles of Acragas, or, as the Romans

called it, Agrigentum, was a famous philosopher, poet and orator, who flourished about 444 B.C. He taught the doctrine of the four elements, earth, air, fire, and water. See Lucr. I, 714–7—

'et qui quattuor ex rebus posse omnia rentur,
ex igni terra atque anima, procrescere, et imbri,
quorum Acragantinus cum primis Empedocles est.'

All phenomena, according to him, were the effect of two principles which he called Νεῖκος and Φιλότης—we should call them attraction and repulsion. It is Empedocles chiefly who is referred to in the Lysis of Plato (214 B) as agreeing with Homer in the view—*ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι.* This may be gathered from a comparison with Aristotle, E. N. VIII, 1, § 6.

b. **carminibus Graecis.**

καὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,
ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.

c. **vaticinatum.** The word amounts only to 'declared'; but it serves admirably to mark the mystical and semi-oracular character of Empedocles himself and his verses.

d. **quae . . . constarent quaeque moverentur,** 'all things at rest or in motion.' The reference is to the alternations of the *ἕν* and the *πλέονα.*

e. **si quando . . . exstitit,** 'in the case of any signal service.'

f. **cavea.** The part of the theatre in which the spectators sat. Cp. 'totum caveae consessum,' Verg. Aen. V, 340. It was divided into 'prima,' 'media,' and 'ultima' (Cat. Mai. § 48; Suet. Octav. 44; Claud. 21). The higher classes sat in front and below, the lower behind and above. Hence—'verba ad summam caveam spectantia' (Sen. De Tranq. An. 11) = 'playing to the gallery.'

g. **hospitis.** 'Hospes' = *ξένος,* a term covering our two correlatives 'host' and 'guest.' 'Hospitium' with the Romans was one of the most solemn duties of life, ranking even before 'clientela' (Aul. Gell. XIV, 13). The sanctity of the tie is illustrated by the story in Livy (XXV, 18) of the duel between Crispinus and his Capuan 'hospes' Badius.

h. **M. Pacuvii.** The tragic poet Pacuvius, whom Laelius is here made to speak of as his friend, was born at Brundisium, about B.C. 219. He was sister's son to Ennius, and excelled not only as a poet but also as a painter (Plin. N. H. xxxv, 4, § 19). His rival Accius, with whom he was usually compared, was 50 years younger than himself. Nevertheless they exhibited plays under the same aediles, when Pacuvius was 80 and Accius 30 years old (Brut. § 229). The dictum of Horace (Epist. II, 1, 55, 56)—

'Ambigitur quoties, uter utro sit prior, aufert
Pacuvius docti famam senis, Accius alti'

is confirmed by Quintilian (X, 1, § 97). The style of Pacuvius is condemned by Cicero (Brut. § 258); and he had evidently gone out of fashion by the time of Persius (see I, 77). In his old age he retired from Rome to end his days at Tarentum. There is a pleasant story told by Aulus Gellius (XIII, 2) of how he received a visit there from Accius, who was on his way to Asia. Accius read to him his tragedy of Atreus. The veteran poet pronounced the performance to be sounding and sublime, but a little crude. Accius good humouredly accepted the criticism, but hoped to improve with time, remarking that fruits which began by being harsh ended by having a fine flavour, whereas those that were luscious to start with soon went rotten. Aulus Gellius (I, 24, § 4) has also preserved to us the modest epitaph, which Pacuvius is said to have composed for himself—

'Adulescens, tametsi properas, te hoc saxum rogat
Ut sese aspicias, deinde quod scriptum est legas.
Hic sunt poetae Pacuvii Marci sita
Ossa. Hoc volebam nescius ne esses. Vale.'

i. **nova fabula.** The Dulorestes, one of the most celebrated of the tragedies of Pacuvius. It was a free adaptation from the Iphigenia in Tauris of Euripides. It appears still to have held the stage in the time of Cicero himself. Cp. De Fin. V, § 63—'qui clamores volgi atque inperitorum excitantur in theatris, cum illa dicuntur:

ego sum Orestes;

contraque ab altero:

immo enimvero ego sum, inquam, Orestes!

cum autem etiam exitus ab utroque datur' (a way out of the difficulty is offered by both) 'conturbato errantique regi, "ambo ergo una necarier precamur," quotiens hoc agitur, ecquandone nisi admirationibus maximis?' There is nothing exactly corresponding to this scene in the Iphigenia in Tauris of Euripides.

j. **Stantes plaudebant.** 'They rose and clapped their hands.'

k. **quod facere ipsi,** &c. Cp. Cat. Mai. § 64—'Athenienses scire quae recta essent, sed facere nolle,' said by one of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors when the Athenians applauded them in the theatre for showing a respect for old age which they had failed to exhibit themselves.

l. **Hactenus.** § 55 *g*.

m. **si qua praeterea sunt.** 'Anything that there is further.'

n. **si videbitur** = 'si placet' (§ 36), 'if you please.'

o. **qui ista disputant.** See § 17 *c*.

p. **quaeritote.** § 10 *c*.

a. **aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae,** 'your discourse is somehow of a different texture.' § 25.

b. **de re publica.** § 14 *f.*

c. **qualis . . . patronus.** 'How well he supported the cause.' Patronus is the counsel for the defence.

d. **accuratam** 'studied' = ἀκριβής. Cp. 'accuratio' = ἀκρίβεια, Brut. § 238. Philus is made to play the part of Glaucon and Adimantus in the Republic of Plato. Lactantius (Div. Inst. V, 16 *ad fin.*) maintains that Laelius' reply to Philus is inadequate.

e. **Quid amicitiam?** Supply 'defendere.' The infinitive clause then serves as subject in the next sentence.

f. **ei, qui . . . ceperit,** 'one who has obtained.'

a. **igitur.** Inchoative. § 26.

b. **desiderata sit amicitia,** 'the want of friendship has been felt.' 'Carere,' to be without, 'egere,' to need, 'desiderare,' to feel one's need.

c. **minus.** Used here instead of 'non,' because there are degrees of inability. Cp. § 23 *k.*

d. **proprium amicitiae,** 'a property of friendship,' i. e. an attribute connected with, but not constituting the essence of, friendship. It does not seem here to mean 'a peculiar property,' as in De Orat. III, § 115.

e. **antiquior.** 'Antiquus' = παλαιός, 'old and venerable.'

f. **amor enim,** &c. For this derivation, which Cicero could hardly miss, cp. N. D. I, § 122—'"carum" ipsum verbum est amoris, ex quo amicitiae nomen est ductum.' 'Amicitia' is related to 'amor' as 'pudicitia' to 'pudor,' the one through 'amicus,' the other through 'pudicus.'

g. **temporis causa,** 'from worldly motives,' as we might say.

a. **adplicatione magis,** &c., 'rather from an attachment of soul combined with an instinctive feeling of love.' § 27.

b. **etiam in bestiis,** &c. Cp. E. N. VIII, 1, § 3—*φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε (φιλία) πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων.* The proper term in Greek for this animal feeling of affection between parents and children is *στοργή*.

c. **dirimi nisi detestabili scelere.** Cp. the rhetorical amplification of the same sentiment in Pro Rosc. Am. § 53.

d. **deinde cum similis,** &c. 'Next when a like instinctive feeling of love has made its appearance, in case we have got someone with whose nature and character we are in sympathy, because we seem to see in him a light as it were of goodness and virtue.' Two reasons are given for the belief that friendship is based on nature, not on self-interest—(1) the natural feeling of affection that exists between parents and offspring; (2) the like natural love of good men for each other.

e. **perspicere videamur.** Virtual oblique oration. The reason is given, not as a fact, but as our way of looking at the fact. The lengthened ending 'perspicere videamur,' where 'perspiciamus' would have done, is a note of Cicero's style. Cp. Pro Rosc. Am. § 153—'videte, per deos immortalis, quem in locum rempublicam perventuram putetis.' Here 'perventura sit' would have adequately expressed the meaning. Quintilian (X, 2, §§ 17, 18) derides the servile imitators of Cicero who affected a similar redundancy. 'Otiosi et supini, si quid modo longius circumduxerunt, iurant ita Ciceronem locuturum fuisse. Noveram quosdam, qui se pulchre expressisse genus illud coelestis huius in dicendo viri sibi viderentur, si in clausula posuissent *esse videatur.*'

§ 28, *a.* **Nihil est enim virtute amabilius.** E. N. VIII, 3, § 7—*τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς ἐστίν, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά.*

b. **C. Fabricii, M'. Curii.** § 18 *e, f.*

c. **memoriam usurpet,** 'treat the memory.'

d. **quos numquam viderit,** 'though he has never seen them.'

e. **Tarquinium Superbum.** L. Tarquinius Superbus was the seventh and last king of Rome (B.C. 534–510), whose atrocities led to the foundation of the Republic.

f. **Sp. Cassium.** Spurius Cassius Viscellinus was consul in B.C. 502, 493, and 486. In his third consulship he proposed the first agrarian law. It failed to please either party in the State. The patricians were alarmed because their possession of the public lands was threatened, and the commons were disgusted at the Latins and allies being included along with themselves in the distribution. Cassius was accused of aiming at royalty, and was condemned and executed as soon as he resigned office (Livy II, 41).

g. **Sp. Maelium.** Cp. Cat. Mai. § 56. The case of Spurius Maelius presents a close parallel to that of Spurius Cassius. In the year 440 B.C. there was famine at Rome, and a 'praefectus annonae' was for the first time appointed, in the person of L. Minucius. He did nothing to stave off the distress, and the people were flinging themselves into the Tiber rather than face the horrors of starvation. At this crisis Sp. Maelius, a wealthy knight, came to the rescue. He bought up corn from Etruria, which he distributed among the people. As a result he became very popular. Minucius then discovered that a dangerous conspiracy was being carried on in Maelius' house for the overthrow of the state. He laid the matter before the senate. The consuls of 439 complained that they were hampered by the laws of appeal, which were intended for the dissolution of the empire. Next morning the people were surprised to see the venerable L. Quinctius Cincinnatus, who was over eighty years of age, appear as dictator, with C. Servilius Ahala as

his master of the horse. Ahala summoned Maelius before the dictator, and cut him down when he appealed to the protection of the people. The property of Maelius was confiscated and the corn which he had collected was distributed to the people at a nominal price (Livy IV, 12–16). Even in his philosophical works Cicero cannot avoid the part of a political pamphleteer. We must remember that the weak spot in his own career was the execution of Lentulus without trial before the people.

h. **Pyrrho.** Pyrrhus was king of Epirus, and traced his descent to Achilles. His invasion of Italy and Sicily lasted from 281 to 275 B.C. He met his death at Argos in the year B.C. 272.

i. **Hannibale.** The 'bellum Hannibalicum' or Second Punic War lasted from 218 to 201 B.C. The charge of cruelty is echoed by Livy (XXI, 4, § 9), but hardly carried out by his own narrative. Hannibal was certainly capable on occasions of a judicious clemency. See Livy XXII, 7, § 5; XXII, 58, §§ 1–4; XXIII, 15, § 8. The Roman hatred of Hannibal was embodied in the standing epithet 'dirus' (Hor. Carm. III, 6, 36, IV, 4, 42; Juv. VII. 161).

a. **usu,** 'in daily life.' **§ 29.**

b. **motum animi et amoris,** 'impulse of the mind to love.'

c. **admirabilis . . . magnitudo,** 'the flame of goodwill blazes up to a wondrous height.'

d. **desideret,** 'feels a need of.' See § 26 *b.*

e. **generosum,** 'well-born' = *εὐγενής*.

f. **ut quisque minimum,** &c. Notice the superlative degree, where the English idiom requires the comparative. So immediately below—'Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum,' &c., and § 46—'ut quisque minimum firmitatis,' &c.

g. **quod longe secus est,** 'whereas the case is far otherwise.' 'Quod' here corresponds to the idiomatic use of *τὸ δέ* in Greek, e.g. E. N. IX, 9, § 5—*οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές.* See the whole chapter which is on the subject here discussed, namely, whether the sage has need of friends.

a. **virtute et sapientia . . . munitus.** Arist. Pol. I, 2, § 16—*ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ.* **§ 30.**

b. **nullo.** Used as the ablative of 'nemo.' So the genitive in Pro Mur. § 87—'si iniuste neminem laesit, si nullius aures voluntatemve violavit, si nemini,' &c.

c. **suaque omnia.** § 7 *g.*

d. **indigens.** Supply 'erat.' 'Indigens erat' = 'indigebat.' For the analytic form cp. N. D. II, § 21—'omnia enim haec meliora sunt quam ea, quae sunt his carentia'; De Div. I, § 52; De Fin. III, § 16; De

Rep. I, § 40; De Leg. I, § 41; Lact. III, 8—'omne animal doloris est fugiens.' In Latin, as in Greek, these resolved forms occur chiefly in philosophical language, and there is generally some shade of meaning which would not be conveyed by the synthetic form.

e. **sed ego admiratione,** &c. Cp. De Rep. I, § 18 on the mutual admiration of Scipio and Laelius—'fuit enim hoc in amicitia quasi quoddam ius inter illos, ut militiae propter eximiam belli gloriam Africanum ut deum coleret Laelius, domi vicissim Laelium, quod aetate antecedebat, observaret in parentis loco Scipio.'

f. **causae diligendi profectae,** 'the attachment originated.' Sidgwick.

§ 31. *a.* **gratiam.** 'Gratia,' gratitude; 'gratiae,' thanks.

b. **propensi,** 'inclined.' From 'propendēre.'

§ 32. *a.* **Ab his.** Neuter, 'from these conclusions.'

b. **qui pecudum ritu,** &c. § 20 *j.*

c. **suspicere,** 'left their thoughts to.' 'Suspicere,' 'to look up at'; 'despicere,' 'to look down on.'

d. **abiecerunt,** 'have degraded.'

e. **in rem tam humilem,** &c. Brought to the end of sentence for the sake of emphasis.

f. **quam,** sc. 'probitatem.'

g. **adplicant se et propius admovent,** 'attach themselves and draw closer.' Cp. § 27—'adplicatione magis animi.'

h. **usu,** 'intercourse.' See § 2 *g.*

i. **propensioresque ad bene merendum.** Cp. E. N. IV, 1, § 7—*τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν*; VIII, 8, § 3—*δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι*; Acts XX, 35—*μακάριόν ἐστι μᾶλλον διδόναι ἢ λαμβάνειν.*

j. **honesta certatio.** E. N. VIII, 13, § 2—*οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἁμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἂν ᾖ χαρίεις* (=a gentleman), *ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν.*

k. **gravior,** 'more dignified.'

l. **conglutinaret,** 'cemented,' lit. 'glued together,' a favourite word with Cicero. Cp. Cat. Mai. § 72, where 'dissolvere' is used, as here, of the opposite process to 'conglutinare.' In the same passage we have 'conglutinatio' used of the thing compacted together.

m. **natura mutari non potest.** E. N. II, 1, § 2—*οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται.*

n. **ad haec,** sc. 'respondere.'

o. **qui minor est natu.** Brut. § 101.

p. **meo iure.** 'I have a right to.'

a. **quamquam ille quidem,** 'though he indeed,' in contrast with the different language which has just been used by Laelius as to the eternity of friendship. **§ 33.**

b. **nam vel ut non idem,** &c., 'for there often occurred either a difference of interest or a difference of political views.'

c. **aetate ingravescente,** 'when age began to tell upon them.'

d. **Atque earum rerum,** &c. 'And he used to draw an example of what he said from the parallel of early manhood.'

e. **quod summi puerorum amores,** 'in that the most ardent loves of boys.'

f. **praetexta toga.** § 1 *g.*

a. **uxoriae condicionis,** 'match' (with a lady). 'Condicio' is generally used alone. **§ 34.**

b. **quod idem.** For the position of 'idem' cp. § 22—'qui pauci nominantur.' 'Idem' is sufficiently rendered here by a stress on 'both' —'which *both* cannot obtain.'

c. **in optimis quibusque.** The plural because there are pairs of riends.

d. **inimicitias,** 'enmities.' Plural in sense here as well as in form. Cp. §§ 77, 78. In his treatise De Analogia, which was dedicated to Cicero, Julius Caesar laid down that 'inimicitiae' could no more be used in the singular than 'arma,' 'moenia,' or 'comitia.' Nevertheless Cicero has so used it (T. D. IV, § 16) and Ennius and Plautus did so before him.

a. **discidia,** 'ruptures.' From 'dis-scindo.' **§ 35.**

b. **libidinis,** 'self-gratification.' 'Libido' is a very wide word. Cicero reckons under it (T. D. IV, § 16)—'ira, excandescentia, odium, inimicitia, discordia, indigentia, desiderium et cetera eius modi.'

c. **querella.** 'Querella' is one of a small class of abstract nouns in -ella or -ela. Cp. loquella, medella, sequella, luella (Lucr. III, 1015), clientela, suadela, tutela. The rule of spelling according to Lachmann is that the *l* is doubled after a long vowel, when a short one precedes it. See Munro on Lucr. I, 39.

a. **Numne.** Stronger than 'num' alone—'Do you mean to say?' **§ 36.**

b. **Coriolanus.** Cn. Marcius Coriolanus was a proud patrician, who won his surname by his valour in capturing the town of Corioli from the Volscians. Afterwards, in a time of famine, when corn had been imported from Sicily, he counselled the senate to use starvation as a means of wresting their newly-acquired rights from the plebeians. The storm of indignation that was aroused by this proposal forced him to take refuge with Attius Tullius, the leader of the Volscians, and a decree of exile was passed against him in his absence. Attius hated the Romans, and contrived a plot to goad his unwilling countrymen into war. Under

the leadership of Attius and Coriolanus the Volscians were completely triumphant, and advanced as far as the 'fossae Cluiliae,' within five miles of Rome. The commons of Rome were unwilling to fight. Ambassadors and priests were sent in vain to Coriolanus. At length the matrons of Rome went out to him, and the expostulations of his mother Veturia and his wife Volumnia induced him to withdraw his forces. So the story runs as told by Livy (II, 33–40). He does not explain how Attius Tullius consented to surrender the fruits of victory.

c. **Viscellinum.** Viscellinus or Vecellinus was the cognomen of Spurius Cassius. See § 28 *f.*

d. **Maelium.** § 28 *g.*

§ 37. *a.* **Tiberium quidem Gracchum.** Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus came of the noblest blood in Rome. He was son of the Tiberius Gracchus spoken of in § 101 and of Cornelia, the daughter of Africanus Maior. As tribune in B. C. 133 he endeavoured to carry out a scheme of reform, which included the enforcement of the Licinian land-law and the extension of the franchise to the Italians (Vell. Pat. II, 2, § 3). To effect his purpose he had to depose his colleague M. Octavius Caecina, and to get himself re-elected for the following year. His career was cut short by his cousin, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, who headed an attack upon him while he was addressing a popular meeting. Arming themselves with fragments of the benches the aristocrats drove their opponents down the slope of the Capitol, and slew Tiberius Gracchus himself along with many of his followers. The following is the character given of him by Velleius Paterculus, who disapproved of his politics—

'Vir alioqui vita innocentissimus, ingenio florentissimus,
proposito sanctissimus, tantis denique adornatus virtutibus,
quantas perfecta et natura et industria mortalis conditio recipit.'

b. **Q. Tuberone.** Cp. § 101. Q. Aelius Tubero was the grandson of Paulus Aemilius, the conqueror of Macedonia, through his daughter, Aemilia; and was thus sister's son to Africanus Minor (Brut. § 117; Pro Mur. §§ 75, 76). He was a good lawyer (Aul. Gell. I, 22, § 7), and was deeply read in the Stoic philosophy. His life was one of strict integrity, but his character was harsh, stern and repellent, so that he was never a popular favourite (Cp. Tac. Ann. XVI, 22). He lost the praetorship through his parsimony on the occasion of a public banquet given in honour of his uncle Africanus. Panaetius dedicated to him a treatise 'De Dolore Patiendo' (De Fin. IV, § 23) and his disciple, Hecato of Rhodes one 'De Officiis' (De Off. III, § 63). Like most of the Stoics, both Greek and Roman, he was strong in logic but weak in rhetoric. Cicero says of him in the Brutus—'fuit autem constans civis

et in primis Graccho molestus, quod indicat Gracchi in eum oratio, sicut etiam in Gracchum Tuberonis.'

c. **C. Blossius Cumanus.** The Blossii were an old and distinguished family of Capua, who figured in the Second Punic War (Livy XXIII, 7, § 8, XXVII, 3; cp. De Leg. Agr. II, § 93). This C. Blossius appears to have been the chief friend and adviser of Tiberius Gracchus (see Plut. Tib. Grac. chs. 8, 17). He had been intimate with Antipater of Tarsus and had been honoured by him with the dedication of some of his philosophical works. The story of his constancy in friendship is told, after Cicero, by Val. Max. IV, 7, § 1. Plutarch (ch. 20) puts the question about the Capitol into the mouth of Nasica.

d. **hospes.** § 24 *g*.

e. **aderam . . . in consilio,** 'assisting on committee.' Cp. Brut. § 86—'Cum consules re audita "amplius" de consilii sententia pronuntiavissent.'

f. **Laenati et Rupilio consulibus.** B.C. 132. See 41 *k ad fin.* and 69 *c*.

g. **si voluisset, paruissem.** Plutarch adds a sentence which shows the firm belief of Blossius in Gracchus' love for the people—'Ἀλλ' ἐκείνου γε προστάσσοντος, ἔφη, κἀμοὶ τοῦτο πρᾶξαι καλῶς εἶχεν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Τιβέριος τοῦτο προσέταξεν, εἰ μὴ τῷ δήμῳ συνέφερεν.

h. **praefuit.** He and Diophanes the rhetorician, an exile from Mitylene, were credited with having prompted Tiberius to the course he took. On the morning of the day which proved fatal to Tiberius, Blossius encouraged him to despise a number of bad omens, by which he was at first inclined to be daunted (Plut. Tib. Grac. 8).

i. **comitem.** § 96 *e*.

j. **Itaque hac amentia.** 'And so as a consequence of this madness.' The ablative is to be taken with the whole sentence, and gives the ground of the fate which overtook Blossius.

k. **quaestione nova.** A 'quaestio nova' was one held under a special commission, like that which was appointed to inquire into the death of Clodius (Pro Mil. § 13). Plutarch (Tib. Grac. 20) says that some of the friends of Tiberius Gracchus were banished without trial, others seized and put to death. This is probably the other way of stating the same set of proceedings that are here implied by 'quaestione nova.'

l. **ad hostis.** To Aristonicus, on whose fall, in B.C. 130, Blossius committed suicide.

m. **cum conciliatrix . . . fuerit,** 'seeing that it was the impression of virtue which brought about the friendship.' 'Conciliatrix' is a favourite word with Cicero, but he does not use the masculine 'conciliator.'

a. **perfecta quidem,** &c., 'if we were of perfect wisdom indeed, the thing might have no evil consequences.' **§ 38.**

§ 39. *a.* **Aemilium.** See § 18 *e.* Q. Aemilius Papus is known simply as the colleague of Fabricius. They were consuls together in B. C. 282 and 278, and censors in 275.

b. **Luscino.** Luscinus was the cognomen of Fabricius. See § 18 *e.*

c. **M'. Curium.** § 18 *f.*

d. **Ti. Coruncanium.** § 18 *g.*

e. **quippiam.** Somewhat more emphatic than 'aliquid' in a negative sentence and less so than 'quidquam.'

f. **contendisse,** 'begged for,' not 'would have begged for.'

g. **quid attinet dicere,** 'where is the use of saying?'

h. **C. Carbo.** C. Papirius Carbo was tribune in B. C. 131. He and Fulvius Flaccus had been appointed triumvirs for carrying out the land laws in the room of Tiberius Gracchus and his father-in-law Appius Claudius (Appian, Bell. Civ. 18). One of the bills which he proposed was that it should be lawful for a tribune to be re-elected as often as he pleased (cp. § 96). During the discussion upon this measure Carbo asked Scipio what he thought of the death of Tiberius Gracchus, and received the answer that he had been justly slain (Pro Mil. § 8; Vell. Pat. II, 4, § 4; Livy, Epit. 59). After C. Gracchus had met his death Carbo, who was consul in B. C. 120, turned completely round, and defended Opimius, who slew him, adopting the same language which Africanus had used to him (De Orat. II, § 106). His sudden conversion did not inspire confidence in the minds of the nobility (De Leg. III, § 35). They made no effort to save him when he was accused by the rising orator Crassus, and Carbo put an end to himself by swallowing cantharides (Ad Fam. IX, 28, § 3). Carbo was one of the greatest orators of his time, though inferior to the age which followed him. Cicero makes Crassus say (De Orat. III, § 28)—'profluens quiddam habuit Carbo et canorum': but describes him as 'ignarum legum, haesitantem in maiorum institutis, rudem in iure civili.' His speeches were still read in the time of Cicero (Brut. § 104).

i. **C. Cato.** This C. Porcius Cato was more distinguished for his ancestors than for his merits. He was grandson of Cato the Censor and of Paulus Aemilius Macedonicus, and was sister's son to Africanus minor. As consul in B. C. 114 he was ignominiously defeated by the Scordisci in Thrace (Eutrop. IV, 24). Afterwards he was condemned for extortion in Macedonia. The paltry damages laid against him were cited afterwards as a sign of the strictness of the times (Cic. Ver. ii, III, § 184, ii, IV, § 22; Vell. Pat. II, 8, § 1). Eventually his misfortunes seem to have driven him to become a citizen of Tarraco (Pro Balbo, § 28). He is mentioned by Cicero with faint praise as a speaker (Brut. § 108).

j. **Gaius frater.** C. Sempronius Gracchus, according to the state-

ment of Plutarch, was nine years younger than his brother Tiberius. As Tiberius, according to the same authority, perished under thirty, Gaius cannot then have been more than twenty. He possessed all his brother's virtue and more than his brother's ability (Vell. Pat. II, 6, § 1). For a long time he hesitated to follow in his steps: but when he did make up his mind to do so, it was with a reckless energy, as though he meant to court destruction. Indeed the story runs that the shade of Tiberius appeared to him in a dream, telling him to hesitate no longer, as one end awaited both. His first tribuneship was in B.C. 123. He was reappointed for the year 122, without having sued for the office. His influence secured the consulship for C. Fannius Strabo in preference to Opimius, the destroyer of Fregellae. But Opimius was elected for the next year, and meantime the influence of Gracchus had been undermined by Livius Drusus, who outbid him in popular favour in the interests of the senate. The accidental murder of an obscure person named Quintus Antyllius (Plut. C. Grac. 13) or Antyllus (App. Bell. Civ. 25) afforded the senate a pretext for arming Opimius with special powers to secure the safety of the State. The result was the destruction of Gracchus, Fulvius Flaccus and their following. Even the young son of Flaccus, who had been employed as an intermediary, was murdered in cold blood by Opimius. Gracchus himself did not raise a hand against his country. He fled to the grove of the Furies, cursed the people for their ingratitude, and employed a slave to kill him.

k. **nunc.** B.C. 129.

a. **ut neque,** &c. Epexegetical of 'lex.' 'Neque . . . nec' here takes **§ 40.** the place for emphasis of 'ne . . . neve.' See § 78 *f*, and for 'ut . . . ne' 42 *b*.

b. **spatio curriculoque,** 'its course and career.' Cp. Cat. Mai. § 38—'curricula mentis.'

a. **regnum occupare conatus est.** This was the cry by which **§ 41.** Spurius Cassius and Spurius Maelius had been done to death: it was the certainty of its being raised against Tiberius that made Blossius insist on his disregarding the omens (Plut. Tib. Grac. 17). Hear the other side put in a fragment of perhaps contemporary eloquence—'Te nunc adloquor, Africane, cuius mortui quoque nomen splendori ac decori est civitati: tui clarissimi nepotes suo sanguine aluerunt inimicorum crudelitatem' (Ad H. IV, § 22). Cp. De Rep. II, § 49—'itaque et Spurius Cassius et M. Manlius et Spurius Maelius regnum occupare voluisse dicti sunt, et modo Ti. Gracchus * * *' [Desiderantur paginae duae].

b. **quid in P. Scipione effecerint.** § 12.

c. **Carbonem.** § 39 *h*.

d. **recentem poenam.** Tiberius Gracchus was murdered in B.C. 133; Carbo was tribune in 131; Laelius is speaking in 129.

e. **sustinuimus**, 'we have borne with.' They were still bearing with him.

f. **C. Gracchi . . . tribunatu.** The first tribuneship of C. Gracchus was in B. C. 123, some six years after the time when Laelius is supposed to be speaking.

g. **serpit deinde res**, 'then the mischief advances.'

h. **proclivius**, 'with more downhill course.' Cp. Rep. I, § 44, where Cicero is speaking of the change from a benevolent despotism to a tyranny—'proclivi cursu et facile delabitur.'

i. **in tabella**, 'in the matter of the ballot.'

j. **labes**, 'lapse,' carrying out 'labitur.'

k. **primo Gabinia lege.** There were altogether four 'leges tabellariae' passed at Rome up to the time of Cicero. The first was the 'Lex Gabinia' passed in B. C. 139 by Aulus Gabinius, who was then tribune. It enacted that the election of the magistrates should be conducted by secret voting. The second was by the famous L. Cassius, who was tribune in B. C. 137. It extended the ballot to the 'iudicia populi,' with the exception only of cases of treason ('perduellio'). Africanus himself is said to have induced M. Antius Briso, one of the co-tribunes of Cassius, to withdraw his opposition to this measure (Brut. § 97). The third was by Carbo in 131, extending the operation of secret voting to the passing or rejection of laws. The fourth was by C. Caelius. It completed the triumph of the ballot by making it include cases of 'perduellio.' This law was aimed at C. Popilius Laenas, the consul of B. C. 132, to punish him for the cruelty with which he had persecuted the followers of Tiberius Gracchus. Its author is said to have regretted it afterwards. De Leg. III, §§ 35, 36.

l. **videre iam videor**, 'methinks I see already.'

§ 42. *a.* **Quorsum** = 'quo versum,' 'To what end?' lit. whitherwards. So 'horsum' (= 'huc versum'), 'rursum,' 'prorsum,' 'sursum,' 'deorsum,' 'seorsum,' 'aliorsum,' 'introrsum.' 'Quo' is sometimes used by itself in the same sense, e.g. Hor. Carm. II, 3, 9—'quo pinus ingens,' &c.; Sen. de Tranq. An. 11—'Quo, inquit, te reservem, malum et trepidum animal?'

b. **ut . . . ne.** This combination of particles occurs several times in this dialogue. See §§ 40, 43, 44, 60, 65, 78, 99. It is more decided and emphatic than 'ne' alone would be. It is common in Terence, e. g. And. 61—'ut nequid nimis,' 259, 327, 834; Eun. 439—'id ut ne fiat,' 942, &c.

c. **ut . . . non.** Notice the 'ut . . . ne' of purpose, 'ut . . . non' of consequence.

d. **fuerint.** Future perfect.

e. **inpietatis.** Here used of treason against one's country, which ought to be holier than a mother.

f. **Themistocle.** It was Themistocles who persuaded the Athenians to build a fleet (Hdt. VII, 144), and it was to his policy that the victory of the Greeks over the Persians at Salamis (B.C. 480) was due. He was first ostracized by his countrymen and retired to Argos; then, being implicated by the Spartans in the treason of Pausanias, he fled to Artaxerxes, king of Persia, who received him royally (Thuc. I, 135–138).

g. **viginti annis ante.** The exile of Coriolanus is assigned to the date 491 B.C. Themistocles was ostracized in 471; he fled to Persia in 466 B.C.

h. **Coriolanus.** § 36 *b.*

i. **mortem sibi,** &c. This seems to be said on the principle which Atticus, a careful historian, is made to enounce sarcastically in the Brutus (§ 42)—'quoniam quidem concessum est rhetoribus ementiri in historiis, ut aliquid dicere possint argutius.' Atticus himself had disposed of the legendary suicide of Coriolanus. With regard to Themistocles, Cicero shows himself aware in the Brutus that Thucydides is our best authority. Now Thucydides merely says (I, 138, §§ 6, 7)—*νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον· λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτόν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο.* The myth of his having sacrificed a bull and killed himself by drinking its blood first appeared in Clitarchus or Stratocles.

a. **non modo,** 'not merely.' § 43.

b. **vel,** 'even.'

c. **ut res ire coepit.** The murder of Tiberius Gracchus inaugurated a century of civil war. Before that the most bitter strifes had been settled by mutual concessions without an appeal to arms.

a. **Haec igitur prima,** &c. A repetition in a positive form of the precept given negatively in § 40, *ad fin.* § 44.

a. **Nam quibusdam,** &c. 'For certain people, whom I hear to have been accounted sages in Greece, have adopted, I think, some strange opinions.' After Cicero's time 'placita' became the regular word for the dogmas of philosophers. Sen. Epist. 95—'Praeterea nulla ars contemplativa sine decretis suis est, quae Graeci vocant *δόγματα*: nobis decreta licet appellare, vel scita, vel placita.' § 45.

b. **persequantur argutiis,** 'pursue into subtleties.'

c. **fugiendas esse nimias,** &c. In the whole of the passage which follows Cicero has in view the well-known lines of Euripides in the Hippolytus (253–260), which may freely be rendered thus—

'Let friendship's cup be tempered well,
Not mixed to passion's strength;
And hold with care the reins of love,
Nor give them all their length.

So shall you keep your heart your own,
To lend or take again;
The draught shall ne'er intoxicate,
The steeds you shall restrain.
But ah! 'tis bitter grief to know,
As I for her, a double throe!'

d. **sibi suarum cuique rerum.** A complex oblique case of 'sibi suas quisque res (satis habet).'

e. **nimis.** To be taken, as the position shows, with 'inplicari.'

f. **securitatem.** 'Securitas' = the *εὐθυμία* of Democritus (De Fin. V, § 23), the *ἀταραξία* of Epicurus (Diog. Laert. X, § 82).

§ **46.** *a.* **inhumanius,** 'more cynically.'

b. **locum,** 'topic.'

c. **paulo ante.** §§ 29–32.

d. **minimum . . . maxime.** § 29 *f.*

e. **haberet.** The imperfect seems to be due merely to the intervention of 'perstrinxi,' as 'dicere aiunt' would require the present: the proper sequence is resumed in the next sentence.

f. **mulierculae,** 'weak women.' Cp. Pro Mur. § 31. Diminutives with Cicero have generally a touch of sarcasm. Cp. 'rumusculi,' De Leg. III, § 35; 'musculorum iecuscula,' De Div. II, § 33; 'quaesticulus,' ib. § 34; 'passerculus,' § 65; 'caruncula,' § 52; 'radicula,' § 135.

g. **amicitiarum.** For the plural cp. 'inimicitias,' § 34. So 'admirationes' is used in De Fin. V, § 63 for expressions of admiration. Abstract nouns in their strict sense are always singular. See § 69 *a.*

§ **47.** *a.* **nihil . . . melius.** Cp. § 20—'excepta sapientia': but exceptions are the death of rhetoric.

b. **a dis inmortalibus.** § 20 *i.*

c. **ista.** Addressed to some imaginary Epicurean opponent.

d. **blanda,** 'attractive.'

e. **reapse,** 'in point of fact.' From 're' and 'eapse' = 're ipsa.' Cp. De Rep. I, § 2; II, § 66.

f. **locis,** 'grounds.' The nominative would be 'loci.'

g. **actionemve,** 'or action,' T. D. iv, § 34, 'ex ea (i. e. virtute) proficiscuntur honestae voluntates, sententiae, actiones.'

h. **malitiam.** 'Malitia' here means simply 'badness,' as opposed to 'bonitas,' 'goodness.' But the prevailing meaning of the word was 'cunning,' De N. D. III, § 75—'est enim malitia versuta et fallax nocendi ratio.' So in the Tusculans (IV, § 34) Cicero will not employ it as an equivalent of the Greek *κακία*, to denote the opposite of virtue, but invents the rather painful 'vitiositas' in preference—'huius igitur virtutis contraria est vitiositas—sic enim malo quam malitiam appellare

eam, quam Graeci *κακίαν* appellant; nam malitia certi cuiusdam vitii nomen est, vitiositas omnium.'

i. **libidinem** 'self-indulgence.' See § 35 *b*.

j. **videas** 'you may see.' Potential.

k. **flagitiosis modestos**, 'the self-restrained at excesses.' 'Flagitium' denotes an act which is vicious and shameful, without necessarily being criminal ('facinus').

l. **proprium.** § 26 *d*.

a. **cadit in sapientem**, 'attaches to the sage.' Cp. § 100—'in hominem cadere.' De Div. II, § 18—'ut mihi ne in deum quidem cadere videatur, ut sciat, quid casu et fortuito futurum sit.' § 48.

b. **humanitatem.** § 8 *c*.

c. **motu animi.** § 10 *e*.

d. **tenera atque tractabilis**, 'soft and sensitive.'

e. **diffundatur**, 'expands.' Middle.

f. **plus quam.** Supply 'valet' with 'angor' alone as subject.

g. **Cum autem contrahat.** 'Cum . . . contrahat' causal; 'cum contingit' below temporal.

h. **si qua significatio**, &c. Nominative to 'contrahat.'

i. **adplicet et adiungat.** Cp. § 32—'adplicant se et propius admovent.'

a. **animante**, 'a living being.' 'Animans' = *ζῷον* is a very wide term, including gods, men, birds, beasts and fishes. Cic. Timaeus 10. In ch. 6 of the same we have the ablative 'animanti.' § 49.

b. **ut ita dicam.** An apology for introducing a new word. See Cicero's precept as to softening any violent expression by the aid of this formula. De Orat. III, § 165.

c. **redamare.** Cicero's equivalent for the Greek *ἀντιφιλεῖν* (E. N. VIII, 5, § 5, &c.). For the 'd' cp. 'redire,' 'redarguere' (Macrob. Sat. VI, 9).

d. **remuneratione**, 'requital.'

a. **nihil esse quod ad se**, &c. The expression here is confused and obscure. It might seem that the 'ad' before 'amicitiam' was superfluous. If it were omitted, the sense would run thus—'that there is nothing which so entices and attracts anything to itself as likeness does friendship.' But there is no ground for doubting the genuineness of the reading: so that, in interpreting the text as it stands, we must lay no stress on the words 'ad se,' but regard them merely as part of the expression 'ad se inlicere et attrahere' = 'attract,' translating somewhat on this wise—'that there is no such power of attraction in all the world as that possessed by likeness in attracting (men) to friendship.' § 50.

b. **ut . . . diligant.** Cp. § 18—'concedant ut viri boni fuerint.' Here, however, there is more reason for the substitution of an 'ut'

clause for the accusative with infinitive, as we have just had an accusative with infinitive preceding.

c. **quasi propinquitate . . . atque natura,** 'by a kind of natural affinity.'

d. **adpetentius.** See § 58 *c.*

e. **bonis inter bonos.** More definitely 'reciprocal' than 'bonis inter se.'

f. **benevolentiam, qui . . . fons.** This kind of attraction is the rule rather than the exception in Latin. Cp. Phil. II, § 44—'Pompeium, quod imperii populi Romani decus ac lumen fuit.'

g. **inmunis,** 'unsocial,' the opposite of 'communis,' § 65.

h. **quae . . . soleat,** 'seeing that it is wont.'

§ **51.** *a.* **fingunt,** 'manufacture,' with the suggestion that the article is spurious. From this use it was easy for the word to pass into our meaning of 'feign.'

b. **tumque.** 'Tum' here may be rendered 'only.'

c. **tantumque abest ut . . . ut,** 'and so far from friendships being cultivated on account of want, those are the most liberal,' &c. The use of two 'ut' clauses makes this idiom rather heavy: sometimes a simple indicative is substituted for the second. Brut. § 278—'itaque tantum afuit, ut inflammares nostros animos, somnum . . . vix tenebamus.'

d. **opibus et copiis.** § 22 *e.* The distinction between the two ideas is brought out in De Rep. v, § 8—'opibus firma, copiis locuples.'

e. **in qua plurimum est praesidii.** Cp. Apol. 30 B—*οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα.* See § 30 *b.*

f. **haud sciam an,** &c. 'I might doubt whether it is even necessary for friends to be altogether above wants.' See § 20 *f.*

g. **nec domi nec militiae.** § 15 *f.*

§ **52.** *a.* **deliciis diffluentes.** 'Lapped in luxury,' lit. 'dissolving from delights,' as though their moral nature were going all to pieces under the influence of pleasure.

b. **nec usu nec ratione** 'neither in practice nor in theory.'

c. **habent cognitam.** With 'cognitum habere' cp. 'compertum exploratum habere,' 'collectum habere' (De Div. II, § 145): 'coactum habebat,' Caesar, B. G. I, 15; 'redempta habere,' Ibid. 18. From such forms we can see how 'habere' was ready to lend itself on the break-up of the language to use as a mere auxiliary. But in these classical usages it is always more than a mere auxiliary. For instance, in Brut. § 47, 'habuisse conscripta' means 'had written out and kept,' which is a great deal more than could be conveyed merely by 'conscripsisse.'

d. **ut,** 'on condition that.'

e. **neque diligat quemquam,** &c. Juvenal may possibly have had this in mind when he wrote (XII, 130)—

'montibus aurum
exaequet, nec amet quemquam, nec ametur ab ullo!'

f. **circumfluere,** 'to welter.'

g. **nimirum.** An explanatory particle—'I mean one in which.'

a. **diligat,** 'could love?' Interrogative potential. § 53.

b. **Coluntur,** *sc.* 'tyranni.'

c. **ut fit plerumque.** Often used without 'plerumque' of what happens generally (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πόλυ). Pro Mil. § 28—'dum se uxor, ut fit, comparat.' Cp. 'quod persaepe fit,' § 75; 'ut fieri solet,' § 77.

d. **quam fuerint inopes amicorum.** The position of the words is designed to throw stress on 'inopes amicorum.'

e. **Tarquinium.** § 28 *e*.

f. **gratiam referre,** 'to repay.' 'Gratia' is here used in a neutral sense.

a. **quamquam,** 'though indeed.' § 54.

b. **inportunitate,** 'selfishness.' Cat. Mai. § 7—'inportunitas autem et inhumanitas omni aetati molesta est.' 'Inportunitas' (the contrary of 'opportunitas') seems to denote the selfishness which disregards all proprieties of time, place and person. See its use in Terence, And. 231—'tamen eam adducam? inportunitatem spectate aniculae: quia compotrix eius est.' Cp. also De Fin. I, § 35—'filium morte multavit: si sine causa, nollem me ab eo ortum, tam inportuno tamque crudeli.' In De Rep. I, § 50, 'inportunus' is used as the opposite of 'clemens'—'tam enim esse clemens tyrannus quam [rex] inportunus potest.'

c. **si quemquam,** &c., 'that he could have had *any* friend.'

d. **praepotentium.** Tac. Ann. XV, 64 *ad fin.*—'praedives et praepotens' (of Seneca); cp. Juv. Sat. X, 16—'Senecae praedivitis.'

e. **caeca.** For the conception of Fortune as blind cp. Cebetis Tabula, ch. vii—

'Η δὲ γυνὴ ἐκείνη τίς ἐστιν, ἡ ὥσπερ τυφλή τις εἶναι δοκοῦσα, καὶ ἑστηκυῖα ἐπὶ λίθου τινὸς στρογγύλου;

καλεῖται μέν, ἔφη, Τύχη· ἐστὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τυφλή, ἀλλὰ καὶ μαινομένη καὶ κωφή.

f. **sed eos etiam,** &c. In the Timon of Lucian (27) Hermes asks Πλοῦτος how it is that his admirers do not see his deformities—*'Αλλὰ πῶς, ὦ Πλοῦτε, εἰ μὴ τυφλοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ πάντες εἰσί;* and receives the answer—*Οὐ τυφλοί, ὦ ἄριστε· ἀλλ' ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, αἵπερ νῦν κατέχουσι τὰ πάντα, ἐπισκιάζουσιν αὐτούς.*

g. **efferuntur fere,** 'they generally run to unbridled lengths of pride and insolence.'

h. **insipiente fortunato,** 'the fool in fortune.' For the adjective used as substantive cp. 'nobilis indocti,' Juv. Sat. VIII, 49 (see Mayor's note).

i. **intolerabilius,** 'more insufferable.'

j. **imperio, potestate.** The former is strictly used of military, the latter of civil command.

§ **55.** *a.* **copiis, facultatibus, opibus**, 'wealth, means and resources,' § 51 *d.*

b. **vestem egregiam.** 'Vestis' is often used as a collective noun = 'wardrobe.' Cp. Phil. II, § 66—'permagnum optimi pondus argenti, pretiosa vestis, multa et lauta supellex.'

c. **supellectilem.** The simile is no doubt suggested by Xen. Mem. II, 4, § 1—*ὡς πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον ἂν εἴη φίλος σαφὴς καὶ ἀγαθός*, and § 5—*καίτοι πρὸς ποῖον κτῆμα τῶν ἄλλων παραβαλλόμενος φιλὸς ἀγαθὸς οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ κρείττων φανείη*;

d. **qui vincit viribus.** Hence they are called *τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά*. See E. N. IX, 8, § 9—*προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν*. Wealth and honour are of such a nature that plus for A means minus for B in the scramble of life; but the higher goods of virtue and wisdom and kindness are like light that can be imparted without being lost. Their possession by A tends to promote their possession by B.

e. **possessio**, 'property.'

f. **ut**, 'insomuch that.' Cicero writes as though he had said explicitly that friendship is superior to the goods of fortune.

g. **hactenus.** A standing formula for the conclusion of one part of a subject. Cp. § 24—'Hactenus mihi videor,' &c., at the close of the first section of the 'partitio' ('quid sentiret'). So in De Div. II, § 53—'sed haec hactenus; nunc ad ostenta veniamus.'

§ **56.** *a.* **fines et quasi termini**, 'the limits and boundaries as it were.' These words are evidently meant as the Latin equivalent for the Greek word *ὅροι* in one of its multifarious applications. But the meaning of *ὅρος* in this connexion is much closer to the primary one than that of either 'term' or 'definition.'

b. **diligendi.** Genitive of the gerund. The reading 'deligendi,' which Baiter has here, seems out of keeping with his punctuation. Perhaps what Cicero wrote was 'dilegendi' = 'diligendi.'

c. **ferri**, 'proposed.'

d. **adfecti simus.** 'Adfecti' is here an adjective, like 'animatus' in § 57.

e. **ut, quanti quisque**, &c., 'that whatever value each man sets upon himself, the same should be set upon him by his friends.'

f. **faciat.** The subjunctive here seems to be due to Halm, on the analogy of § 59. 'Facit,' which is the common reading in this passage, is quite defensible.

§ **58.** *a.* **definit amicitiam**, &c., 'limits friendship to an equality of service and goodwill.'

b. **nimis exigue et exiliter,** &c., 'in too narrow and beggarly a spirit to make friendship a matter of reckoning, so that the account of receipts and expenses may be balanced.' Livy also has the phrase 'ad calculos vocare' (V, 4, § 7)—'si ad calculos eum respublica vocet.' Cp. De Fin. II, § 60—'quid? fortes viri voluptatumne calculis subductis proelium ineunt, sanguinem pro patria profundunt?' An account appears to have been balanced by withdrawing the pebbles ('calculi'), which represented the items, from either side, until the two were even.

c. **adfluentior.** Cp. 'adpetentius,' § 50. When participles lapse into mere adjectives they become liable to comparison. In some participles the adjectival nature has so triumphed that the verbal nature is almost forgotten, e.g. 'sapiens,' 'diligens,' 'neglegens,' in others the comparison causes more surprise. Thus in De Off. I, § 76 we have 'parentiores' (=more obedient) and in II, § 71 'utentior' (=with more command of money).

d. **observare restricte,** 'to keep a niggard watch.'

e. **ne quid excidat,** &c. Cp. Luke VI, 38—*δίδοτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν· μέτρον καλόν, πεπιεσμένον σεσαλευμένον ὑπερεκχυνόμενον, δώσουσιν εἰς τὸν κόλπον ὑμῶν.*

f. **congeratur.** Friendship's measure should never lack a 'cumulus' or 'auctarium.'

a. **abiectior,** 'too desponding.' **§ 59.**

b. **amplificandae fortunae,** 'of advancing their position.'

c. **fractior,** 'too feeble.' What was said above on the comparison of participles applies to present and past participles. The comparison of the latter is much the more frequent.

d. **eniti et efficere.** A kind of hendiadys for 'strive with all one's might.'

e. **ita amare oportere.** Aristotle (Rhet. II, 13, § 4) says of old men —*Καὶ οὔτε φιλοῦσι σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες.* Notice here the vague use of the infinitive without a subject: 'aliquem' may be supplied mentally, as *τινα* often has to be in Greek. Cp. 'existimare oportet' in § 61.

f. **si aliquando.** 'Aliquis' and the words formed from it are used after 'si' (in place of the more usual 'quis,' 'quando,' &c,) when there is any stress meant to be laid upon the pronoun or adverb. Cp. § 88—'si aliquem'; Cat. Mai. § 44—'Sed si aliquid dandum est voluptati.'

g. **quem ad modum putaretur.** Aristotle, as we have just seen, quotes the saying as that of Bias; but Aulus Gellius (I, 3, § 30) expressly ascribes it to Chilon the Lacedaemonian, and gives the wording thus—'Hac fini ames, tanquam forte fortuna et osurus, hac itidem tenus

oderis, tanquam fortasse post amaturus.' There can be no doubt about the soundness of the latter part of the precept.

h. **unus e septem.** § 7 *c.*

i. **ambitiosi.** Using friendships as means to political advancement.

j. **Quonam . . . modo.** A stronger form of 'quomodo.'

k. **optare.** § 11 *d.*

l. **ansas.** Cp. 'pre-hendo.' We may render the word 'handles': but like the Greek λαβή it is probably a metaphor from the wrestling-ring. Plat. Rep. 544 B—ὥσπερ παλαιστής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε.

m. **rursus autem,** 'while on the other hand.'

§ 60. *a.* **illud,** 'the following.'

b. **praecipiundum fuit.** Notice the unconditional statement. See § 15 *c.*

c. **ut ne quando** = 'ut nunquam.' Notice that the second 'ut' is of consequence, the first of purpose.

d. **si minus.** § 23 *k.*

§ 61. *a.* **emendati,** 'free from faults,' from 'e' and 'mendum,' rather than 'menda.'

b. **si qua fortuna.** Perhaps ablative, not nominative.

c. **minus iustae,** 'less proper.'

d. **agatur,** 'is at stake.' Cp. Liv. XXVII, 34, § 7—'quum fama eius ageretur.'

e. **est enim quatenus . . . possit.** A subjunctive of the same kind as that after 'sunt qui,' &c. The sentiment is out of keeping with that of § 40—'turpis enim excusatio est,' &c.

f. **quam blanditiis,** &c., 'though it is degrading to compass it by fawning and flattery.'

g. **virtus, quam sequitur,** &c. The sentiment is somewhat obscurely expressed. It amounts to saying that when affection can be secured by right conduct, it is by no means to be despised.

§ 62. *a.* **quod omnibus . . . essent,** 'quod' gives the reason of the feeling. The accusative with infinitive might have been used instead. The sentiments here put into the mouth of Scipio are really those of Socrates. See Xen. Mem. II, 4, §§ 1, 2, 4.

b. **dicere posse.** We might supply 'quemque' from 'quisque,' were it not for the 'neglegentis' below, which shows that 'homines' is the subject throughout.

c. **cuius generis,** 'a class of which.'

§ 63. *a.* **ut cursum.** Supply 'equorum.' 'Currum' for 'cursum' is a tempting conjecture, but there seems to be no warrant for it.

b. **quo utamur,** &c., 'that we may test to some extent the characters of our friends before indulging in intimacy with them, just as we use horses that have been tried.' Baiter's text has 'quo utamur quasi equis

temptatis sic amicitia, aliqua parte,' &c. 'amicitia' is only found in two later MSS.: the bulk of them have 'amicitias.' Mr. A. C. Clark's conjecture has been here followed, which regards 'amicitias' as 'an ungrammatical addition from the margin in the archetype.' There is a slight zeugma involved in the word 'utamur.' See § 2 *g*.

c. **pecunia**, 'sum of money.'

d. **leves**. The meaning of 'levis' is best understood from that of its opposite 'gravis.' The 'gravis' is the man of weight, whose word is his bond; the 'levis' is the man who is fickle and unprincipled. Cp. 'levior cortice,' Hor. Carm. III, 9, 22.

e. **sin vero**, &c. The unusualness of this combination of particles has given rise to doubts as to the reading. The whole expression is more emphatic than if he had said 'siqui vero.'

f. **imperia, potestates**. § 54 *j*.

g. **Inbecilla . . . ad contemnendam**, 'too weak to despise.' Lit. 'weak in the direction of despising.'

h. **obscuratum iri arbitrantur**, 'they think it will be overlooked.'

a. **invenias**. The vague use of the second person is suitable to the **§ 64.**
subjunctive; above we had the indicative with the first person—'ubi eos inveniemus.'

b. **honorem amici**, 'a friend's promotion.' 'Honores' above are 'offices of state.' Cp. Greek *τιμαί*.

c. **maxime raro**. More elegant than 'rarissimo.' Cp. De Orat. III, § 18—'est enim is (locus) maxime et opacus et frigidus.'

d. **paene divino**, 'almost above humanity.'

a. **Simplicem . . . et communem et consentientem**, 'frank and **§ 65.**
sociable and sympathetic.' 'Communis' is almost our 'clubbable.' It approaches in meaning both to 'comis' and to 'civilis.'

b. **multiplex ingenium et tortuosum**, 'a mind full of twists and turns.' This is the opposite of what is denoted by 'simplicem' above.

c. **ut ne**. § 42 *b*.

d. **inferendis . . . oblatis**. 'Inferre' of bringing a charge against someone; 'offerre' of laying it before another.

e. **fit verum**, 'proves true.' Cp. *γίνεται*.

f. **initio**. § 18—'Sed hoc primum sentio,' &c.

g. **quem eundem**, &c. Cp. § 18 *ad fin.*—'concedant ut viri boni fuerint.'

h. **ingenui** = our 'gentleman.' Cp. *ἐλευθέριος*.

i. **fronte**, 'under a smooth brow.'

j. **criminationes**. Here = 'crimina,' abstract for concrete. Strictly 'criminatio' is a line of accusation. Cp. Pro Quinctio § 33—'inaudita criminatione accusatorum.'

k. **repellere**. Notice that the infinitive here corresponds to the

clause with 'ne' above—'primum, ne quid fictum sit; deinde . . . repellere.'

l. **aliquid . . . esse violatum,** 'that some wrong has been done to him.'

§ **66.** *a.* **condimentum amicitiae.** For the metaphor cp. Cat. Mai. § 10 —'comitate condīta gravitas.'

b. **illa quidem.** In this idiom the 'illa' has no particular force, but acts merely as a kind of pad between 'habet' and 'quidem.'

c. **gravitatem,** 'impressiveness.'

d. **proclivior,** 'more inclined,' 'prone.' Cp. 'proclivius ad perniciem,' § 41.

§ **67.** *a.* **Exsistit.** 'There presents itself.'

b. **vetulis.** § 46 *f.*

c. **teneros,** i. e. young and supple.

d. **homine.** Not merely of a man, but of a human being.

e. **satietates.** § 69 *a.*

f. **suavissima,** 'the mellowest.'

g. **multos modios salis,** &c., 'that many bushels of salt should be eaten together, in order that the work of friendship may be fulfilled.' 'Expletum sit' here may be a true perfect, 'may have been fulfilled,' but it would be superfluous to render it so in English. The proverb quoted is from the Greek, Cp. E. N. VIII, 3, § 8—*ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλῶσαι.*

§ **68.** *a.* **herbis,** 'blades of corn.'

b. **illae quidem.** § 66 *b.*

c. **vetustas,** 'the old,' abstract for concrete. 'Vetustas,' which by itself would be rather harsh, is led up to by 'novitates'; for when a word is used in the plural it has already lost somewhat of its strict character as an abstract noun. Cp. § 69 *a.*

d. **Quin ipso equo.** 'Nay even in the case of the horse,' 'ipso equo' is replaced later by the more definite 'eo quo.'

e. **quo consuevit.** The ablative is due to an ellipse of 'uti.'

f. **montuosis etiam et silvestribus.** The 'etiam' here speaks volumes for the change of sentiment with regard to nature between ancient and modern times. Cicero in many passages, and especially in the De Legibus, shows a keen sense of the beauties of scenery: but it is the amenities of nature, not her awfulness and sublimity, that attract him.

g. **commorati sumus,** 'we have dwelt.' Cp. Horace's 'sub divo moreris' (Carm. II, 3, 23). The similar use in later Latin of 'demorari' gave rise to the French 'demeurer.'

§ **69.** *a.* **excellentiae.** For other instances of abstract nouns used in the plural cp. 'satietates,' § 67, 'novitates,' § 68, 'utilitates,' § 75; 'honestates,' Pro Mur. § 87. Cp. § 46 *g.*

b. **Philo.** See § 14 *b.*

c. **Rupilio.** Cp. §§ 37, 73, 101. P. Rupilius was a friend and contemporary of Scipio and Laelius. His elevation to the consulship (B. C. 132) was a striking instance of change of fortune. For his poverty had previously compelled him to accept the control of the customs in Sicily, and now he was sent to the same province, as consul, to put an end to the Servile War (Val. Max. VI, 9, § 8). Such was the strictness of his discipline that he ordered his own son-in-law, Q. Fabius, to quit the province, for having through his negligence lost the citadel of Tauromenium (Ibid. II, 7, § 3). He was brought to trial after his consulship for his harsh treatment of the friends and followers of Tiberius (Vel. Pat. II, 7, § 4). There is a curious statement by the historian Fannius (Tusc. IV, § 40) that he died through excessive grief at his brother's rejection for the consulship (cp. § 73).

d. **Mummio.** Spurius Mummius (cp. § 101) was brother of the famous L. Mummius Achaicus, who destroyed Corinth and formed the Roman province of Achaia in the same year in which Scipio took Carthage (B.C. 146). Spurius seems to have been a man of more culture than his brother. Cicero introduces him also into the De Republica, where he is spoken of as a special favourite of Scipio's (I, § 18). He had been with him shortly before in Rhodes (III, § 48). His politics may be judged of from the following trenchant sentence—'Sed tamen vel regnum malo quam liberum populum' (III, § 46). As a natural consequence he hated rhetoricians (V, § 11). He wrote some humorous epistles in verse to his friends from Corinth, where Cicero surmises that he may have acted as 'legatus' to his brother (Ad Att. XIII, 6, § 4; 30, § 3).

e. **inferioris ordinis,** 'friends of lower rank,' in contrast with those just mentioned, who held the chief place in his affections.

f. **Quintum . . . Maximum.** Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus was the eldest son of Paulus Macedonicus, and so brother to Africanus Minor (see § 9 *f.*). When their father died, Africanus gave up to Fabius his own share of the inheritance (Paradox. § 48). He served under his father in the last war against Macedonia, B.C. 168 (Livy XLIV, 35; App. Hisp. 65). In B.C. 145 he was made consul himself (cp. § 96), and conducted the war against Viriathus in Spain, but without much success. Afterwards he commanded one of the two camps by which Numantia was invested in the year (B.C. 133) in which his brother Scipio took that city (App. Hisp. 90).

g. **omnino.** This word has here a concessive force—'an excellent man, I admit.'

h. **esse ampliores,** 'to have their dignity enhanced.' The idea is of bulking more largely in the eyes of the world. Scipio was animated

with much the same feeling as Caesar. He was in the habit of thinking certain things to be 'inconsistent with the dignity of himself and the Roman people.'

§ 70. *a.* **ut . . . impertiant,** 'namely that . . . they should impart.'

b. **ea,** 'the results,' a vague use of the pronoun. The 'praestantia virtutis, ingenii' is itself incommunicable.

c. **ut, si.** Ut is a hard-worked particle. We have just had 'ut' epexegetical, we have now 'ut' consecutive, and in the next clause we have 'ut' comparative.

d. **in fabulis,** 'in romance.' In Greek it would be ἐν μύθοις.

e. **pastores, quos patres.** As in the story of Romulus and Remus, who were brought up by the shepherd Faustulus and his wife Larentia (Livy I, 5), and in that of Cyrus the Elder, who was reared by the βούκολος Μιτραδάτης and his wife Σπακώ (Hdt. I, 110).

f. **certis,** 'undoubted.' Cp. the jeer of Cicero against Erucius in Pro Rosc. Am. § 46—'si tibi fortuna non dedit ut patre certo nascerere.'

§ 71. *a.* **necessitudine.** 'Necessitudo' denotes any close bond of connexion. Hence 'necessarius' for a relation either by blood or marriage, or simply an intimate friend, as in § 74.

b. **quorum plerique,** 'but most of them.'

c. **officia exprobrantium.** Cp. Ter. And. 43, where Sosia complains to Simo that his raking up his kindnesses looks as if he thought they had been forgotten—

'nam istaec commemoratio
quasi exprobratio est inmemori benefici.'

d. **meminisse debet,** &c. See the same sentiment expressed by Demosthenes, De Cor. § 269, Dindorf. Theophrastus sets it down as one of the traits of the ὑπερήφανος to remember the benefits conferred by himself.

§ 72. *a.* **inferiores.** Accusative governed by **extollere.** The way in which they are to raise their inferiors appears from the words below—'qui hac opinione non modo verbis,' &c.

b. **Sunt enim quidam, qui . . . faciunt.** The speaker here may be supposed to have definite persons in view, whom he could name if he wished. Cp. Horace's 'sunt qui non habeant, est qui non curat habere,' where he is talking of riches, and by 'est qui' means himself. 'Sunt qui faciant' would be generic.

c. **cum . . . putant,** 'in thinking.'

§ 73. *a.* **sustinere.** Supply 'possit.'

b. **non enim neque,** &c. The 'neque' here only strengthens the 'non.' Nobbe's text omits it: but it is probably due to an irregularity of construction. Cicero may originally have conceived the sentence somewhat in this way—'non enim neque tu possis omnis tuos ad honores

amplissimos perducere, neque si possis, possint illi tamen quidvis sustinere': but he was diverted from his purpose by the occurrence of an example.

c. **honores.** § 64 *b.*

d. **P. Rupilium.** § 69 *c.*

e. **fratrem eius Lucium.** § 69 *c, ad fin.*

a. **Omnino.** This word serves here as a mere particle of transition practically equivalent to 'moreover.' § **74.**

b. **conroboratis iam,** &c. 'Only when both character and age have been seasoned and strengthened.' The metaphor is from the growth of wood.

c. **ineunte aetate.** The time pointed to is early manhood. For the phrase cp. 'ineunte vere,' Cat. Mai. § 53.

d. **pilae.** Mentioned among the pursuits of youth in Cat. Mai. § 58. The game of ball is probably a good deal older than Nausicaa (Hom. Od. V, 100). Maecenas was equal to it after a journey, while Horace and Vergil were not (Hor. Sat. I, 5, 48)—

'lusum it Maecenas, dormitum ego Vergiliusque;
namque pila lippis inimicum et ludere crudis.'

The diminutive is used by St. Augustine among the emblems of childhood (Conf. I, ch. 19 *ad fin.*)—'a nucibus et pilulis et passeribus ad praefectos et reges.'

e. **eos habere necessarios.** 'Oportet' has to be supplied from 'iudicandae.' This is a rare construction in Latin, but we seem to have a parallel to it in Livy XXVI, 32, § 2; XXVII, 20, §§ 6, 7. It is more common in Greek. Take for instance Plat. Crito 51 C—*καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτήν*, where the *πείθειν* is governed by the *δεῖ* latent in *ποιητέον*.

f. **paedagogi.** The *παιδαγωγός* was the slave who had the care of children. Thus the *παιδαγωγός*, who figures in the Medea of Euripides, is addressed as

τέκνων ὀπαδὲ πρέσβυ τῶν Ἰάσονος
(line 53, Dindorf).

It was the duty of the *παιδαγωγός* to conduct his young master to and from school (Plat. Lysis, 208 C). In the Lysis of Plato the *παιδαγωγοί* are represented (223 A) as pouncing down upon the boys, like duennas, and carrying them off to the detriment of the dialogue. In the Phormio of Terence (line 144) Phaedria is jocularly called a 'paedagogus' because he escorted a girl to and from her music-lessons. The word has given rise to our 'page' on the one hand and 'pedagogue' on the other: its meaning may be said to lie between the two.

g. **aestimandi.** The MSS. here have simply 'est,' for which Mommsen conjectured 'aestimandi.'

h. **Aliter.** This carries us back to 'Omnino amicitiae conroboratis iam,' &c. 'Isto . . . aestimandi' must be regarded as a parenthesis.

i. **dispares enim mores,** &c. A curiously ambiguous sentence. Perhaps it is meant to be taken thus—'For a difference in tastes is a consequence of difference in character, and unlikeness in these (namely, both character and tastes, cp. 'morum studiorumque distantia' below) dissevers friendships.'

j. **quanta maxima potest esse.** Cp. Livy XXII, 3, § 6—'quantam maximam vastitatem potest, caedibus incendiisque consuli procul ostendit.' For the position of the superlative cp. § 12.

§ 75. *a.* **intemperata quaedam benevolentia,** 'an intemperance of affection, if I may be allowed the expression.' The phrase suggests some such Greek original as ἀκρασία τῆς φιλίας.

b. **Neoptolemus.** Neoptolemus, otherwise known as Pyrrhus, was the son of Achilles (Od. XI, 506). He was brought up on the island of Scyros (Il. XIX, 326), under the care of Lycomedes (Soph. Phil. 243). After his father's death Ulysses brought him from Scyros to Troy (Od. XI, 509), because of a prophecy that Troy could not be taken without him.

c. **Lycomedem.** Lycomedes was king of the Scyrians (Plut. Thes. 35).

d. **ut discedendum sit.** Consecutive clause—'so that one has to leave.' **magnae** is here constructed like 'tantae.'

e. **desiderium.** § 10 *d.* Here we may render it 'the pain of parting,' but it means more precisely the pain that follows parting.

f. **parum iustus,** 'hardly proper.' 'Parum' serves as a weakened kind of negative, like 'minus.'

§ 76. *a.* **et quid postules,** &c., 'not only what you are asking from your friend, but also what you would allow him to obtain from you.' 'Put yourself in his place,' appears to be the meaning.

b. **dimittendis.** 'Dimittere' is properly used of voluntarily putting a thing away from one. Cp. St. Augustine's 'Te nemo amittit, nisi qui dimittit' (cp. IV, 9).

c. **oratio nostra,** 'our discourse.'

d. **remissione usus,** 'by an abatement of intimacy.'

e. **eluendae,** 'must be got rid of.' Lit. 'washed away.' Cp. our phrase 'to wash one's hands of.'

f. **dissuendae magis quam discindendae.** A homely and vigorous metaphor, perhaps picked up out of some one of the more than 150 speeches of Cato's, which Cicero professed to have read (Brut. § 65).

g. **nec fieri possit.** A periphrasis for 'possible.' The want of some equivalent for the Greek δυνατός led to the invention of 'possibilis' after the time of Cicero. See Quint. III, 8, § 25—'δυνατόν, quod

nostri *possible* nominant, quae ut dura videatur appellatio, tamen sola est.'

h. **faciunda sit.** Pleonastic for 'fieret,' and probably due to the 'fieri' preceding.

a. **in rei publicae partibus dissensio,** 'a difference of opinion on party politics.' 'Partes' = our 'party.' Cp. Cicero's sneer at Antony (Phil. II, § 74)—'Hunc igitur quisquam, qui in suis partibus, id est in suis fortunis, tam timidus fuerit, pertimescat?' § 77.

b. **inimicitiae.** § 34 *d.*

c. **Q. Pompeii.** This Q. Pompeius was the founder of his family, which was not the same as that of the triumvir. He was a 'novus homo,' who rose by sheer force of intellectual ability (Brut. § 96): but, though clever, he was unprincipled—'callide improbus' is Cicero's description of him in the De Finibus II, § 54 (cp. De Off. III, § 109). He was elected consul in B.C. 141 along with Cn. Servilius Caepio. Laelius was his defeated rival. He is said to have thrown Laelius off his guard by declaring that he did not mean to stand. Hence the quarrel referred to in the text. Ten years later (B.C. 131) he was censor along with Q. Metellus Macedonicus. This year is remarkable for the fact that then for the first time both censors were plebeians (Liv. Epit. 59).

d. **meo nomine,** 'on my account,' a metaphor from book-keeping. 'Nomen' is the entry in the ledger under the name of some one. Cp. Caesar, B. G. I, 18—'odisse etiam suo nomine Caesarem et Romanos.' We have the word in its literal sense in a fragment from the Synephebi of Caecilius Statius (De Fin. I, § 73)—

> 'aut tu illum fructu fallas aut per litteras
> avertas aliquod nomen.'

e. **collega nostro.** Perhaps as augur.

f. **Metello.** The famous Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, so called from his victory over the pretender Andriscus, who claimed to be a son of Perseus (B.C. 148). He was consul in B.C. 143 along with Appius Claudius Pulcher, and carried on war with success in Nearer Spain until B.C. 141, when he was succeeded by Q. Pompeius. His unpatriotic conduct on this occasion, in handing over the army to his successor in as inefficient a state as possible, is a blot on an otherwise unblemished career (Val. Max. IX, 3, § 7). Ten years later (B.C. 131) he was censor along with this hated rival (see § 2 *i.*). Metellus was a statesman and orator as well as a general. He defended L. Cotta against Africanus, and a speech of his against Ti. Gracchus was worked into his Annals by C. Fannius (Brut. § 81). He died in B.C. 115, and was carried to the grave by four sons, of whom two were ex-consuls, one a consul, and the fourth a candidate, afterwards successful, for the consulship. Velleius

Paterculus devotes a whole chapter (I, 11) to the glorification of Metellus. On the enmity of Metellus to Scipio see De Rep. I, § 31.

g. **utrumque egit**, &c., 'in both he acted with dignity, with authority, and without any bitter feeling of offence.' 'With authority' may be understood to mean in a way that others would do well to imitate. There is a rule in Latin grammar that an ablative unsupported by an adjective must not be used adverbially: but we seem here to have an instance to the contrary. Cp. Brut. § 46—'nam antea neminem solitum via nec arte, sed adcurate tamen et de scripto plerosque dicere.'

§ 78. *a*. **discidia**. § 35 *a*.

b. **exstinctae . . . oppressae**, 'died out . . . put out.' For the metaphor from flame cp. Cat. Mai. § 71.

c. **is, qui patiatur**. The feeling of blame for a man who suffers injury is far from extinct yet. It is sanctioned in the Ethics of Aristotle (E. N. IV, 5, § 6)—*τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες*. But Socrates not only taught, but, if accounts be true, acted on the principle of absolute non-resistance to evil.

d. **Omnino**. 'Assuredly.' Like 'profecto.'

e. **incipiant**. Sc. 'homines.'

f. **neve**. This, and not 'neque,' is the proper particle after 'ne.' Cp. § 40 *a*.

§ 79. *a*. **omni ex parte**, &c., 'in every way perfect in its kind.' Cp. Hor. Carm. II, 16, 25—

'nihil est ab omni
parte beatum.'

b. **neque . . . et**. Like the Greek *οὔτε . . . τε*. Cp. Brut. § 97—'Sex. Pompeii sunt scripta nec nimis extenuata . . . et plena prudentiae,' and Cat. Mai. § 51.

§ 80. *a*. **carent**, 'they forego.'

b. **ipsi sibi exemplo sunt**. One's feeling towards oneself transferred to another would be the most perfect type of friendship. See E. N. IX, 4, § 1—*τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι*: cp. 8, § 2.

c. **a se ipse**, 'a se ipso' would mean from himself, as opposed to someone else, which is not the meaning required here.

d. **est enim is**, &c. 'For the true friend is one who is, as it were, a second self.'

e. **alter idem**. E. N. IX, 4, § 5—*ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός*; 9, § 10—*ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν*.

§ 81. *a*. **Quod si hoc adparet**, &c. We had this 'locus' before in § 27—'Quod quidem quale sit,' &c.

b. **in bestiis, volucribus.** With Baiter's punctuation we must translate thus, 'in the lower animals, whether birds, fishes or beasts, whether tame or wild.' This involves taking 'bestia' as a genus, including bird and fish. It is possible however that we have two threefold divisions of the lower animals (1) from the point of view of the element in which they live, into beasts, birds and fishes, (2) from the point of view of their relation to man, into those that are tame but live in the fields, like cows and sheep, those that live in the house, and those that are wild.

c. **id enim pariter,** &c., 'for this is congenital to every living creature.' This is the first principle from which Cato Uticensis is made to start in his exposition of the Stoic philosophy (De Fin. III, § 16)—'"Placet his,"' inquit, '"quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc enim est ordiendum—ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre."'

d. **animante.** § 49 *a.*

e. **requirant.** This word implies a feeling of want, like 'desiderio' below, which we may render 'yearning.' Cp. Shelley's 'love's sweet want.'

f. **anquirit,** 'looks round for.' From 'an' = ambi- and 'quaero.'

g. **unum ex duobus.** μία ψυχή is quoted by Aristotle (E. N. IX, 8, § 2) as one of the stock sayings on the subject of friendship. See § 92.

a. **similem sui.** The genitive after 'similis' is said to be specially used of a moral resemblance. **§ 82.**

b. **stabilitas amicitiae.** Cp. §§ 62, 64 *ad fin.*

c. **confirmari,** 'established.'

d. **quibus ceteri serviunt.** For the treatment of this topic see Paradox. 5—ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος.

e. **cum homines,** &c. Cp. § 61—'cum emendati mores,' &c.

f. **neque quicquam umquam,** &c. Cp. §§ 40, 44 and contrast § 61—'minus iustae amicorum voluntates.'

g. **inter se.** Less heavy than 'alter alterum.' The reversion of the verbs to the plural is a natural consequence of the change of pronoun.

a. **in iis perniciosus est error,** 'they are in deadly error.' **§ 83.**

b. **libidinum.** § 35 *b.*

c. **adiutrix.** Since most abstract terms are feminine, and there is a constant tendency to personify abstractions, these feminine forms of 'movable substantives' are of common occurrence in the philosophical writings of Cicero. Cp. § 37 *ad fin.*—'conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio'; § 89 *ad fin.*—'adsentatio, vitiorum adiutrix.'

d. **si quos inter.** The postposition is due to the fact that the 'si' and the 'quos' cohere so closely that 'inter' must either precede or

follow them: the latter was felt to be the lesser evil. Cp. De Inv. II, § 19—'si quod ad facinus,' II, § 32—'si quo in pari ante peccato .... si quam in similem ante suspitionem.'

e. **futura est.** An elementary instance of the tendency to analysis spoken of in § 30 *e.*

f. **ad,** 'towards the attainment of.'

§ 84. *a.* **honestas.** τὸ καλόν.

b. **gloria.** τιμή, the end of the πολιτικὸς βίος. E. N. I, 5, § 4.

c. **tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas.** The view of the Epicureans, as expounded in the first book of the De Finibus. See especially § 37.

d. **et cum haec adsint,** &c. They are therefore the causes of the happy life. For a cause may be defined as 'that without which something would not be, and, given which, something is.'

e. **Quod.** 'Quod' seems to refer to 'societas': but the language is vague and rhetorical.

f. **opera danda.** 'Operam dare' is 'to pay attention to.' It also means 'to pay attentions to.' See Ter. Heaut. 910—

> 'Me. quid? istuc times quod ille operam amico dat suo?
> Ch. immo quod amicae.'

§ 85. *a.* **dicendum est enim saepius.** It has not been said before in this epigrammatic way, but the substance of the remark was given in § 60 and § 78.

b. **praeposteris . . . utimur consiliis,** 'we put the cart before the horse.'

c. **acta agimus,** 'shut the stable-door after the steed is stolen.' The proverbial expression 'acta agere' has reference to doing a thing too late. It is a metaphor borrowed from the law-courts, in which it was forbidden to plead a cause that had been duly pleaded already ('ne quis rem actam apud iudices repetat,' Donatus). Cp. Plaut. Pseud. I, 3, 27—

> 'mortua re, verba nunc facis.
> Stultus es, rem actam agis.'

Cist. IV, 2, 36—

> 'Actam rem ago. quod periit, periit.'

Terence, Phormio 419—

> '"actum,"' aiunt, '"ne agas."'

Terence also supplies us with a good commentary on the force of the expression in Adelphi 232—

> 'nunc si hoc omitto ac tum agam ubi illinc rediero,
> nil est; refrixerit res.'

d. **ultro et citro,** 'mutually,' 'reciprocally.' Cp. De Off. I, § 56—'magna etiam illa communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultro et

citro datis acceptis.' We have the literal meaning 'to and fro' in Pro Rosc. Am. § 60—'Postea homines cursare ultro et citro non destiterunt.'

a. **rei . . . incuria,** 'carelessness in a thing.' § 86.

b. **omnes uno ore.** A common phrase. Cp. Ter. And. 96—

'tum uno ore omnes omnia
bona dicere et laudare fortunas meas.'

c. **et venditatio quaedam,** 'and pronounced a species of puffing and self-advertisement.'

d. **tenuis.** 'Tenuis' is regularly used in the sense of 'poor' and 'tenuitas' in that of 'poverty.' In De Inv. I, § 35 'tenuis' is employed by Cicero as the contrary of 'pecuniosus,' whereas, when he comes to the same topic again (II, § 30), he substitutes 'pauper.' For 'tenuitas' cp. De Div. I, § 92, where we are told that the sons of leading men at Rome were sent to Etruria to learn augury, 'ne ars tanta propter tenuitatem hominum a religionis auctoritate abduceretur ad mercedem atque quaestum.'

e. **victus cultusque.** 'Cultus' is wider than 'vic us.' The former refers specially to food, the latter to dress and outward surroundings generally. The whole phrase 'tenuis victus cultusque' may be roughly rendered by our 'plain living.'

f. **inflammantur,** 'are fired.'

g. **admirabilia** = *θαυμαστά*.

h. **ii, qui ad rem publicam,** &c. 'Ii, qui ad rem publicam,' &c. = those who adopt the *βίος πολιτικός*; 'ii, qui rerum cognitione,' &c. = those who adopt the *βίος θεωρητικός*; 'ii, qui suum negotium,' &c. = *ἰδιῶται*, as opposed to *πολιτικοί*; 'ii, qui se totos,' &c. = those who adopt the *βίος ἀπολαυστικός*. Cp. Arist. E. N. I, 5.

i. **postremo.** Except for the sake of having a hit at pleasure, the last member of the division ought to be 'ii, qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi,' as being the residual head under which any kind of life, which has not had a special name assigned to it, may be thrown. For either you go in for politics or not; if you do not go in for politics, either you devote yourself to learning or not; if you do not devote yourself to learning, either you become a voluptuary or not; if you do not become a voluptuary, you can only be described as minding your own business.

j. **liberaliter,** 'like gentlemen.'

a. **asperitate . . . naturae,** 'of so fierce and brutal a nature.' § 87.
'Asper' is a word used of dangerous animals, such as a lion (Hor. Carm. III, 2, 10) or a tiger (Ib. I, 23, 9).

b. **congressus ut.** The hyperbaton throws emphasis on the word 'society.'

c. **Timonem.** Timon of Athens, or Timon the misanthrope (Diog. Laert. IX, § 112), lived during the time of the Peloponnesian war, Plut.

Anton. 70). He belonged to the deme of Colyttus, and his father's name was Echecratides (Lucian, Timon, 7). He conceived a hatred for mankind and shunned society, but made an exception in favour of Alcibiades, because he foresaw that his career was charged with mischief to the Athenians. He is referred to by Aristophanes in the Lysistrata (808–15), where he is graphically described as Ἐρινύος ἀπορρώξ: but from the way in which he is spoken of we may infer that he had been dead some time (B.C. 411). In the Birds also (B.C. 414) his name has already passed into a proverb. Lucian has a dialogue on him, in which his bitterness is ascribed to the ingratitude of the friends on whom he had lavished his wealth. Shakespeare's play is drawn, directly or indirectly, partly from that and partly from the short description given of Timon in Plutarch's life of Antonius (ch. 70). The following is the epitaph which he is said to have composed for himself—

ἐνθάδ' ἀπορρήξας ψυχὴν βαρυδαίμονα κεῖμαι·
τοὔνομα δ' οὐ πεύσεσθε, κακοὶ δὲ κακῶς ἀπόλοισθε.

Here lie I, born to woe,
  And fraught with hate and gall.
My name ye shall not know.
  A curse upon you all!

d. **nescio quem,** 'one Timon.'

e. **anquirat.** § 81 *f.*

f. **apud quem, &c.** Timon had one admirer and imitator, named Apemantus (the 'churlish philosopher' of Shakespeare), who was sometimes admitted to his society on account of his similarity of character. One day the pair were celebrating the Feast of Pitchers together. Apemantus remarked how pleasant their banquet was. 'Yes,' replied Timon, 'if you were not here.'

g. **evomat.** For 'evomere' of venting spleen cp. Ter. Hec. 515—

'porto hoc iurgium
ad uxorem, quoius haec fiunt consilio omnia,
atque in eam hoc omne quod mihi aegre est evomam.'

h. **ferreus . . . ferre . . . auferret.** Cicero is here indulging in a pun. We need not follow him with 'Who so bearish as to bear?'

§ 88. *a.* **Tarentino Archyta.** Archytas of Tarentum was one of the most distinguished philosophers of the Pythagorean school, and a deep student of mathematics and mechanics. He was also invincible as a general, and held the supreme command over his countrymen seven times, though the law only allowed of its being held once (Diog. Laert. VIII, §§ 79, 82). In geometry he was the first to discover how to double the cube (Ibid. § 83). In proof of his mechanical ingenuity it is recorded that he invented a wooden dove which could fly (Aul. Gell. X,

12, §§ 9, 10). He displayed his philosophy also by inventing a children's rattle (πλαταγή, Arist. Pol. VIII, 6, § 2), to prevent their breaking things in the house, as he recognised their inability to keep quiet. Archytas is supposed to have been born about B.C. 400. His father's name is variously given as Mnesagoras or Hestiaeus (D. L. VIII, § 79). He was a friend and correspondent of Plato's. The ninth of Plato's letters is addressed to him, and contains a very striking passage. Diogenes Laertius has also preserved two trivial letters, which were interchanged between the philosophers. Cicero records (Cat. Mai. § 41) that Plato was at Tarentum with Archytas in the consulship of L. Camillus and Ap. Claudius (B. C. 349). It was by an embassy from Archytas and his fellow-Pythagoreans that Plato was rescued when he was in danger of his life on his third visit to Syracuse, owing to the jealousy and suspicion of the tyrant Dionysius (Plut. Dion. 20; cp. D. L. VIII, § 79). Aristoxenus the musician wrote a life of Archytas (Athen. XII, 545 *a*), and Aristotle composed three books on his philosophy (D. L. V, § 25). We know from Horace (Carm. I, 28), that he was drowned in the Adriatic.

b. **ab aliis senibus.** That Laelius heard the saying at third hand from Archytas is of course only a flight of historical imagination on the part of Cicero, like that by which Cato Maior in the De Senectute (§ 41) is connected by a chain of tradition with the same Archytas and with Plato. But the thing is just possible as a matter of chronology. For Laelius was born about B. C. 186. Let us suppose that as a boy of ten he heard the saying from an old man of eighty, who heard it seventy years before from another old man of eighty. This second old man would be ten years old in B. C. 336, when Archytas, who was born about B. C. 400, may easily have been alive. We have Cicero's word for it (Cat. Mai. § 41) that he was alive in B. C. 349.

c. **naturamque mundi,** &c. The beauty of the universe was one of the Stoic arguments for the existence of a divine mind. See De N. D. II, § 17—'tantum ergo ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum caelestium,' &c.; De Div. II, § 148—'et esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri'; cp. De Orat. III, § 179.

d. **si aliquem.** § 59 *f.*

e. **dulcissimum.** For the superlative cp. § 29 *f.*

f. **quae ab ea monemur.** The passive form of the construction 'admoneo te hoc.'

g. **usus,** 'intercourse.'

h. **una illa subeunda est offensio,** 'the following cause of offence in particular must be encountered.' That it is not the *only* one, which

has to be endured, is shown by 'tum ferre' above. 'Subeunda' is Facciolati's conjecture for the unsatisfactory reading of the MSS. 'sublevanda.'

§ **89.** *a.* **in Andria.** Line 68.

b. **familiaris meus.** P. Terentius Afer, commonly known as Terence. He was on such intimate terms with both Laelius and Scipio, that they were credited with having had a hand in the composition of his plays. See the life of Terence ascribed to Suetonius (ch. 2)—'Non obscura fama est, adiutum Terentium in scriptis a Laelio et Scipione, quibuscum familiariter vixit.' Cicero himself writing to Atticus (VII, 3, § 10) says—'Terentium, cuius fabellae propter elegantiam sermonis putabantur a C. Laelio scribi.' In the life of Terence we have the following words quoted from the speech of Q. Memmius 'pro se'—'P. Africanus, qui a Terentio personam mutuatus, quae domi luserat ipse, nomine illius in scenam detulit.' This would make Scipio stand to Terence in the supposed relation of Bacon to Shakespeare. But the following anecdote, quoted from Nepos, as being ascertained by him on good authority, would transfer the chief responsibility to Laelius. That nobleman was spending the 1st of March at his villa at Puteoli. This day, it will be remembered, was that Saturnalia of womankind on which Horace as a bachelor hardly knew what to do with himself (Carm. III, 8). So when Laelius' wife reminded him that he was to dine earlier than usual that day, he recognised her authority, but at the same time humbly begged that he might not be interrupted. When at last he did make his appearance in the dining-room, he said that he had seldom succeeded better in writing. After this there was nothing to do but to ask him to quote, and he proceeded to deliver himself of the passage in the Heautontimorumenus (723, &c.) beginning—

'Satis pol proterve me Syri promissa huc induxerunt,'

of which it may be remarked in passing that it is by no means in Terence's happiest vein. These reports of help from noble persons were current in Terence's own time, being perhaps disseminated by his enemy Luscius Lanuvinus. Terence himself was far too good a courtier to contradict them. See his words in the prologue to the Adelphi (15–21).

c. **Obsequium amicos**, &c. 'Compliance produces friends, sincerity dislike.'

d. **fraudem.** 'Fraus' sometimes means 'harm,' 'mischief,' or some unpleasant consequence of action. Cp. Pro Rosc. Am. § 58 *ad fin.*—'Haec te opinio falsa in istam fraudem impulit'; Liv. XXIV, 10, § 5.

e. **habenda ratio.** 'Habere rationem' = ἔχειν λόγον, 'to pay regard.'

f. **libenter utimur.** From the point of view of Laelius because Terence was a friend; from the point of view of Cicero because of the

purity of Terence's style. Cp. De Rep. II, § 3, '*originem*'; 'libenter enim etiam verbo utor Catonis.'

g. **non modo amico,** &c. 'Non modo' before 'ne . . . quidem' stands for 'non modo non' when the predicate is common to the two clauses and not expressed until the last. Cp. Cat. Mai. § 34 *ad fin.*—'itaque non modo quod non possumus, sed ne quantum possumus quidem cogimur.'

a. **scitum,** 'a shrewd saying.' Cp. Div. II, § 51 *ad fin.*—'Vetus autem illud Catonis admodum scitum est, qui mirari se aiebat, quod non rideret haruspex, haruspicem cum vidisset.' **§ 90.**

b. **molestiam . . . capiunt,** 'feels the annoyance.'

c. **quod contra oportebat,** &c. 'Whereas on the contrary they ought', &c. Cp. Pro Quinct. § 87; Cat. Mai. § 84—'cuius a me corpus est crematum—quod contra decuit ab illo meum.' At first sight two explanations suggest themselves of this difficult piece of syntax—(1) that contra is a preposition, or rather postposition, of which instances might be quoted from Cicero; (2) that 'esse' has to be supplied. Possibly neither of these explanations would be right, and we have here an instance of what may be called grammatical atrophy, that is to say, a now unmeaning relic of a once significant construction. Some light may perhaps be thrown on the original nature of the construction by a comparison with the epitaph—

'quod decuit natam patri praestare sepulto,
'hoc contra natae praestitit ipse pater.'

Munro (on Lucr. I, 82) regards the 'quod' as the old ablative.

a. **habendum est nullam.** Though the neuter singular of the gerundive may not govern an accusative, it may take the construction of accusative with infinitive. **§ 91.**

b. **quamvis . . . multis nominibus,** 'with as many names as you please'—an apology for the tautology of 'adulationem, blanditiam, adsentationem.'

c. **ad voluntatem.** Cp. Caes. B. G. I, 36—'item populum Romanum victis non ad alterius praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperare consuesse.'

a. **Cum . . . tum.** 'Not only . . . but also.' See § 23 *a.* **§ 92.**

b. **adulterat,** 'vitiates.'

c. **unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus.** This is the perfect work of love. Pythagoras has the credit of having first formulated the sentiment. Cp. De Off. I, § 56—'in quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eaedem voluntates, in iis fit ut aeque quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso, efficiturque id, quod Pythagoras volt in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus.'

d. **ne in uno quidem quoque.** Cp. § 18 *a.*

§ **93.** *a.* **tam flexibile, tam devium,** 'so full of turns and winds.' The French 'plein d'égarements' would be a better reflexion of 'devium.' Cp. § 65—'multiplex ingenium et tortuosum.'

b. **convertitur.** Middle voice.

c. **Negat quis,** &c. 'Nego,' I say no; 'aio,' I say yes. The lines are Eunuchus, 252, 3. We may compare with them Juvenal III, 100–4; Mart. XII, 40.

d. **quod amici genus,** &c., 'and to have such a friend by one at all betrays a want of principle.' For 'adhibere' in its literal sense of 'having by,' 'keeping,' cp. Ter. Phormio, 880—

'aït uterque tibi potestatem eius adhibendae dari.'

§ **94.** *a.* **Gnathonum similes,** &c. The plural is irrational. For the genitive cp. 82 *a.* The 'sint' belongs to 'similes.' A comma which is not in Baiter's text has been inserted after 'sint.'

b. **cum ad vanitatem,** &c., 'when their mendacity is supported by their position.'

§ **95.** *a.* **blandus,** 'flattering,' corresponding to the abstract term 'blanditia.'

b. **omnia fucata et simulata,** 'all adulterations and shams.'

c. **popularem,** 'a demagogue.'

d. **adsentatorem.** Cp. Eur. Hec. 134—ἡδυλόγος, δημοχαριστής.

§ **96.** *a.* **C. Papirius.** Carbo. See § 39 *h.*

b. **nuper.** He was tribune in B.C. 131.

c. **influebat in,** 'steal into.' The phrase 'influere in' seems to be the origin of our word 'influence.'

d. **de tribunis pl. reficiendis,** i.e. allowing them to be re-elected.

e. **comitem,** 'follower.' Cp. § 37.

f. **est in manibus,** 'is in everybody's hands,' 'is read.' Cp. Cat. Mai. § 12—'Est in manibus laudatio, quam cum legimus, quem philosophum non contemnimus?' In § 38 of the same we have the phrase in a different sense, = 'on hand'—'Septimus mihi liber Originum est in manibus.'

g. **popularis,** 'intended to please the people.'

h. **Q. Maximo . . . L. Mancino consulibus.** B.C. 145, sixteen years before the time of speaking.

i. **C. Licinii Crassi.** Tribune in B.C. 145. Nothing is known of him except the fact recorded below.

j. **Cooptatio enim collegiorum,** &c. 'For the right to fill vacancies possessed by the colleges was being transferred to the patronage of the people.' 'Cooptatio' in its strict sense means the election of new members of a body from within the body itself: but it is used in De Rep. I, § 16 of the original appointment of the augurs by Romulus—

'ex singulis tribubus singulos cooptavit augures'; cp. De Div. II, § 23 (of Caesar's appointment of senators).

k. **is primus instituit,** &c. Plutarch attributes this innovation to C. Gracchus. But Cicero's statement is reinforced by the still higher authority of Varro (De R. R. I, ch. 2), who says—'C. Licinius tribunus plebis cum esset post reges exactos annis trecentis sexagintaque primus populum ad leges accipiundas in septem iugera forensia e comitiis eduxit.' Varro does not say that Licinius addressed the people in the Forum, but Cicero's statement is a natural sequel to his. The Comitium and the Forum proper were separated by the Rostra, so that it was only a matter of facing one way or the other. See Plut. C. Grac. ch. 5.

l. **versus.** Participle.

m. **vendibilem,** 'pleasing.' Cp. Brut. § 174—'non tam vendibilis orator,' ib. § 264—'nam populo non erat satis vendibilis.'

n. **religio deorum inmortalium** = the privileges of the College of Augurs.

o. **consul.** B.C. 140.

p. **re,** 'on its merits.' See Introd. § 17.

a. **rebus fictis et adumbratis,** 'for pretences and shows.' 'Adumbrare' here refers to scene-painting. Cp. Plato's *σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς* (Rep. 365 C) of the painted exterior of virtue. **§ 97.**

b. **loci plurimum,** 'most scope.' Sidgwick.

c. **quae tota veritate perpenditur,** 'which is esteemed altogether according to its truth.' Lewis and Short.

d. **ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas.** The fact that this was a common saying gives point to the 'double entendre' in Phil. II, § 111 —'tuum hominis simplicis pectus vidimus.'

e. **habeas,** 'you can have.' Potential.

a. **Omnino.** 'I grant you that.' Cp. § 69 *g.* **§ 98.**

b. **quamque amabilis sit.** § 28 *a.*

c. **opinione** = *δόξα* or *τὸ δοκεῖν.*

d. **esse quam videri.** Cp. Aeschylus, Sept. c. Theb. 592—

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει,

and the discussion on the sentiment in the Republic of Plato (362 A), in which Glaucon remarks that it would be far more true to say of the unjust man—*οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν.*

e. **adhibetur,** 'is brought to bear.'

f. **testimonium esse laudum suarum.** Honour is valuable to the wise as a testimony of merit: flattery is a spurious form of honour.

g. **milites gloriosi.** Like Pyrgopolinices in the Miles Gloriosus of Plautus and Thraso in the Eunuchus of Terence, who are flattered severally by the parasites Artotrogus and Gnatho.

h. **Magnas vero,** &c. Ter. Eun. 391.

i. **Satis erat.** § 15 *c.*

§ 99. *a.* **blanda ista vanitas,** 'those soft nothings.'

b. **excors.** Notice that the heart was often regarded as the seat of the intellect. T. D. I, § 18—'aliis cor ipsum animus videtur, ex quo excordes, vaecordes concordesque dicuntur et Nasica ille prudens bis consul Corculum et

egregie cordatus homo catus Aelius Sextus.'

The inclusion of 'concordes' does not to us seem appropriate, but 'concordia' probably suggested ὁμόνοια to Cicero.

c. **etiam adversando saepe adsentetur.** See the historical instance in Tac. Ann. I, 8, on which Tacitus remarks 'ea sola species adulandi supererat.'

d. **det manus,** 'surrenders,' a metaphor from giving the hands to be bound.

e. **is, qui inlusus sit,** 'his dupe.'

f. **plus vidisse,** 'to have been clearer-sighted.' Sidgwick.

g. **ut in Epiclero.** These words are omitted by Baiter without remark.

h. **Ut me hodie,** &c. The lines are from 'The Heiress' of Caecilius. Cp. Cat. Mai. § 36.

i. **comicos,** 'in the comedy.' Cp. Pro Rosc. Am. § 47—'comicum adulescentem.' 'Tragicus' is used in the same way in Horace, De Arte Poet. 95.

j. **Versaris atque,** &c., 'knocked me about and made game of me in the finest fashion.'

k. **inluseris.** Baiter has 'inlusseris,' which was no doubt the way in which Cicero wrote it. Quintilian, who could still see the autographs of Cicero and Vergil, tells us (I, 7, § 20) that they habitually doubled the *s* after a long vowel, as 'caussae, cassus, divissiones.'

§ 100. *a.* **stultissima persona,** &c. Cp. Cat. Mai. § 36—'Nam quos ait Caecilius "comicos stultos senes," hoc significat credulos, obliviosos dissolutos.'

b. **in hominem cadere.** Cp. § 48 *a.*

c. **concludamus.** Showing that the 'conclusio' or peroration is now coming.

d. **cum se extulit.** A metaphor from the rising of a star.

e. **sive . . . sive,** 'call it which you will.'

f. **nihil est aliud nisi.** A common way of expressing the coextension of subject and predicate in a definition. Cp. the definition of friendship in § 20.

g. **diligere quem ames.** Not a very good definition since it uses twice over the idea sought to be defined.

h. **ecflorescit ex amicitia.** Thus utility bears somewhat the same

relation to friendship as pleasure, according to Aristotle, does to virtuous action. E. N. X, 4, § 8—*οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.*

i. **minus.** See § 23 *k*.

a. **L. Paulum.** § 9 *f*.

b. **C. Gallum.** § 9 *g*. § 101.

c. **P. Nasicam.** It appears from Brutus, § 79, that this was P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, surnamed Corculum on account of his knowledge of civil law (T. D. I, § 18). He was the son of the man who was selected to receive the Idaean mother on her arrival at Ostia from Phrygia, and the father of Serapio, the murderer of Tiberius Gracchus. He was elected consul for the first time in B.C. 162 along with C. Figulus, but they were obliged to resign on account of a flaw in the auspices (N. D. II, § 10). His second consulship was in B.C. 155. He was censor in B.C. 159 along with M. Popilius Laenas. They saw a very fat man on a very lean horse, and asked him why he was so much better kept than his beast. 'Because' he replied, 'I look after myself, whereas that good-for-nothing Statius looks after the horse.' The wag was promptly degraded for this untimely facetiousness (Aul. Gell. IV, 20, § 11).

d. **Ti. Gracchum.** Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the father of Tiberius and Caius, and himself one of the most distinguished of Romans. Balbus in the De N. D. II, § 11, is made to call him 'vir sapientissimus atque haud sciam an omnium praestantissimus,' and Plutarch remarks that the claims to fame of his censorship, his two consulships (B.C. 177 and 163) and his two triumphs were eclipsed by the brilliancy of his virtue. Though an opponent of Africanus the elder, he defended him when unjustly attacked, and afterwards married his daughter Cornelia. This lady, who is known to fame as 'the mother of the Gracchi,' was considerably younger than her husband, and was early left a widow with twelve children, of whom only three survived. These were Tiberius and Caius, and a daughter Sempronia, who married Africanus the younger, and was credited by some people with having caused his death. There was extant in Cicero's time a speech in Greek, which the father Tiberius delivered to the Rhodians (Brut. § 79).

e. **L. Furium.** § 14 *b*.

f. **P. Rupilium.** § 69 *c*.

g. **Sp. Mummium.** § 69 *d*.

h. **Q. Tuberonis.** § 37 *b*.

i. **admodum adulescentis,** 'admodum' goes with 'adulescentis,' not with 'delector.'

j. **P. Rutilii.** P. Rutilius Rufus was known in antiquity as the author of a history of Rome in Greek (Livy XXXIX, 52; Athen. IV,

p. 168 *d*, VI p. 274 *c*), also of an autobiography, which did not detract from his credit (Tac. Agric. I), and of several speeches written in a severe and meagre style. He had much practice as an advocate, but was lacking in the grace and fire of the orator (Brut. § 110); he was better as a jurisconsult, a function which he contrived to combine with that of pleader (Brut. §§ 113, 114). Rutilius became consul in B.C. 105. Afterwards he served as legatus to Q. Mucius Scaevola (pontifex), when the latter was proconsul in Asia. In this capacity he incurred the enmity of the equestrian order, who then exercised the judicia, by defending the provincials against the exactions of the 'publicani.' After his return a charge of extortion ('de repetundis') was got up against him, his accuser being the epicure Apicius, the first of that name (Athen. IV, p. 168 *d*). This was so obviously a party move that the state was convulsed with excitement. But Rutilius wrapped himself in his virtue, and though he might have been defended by L. Crassus or M. Antonius, the most celebrated orators of the day, he preferred to defend himself with the cold logic of the Stoic philosophy, in which he was deeply versed, having been a disciple of Panaetius. The result was his banishment, of which Seneca (De Ben. VI, 37) says that there was no one who was not more ashamed of it than himself. On his arrival in Asia, to which he retired, all the states of that province sent deputations to meet him (Val. Max. II, 10, § 5). After Sulla's triumph he was recalled to his country, but he then refused to leave Smyrna, of which he had been made a citizen (Pro Balbo § 28; Sen. De Prov. 3). Ovid alludes to this incident in his epistles ex Ponto (I, 3, 63, 64)—

'Et grave magnanimi robur mirare Rutili,
Non usi reditus conditione dati.'

Cicero met him at Smyrna (Brut. § 85) when he visited Asia as a young man after the delivery of the speech Pro Roscio Amerino.

k. **A. Verginii.** Of this person nothing more is known than the fact here recorded. The mention is perhaps a compliment to some friend of Cicero's youth.

l. **ita ratio comparata est,** &c., 'our life and nature have been so ordained.'

m. *ex alia.* These words have been supplied by Orelli to complete the sense.

n. **optandum.** § 11 *d.*

o. **e carceribus . . . ad calcem.** A metaphor from the chariot-races. The 'carceres' were the barriers within which the horses were confined before starting; the 'calx' was the line marked with lime which served for the goal. Cp. Cat. Mai. § 83 *ad fin.*—'nec vero velim quasi decurso spatio ad carceres e calce revocari.'

§ 102. *a.* **caducaeque.** 'Caducus' is a verbal adjective of peculiar forma-

tion, lit. 'ready to fall.' The verbal force is apparent in Hor. Carm. II, 13, § 11—

'te triste lignum, te caducum
in domini caput immerentis.'

Cp. Verg. Aen. X, 622—'caduco . . . iuveni' = 'casuro iuveni.'

b. **anquirendi.** § 81 *f.*

c. **quae exstincta non est.** For the sentiment cp. Cat. Mai. § 69—'tantum remanet, quod virtute et recte factis consecutus sis.'

d. **illam semper in manibus habui,** 'was always in contact with it.' Cp. § 96 *f.*

e. **imaginem,** 'thought,' 'idea.'

a. **quod quidem senserim,** 'so far, at least, as I was aware.' Sidgwick. **§ 103.**

b. **idem victus isque communis,** 'the same food and that taken in common,' i. e. the meals shared. The expression verges on a pleonasm. Cp. De Div. I, § 131—'quid est igitur cur, cum domus sit omnium una eaque communis . . . ?'

c. **militia.** Cp. § 15 *f.*

d. **peregrinationes rusticationesque.** Cp. what Cicero says of books in the Pro Archia § 16—'pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur.'

a. **coniunctissimi atque amantissimi.** For the collocation cp. § 2—'quocum coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat.' **§ 104.**

b. **sed nec illa exstincta sunt,** &c., 'but they are not exstinct, nay, they are rather fostered and fed by thought and memory on my part,' i. e. kept alive like a sacred fire. With the combination of particles 'nec . . . que' cp. 'neque . . . et,' § 79.

c. **brevia tolerabilia.** A reminiscence of Epicurus' dilemma against pain. Cp. De Fin. II, § 95—'nam ista vestra "si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis" dictata sunt.'

d. **Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem.** Cp. Cat. Mai. § 85—'Haec habui de senectute quae dicerem'; De Div. I, § 131, *ad fin.*—'"haec habui" inquit "de divinatione quae dicerem."' Instead of the relative and subjunctive we have sometimes the infinitive, as in De N. D. III, § 93—'haec fere dicere habui de natura deorum.' Here 'habeo dicere' = ἔχω λέγειν.

e. **ita virtutem locetis.** The exhortation is really to friendship, but in passing homage is paid to virtue.

f. **ea excepta.** Cp. § 20—'excepta sapientia.' Since ἠθικὴ ἀρετή is impossible without φρόνησις, the two things, 'virtus' and 'sapientia,' may be considered one.

FASTI LAELIANI.

B. C.
753. Founding of Rome.
600–500. Era of the Seven Sages.
534–510. Reign of L. Tarquinius Superbus.
502. Cos. Sp. Cassius Viscellinus I.
493. Cos. Sp. Cassius Viscellinus II.
491. Exile of Coriolanus.
486. Cos. Sp. Cassius Viscellinus III.
485. Execution of Cassius.
480. Battle of Salamis.
471. Themistocles ostracized.
466. Themistocles fled to Persia.
444. Empedocles flourished.
439. Sp. Maelius killed.
431–404. Peloponnesian War.
400. Archytas born.
349. Coss. { L. Furius Camillus. / Ap. Claudius Crassinus Regillensis.
Plato at Tarentum with Archytas.
290. Cos. M'. Curius Dentatus I.
282. Coss. { C. Fabricius Luscinus I. / Q. Aemilius Papus I.
281–275. Pyrrhus' invasion of Italy.
280. Cos. Ti. Coruncanius.
Victory of Pyrrhus over the Romans.
Fabricius sent to treat concerning the ransom of the prisoners.
278. Coss. { C. Fabricius Luscinus II. / Q. Aemilius Papus II.
Fabricius sent back to Pyrrhus the physician who offered to poison the king.

B. C.

275. Cos. M'. Curius Dentatus II.
Censors { C. Fabricus Luscinus. / Q. Aemilius Papus. }

274. Cos. M'. Curius Dentatus III.

270. Death of Epicurus.

239. Birth of Ennius.

219. Birth of Pacuvius.

218–201. Second Punic War.

186. Birth of Laelius.

185. Birth of Scipio.

182. Cos. L. Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus I.

177. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus I.

169. Death of Ennius.

168. L. Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus II.
Q. Fabius Maximus and P. Cornelius Scipio fought under their father at Pydna.

166. Cos. C. Sulpicius Gallus.
The Andria of Terence exhibited.

163. Cos. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus II.

162. Cos. P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum. Abdicated.

160. Death of L. Aemilius Paulus.
The Adelphi of Terence exhibited at the funeral games in honour of Aemilius Paulus.

155. Cos. P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum II.

150. Dramatic date of the Cato Maior.

149. Cos. M'. Manilius.
Death of Cato.

149–146. Third Punic War.

148. Victory of Metellus over Andriscus.

147. Cos. P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus I.

146. Destruction of Carthage by Scipio.
Formation of the Roman province of Achaia by L. Mummius.

145. Coss. { Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus. / L. Hostilius Mancinus. }
Laelius praetor.
Lex de sacerdotiis of C. Licinius Crassus defeated.

143. Cos. Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus.

143–133. Numantine War.

141. Cos. Q. Pompeius.
Laelius defeated for the consulship.

140. Cos. C. Laelius Sapiens.
Pacuvius (aged 80) and Accius (aged 30) exhibit plays together.

139. Gabinia lex.

B. C.

138. Coss. { P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapis.
{ D. Junius Brutus Gallaecus.

137. Cassia lex.

136. Cos. L. Furius Philus.

134. P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus minor II.

133. Destruction of Numantia by Scipio.
Tribuneship and death of Tiberius Gracchus.

132. Coss. { P. Popilius Laenas.
{ P. Rupilius.

131. Tribuneship of C. Papirius Carbo.
Censors { Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus.
{ Q. Pompeius.

130. Capture of Aristonicus.
Suicide of C. Blossius Cumanus.

129. Dramatic date of the De Republica.
Death of Scipio.
Dramatic date of the Laelius.

123. First tribuneship of C. Gracchus.

122. Second tribuneship of C. Gracchus.

121. Death of C. Gracchus.

120. Cos. C. Papirius Carbo.

119. Carbo accused by Crassus.

117. Cos. Q. Mucius Scaevola augur.

115. Death of Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus.

114. Cos. C. Porcius Cato.

109. Atticus born.

106. Cicero born.

105. Cos. P. Rutilius Rufus.

95. Cos. Q. Mucius Scaevola pontifex.

91. Cicero assumed the toga virilis.

90–88. Marsic or Social War.

88. Cos. Q. Pompeius Rufus.
Tribune. P. Sulpicius Rufus.
Supposed narration of the Laelius by Scaevola the augur.


82. Scaevola pontifex murdered.

78. Supposed narration of the De Republica by P. Rutilius Rufus.

63. Cos. M. Tullius Cicero.

44. Date of composition of the Laelius.

STEMMATA AEMILIORUM PAULORUM ET SCIPIONUM.



INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.

The references are made to the sections of the Text and, when mentioned, of the Introduction; a letter appended refers the reader to the Notes.

INDEX TO THE NOTES.

I.

English.

II.

Latin.

F 2

THE END.

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